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India and Canada have a common colonial past which deeply disturbed the close ecological 
relationship between Indigenous peoples and forests, with the colonial authorities restricting 
Indigenous peoples’ legitimate use of forest resources. Even during the post-colonial period, the 
forest policies in both these countries continued centralized conservation mechanisms that 
excluded Indigenous peoples. However, the past few decades have witnessed a shift towards 
decentralized governance in both jurisdictions. This recent trend manifests an attempt to devolve 
powers and authority to Indigenous institutions.  In India, the constitutional recognition of 
decentralized governance and the enactment of the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest 
Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 emphasized the significance of traditional tribal 
institutions in resource governance.  By contrast, in Canada, although the development of co-
management regimes is sometimes highlighted as showing the changing face of forest resource 
governance, the devolution of power to traditional Aboriginal institutions in decision-making over 
resources remains unsettled.   
 
The first chapter sets a background for the thesis by giving an introduction to the history of 
alienation faced by the indigenous peoples in India and Canada during colonial times. It further 
expands on the rationale for choosing both the jurisdiction as two comparable units. The second 
chapter provides a theoretical framework to the thesis by discussing various theories on 
decentralization. This part highlights the role of indigenous peoples and their institutions in forest 
resource governance. The third chapter examines the efforts towards decentralization in India 
through the Constitutional recognition and enactment of the FRA. Here it is argued that a radical 
shift in the tribal self-governance in India has achieved decentralization of forest resource 
governance. This argument is developed through an analysis of the implementation of the FRA at 
Mendha Lekha in Maharashtra. Some of the important judicial decisions that legitimized the 
decision-making powers of the tribal institutions in the forest resource governance are also 
discussed at this juncture. The fourth chapter analyzes decentralized forest governance in Canada 
through the evolution of co-management. Through an illustration of Clayoquot Sound in British 
Columbia, it is argued that there is an ongoing absence of strong decentralized institutional 
arrangements for decision-making on forest resource governance in Canada. Some of the important 
iii 
judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada on duty to consult and accommodation are also 
discussed here to argue that an absence of a Constitutional recognition of these rights as compared 
to India has limited the scope of judicial interventions that legitimizes Aboriginal consent in the 
resource governance. The fifth chapter offers concluding remarks by comparing both the 
jurisdictions. Through a comparative analysis, this part argues that the FRA provides a stronger 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
India and Canada are colonial cousins, sharing not only the abuses of their colonial eras, but also 
the destruction of the economic and social structure of Indigenous communities at the hands of the 
colonial settlers.1 The culture of Indigenous peoples in both these jurisdictions has evolved in 
environments that were insulated from external influences during pre-colonial times. In India, the 
majority of the tribal population relied on the forests for their livelihood. Likewise, Canada’s 
Aboriginal peoples included communities that depended on the forests, amongst other resources. 
Indigenous communities in both these countries therefore maintained traditional practices to 
conserve their resources. Indeed, these resources needed to be managed efficiently, as they were 
critical for the survival of such communities, who consciously sustained a symbiosis between 
themselves and the forest.  Therefore, it could be said that Indigenous communities valued the 
continuity of their relationship with nature, rendering it crucial to conserve natural resources for 
the future. This created a sense of oneness between communities and their resources, whereby 
resource management was emphasized in their cultural practices. However, this close ecological 
relationship was profoundly disturbed during the colonial era in India and Canada, during which 
the State restricted the legitimate use of forest resources.  
To elaborate on the above, colonial powers imposed a system on forest communities, which was 
sharply at odds with their traditional lifestyle. Such a change adversely affected their land holdings 
and livelihood. The Western model of centralized conservation techniques, adopted under the 
colonial regimes in both India and Canada, was more exclusive than inclusive, thus leading to a 
separation of traditional communities from their natural resources and environment. Subsequently, 
post-colonial legislation followed the same exclusionary principles of resource management. 
Numerous statutes relating to forests and Indigenous communities in the post-colonial era played 
a leading role in weakening traditional institutions and thereby disturbing the relationship between 
Indigenous peoples and the forests.   
McGregor (2011) argues that the 
                                                 
1 See Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf, Tribes of India: The Struggle for Survival (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1982) at 79-82.; John Borrows, “Living Between Water and Rocks: First Nations, Environmental 
Planning and Democracy” (1997) 47 UTLJ  417 at 425-28. 
2 
acquisition of land was an important policy objective of the colonial governments. 
Aboriginal people, like forests, were regarded as impediments to the path of such 
progress and were therefore systematically moved “out of the way” through treaties, 
policies and legislation.2 
In Canada, through expropriation, colonial settlers established their claim over the land, which was 
already being managed and conserved by the Aboriginal peoples.3 Similarly, in India, “eminent 
domain”4 and terra nullius were the rationale adopted for the exclusion of the Indigenous 
population.5 These principles, in brief, propose that in the name of “public purpose”, the 
government or Crown has the authority to alienate any land owned by an Indigenous population, 
in the absence of any express claims. These were broad terms; enabling both colonial and post-
colonial governments to legitimize their arguments against Indigenous peoples. Moreover, in their 
application, these principles had an enormous impact on the populations concerned. The 
implementation of forestry science and Western knowledge systems also played a significant role 
in disturbing the connection between Indigenous communities and their natural resources. The 
State thus imposed a scientific approach to forestry through legislation regarding Indigenous 
populations and the forests, ultimately shaping the resource governance regimes in India and 
Canada.  
The impact of these colonial legal instruments persisted during the post-colonial phases in different 
ways. State agencies were mainly focused on generating revenue, and the inclusion of Indigenous 
people in resource governance was considered an impediment. However, a new trend towards 
democratic decentralization, which emphasizes the relevance of including Indigenous peoples, has 
gained momentum in both jurisdictions over the past few decades. This shift has added a new 
                                                 
2Deborah McGregor, “Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations and Sustainable Forest Management in Canada: The 
Influence of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples” (2011) 92:2 J Envtl Mgmt 300 at 302. 
3Louis A Knafla & Haijo Westra, eds, Aboriginal Title and Indigenous Peoples: Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) at 15 [Knafla & Westra]. 
4 Eminent domain is understood as the power that the state may exercise over all land within its territory. There are 
two assumptions that underlie the doctrine: (i) In the absence of clear titles, land belongs to the state. (ii) This 
principle may be invoked for a public purpose. In most cases, governments have legitimized displacements in the 
courts with the support of this doctrine.  
5Sanghamitra Padhy, Greening Law: A Sociological Analysis of Environmental Human Rights in India (D Phil 
Thesis, University of South California, 2008) at 133 online: USC Libraries < http://digitallibrary.usc.edu>.; Terra 
nullius means land that is unoccupied or uninhabited. This is another doctrine which is used to dispossess the land 
occupied by Indigenous peoples. 
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dimension to deliberations over the inclusion of Indigenous peoples in resource governance, thus 
contributing to the transformation of the resource governance regimes in both countries.  
In India, the Constitutional recognition of decentralized governance and the enactment of the 
Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 20066 
(the FRA) asserted the role of traditional tribal institutions in resource governance. The FRA is 
ground-breaking legislation; even in its preamble, it admits to seeking to undo the “historic 
injustice” committed against tribal peoples in India.7 It also strengthens the conservation regime, 
while simultaneously securing the tenure and access rights of tribal peoples in this context. In fact, 
the FRA constitutes a shift away from a power-sharing model towards a rights-based model, which 
recognizes the decision-making autonomy of tribal institutions in resource governance. Moreover, 
it has facilitated a number of optimistic judicial interventions in this area.  Meanwhile, in Canada, 
the discourse on democratic decentralization in resource governance has been rejuvenated by the 
evolution of co-management models. The development of co-management regimes is highlighted 
as showing the changing face of forest resource governance, with an emphasis on power-sharing 
between government agencies in this area. However, the devolution of power to traditional 
Aboriginal institutions in decision-making over resource governance is still unsettled in Canada. 
Moreover, the jurisprudence evolving around the “duty to consult and accommodate” in Canada 
does not mandate “consent” from traditional Aboriginal institutions with regard to forest resource 
governance. Thus, the obligations imposed by the legal frameworks in both jurisdictions are 
evolving differently.   
The concept of decentralization is gaining momentum across the globe as a means to address the 
failures of colonial resource governance models. My discussion in this thesis will refer frequently 
to the idea of emerging legality on forest resource governance in India and Canada. Emerging 
legality here refers to institutionalized norms originating from inter alia the text of laws, policies, 
guidelines surrounding Indigenous institutions and their decision-making powers as well as 
traditional norms based on customs surrounding Indigenous institutions. These institutionalized 
and traditional norms have developed within a broader landscape of decentralization. Hence, the 
                                                 
6 The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (January 2, 
2007) Gazette of India Extraordinary II, s 1, No.2 [FRA]. 
7 Ibid. 
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term “emerging legality” indicates the legal developments resulting from a response to the call for 
greater community involvement in decision-making processes. This normative progression may 
appear to be following a similar trajectory in both the jurisdictions under study here.  However, it 
varies subtly, thereby failing to produce similar results in effect. The focus of this research is not 
dissecting the elements or forms of this “emerging legality” (regulations, institutions, principles, 
and so on) but the ways in which it has responded to the challenges and the degree to which it is 
successful. Therefore, the current thesis will examine the contrasting ways in which this emerging 
legality on forest governance in India and Canada responded to the demand for decentralization. 
 
Decentralization in this study refers to the devolution of power from the central government to the 
actors and institutions at the local level, more specifically traditional indigenous institutions in 
India and Canada. Devolution denotes to the process of transfer of power and authority to these 
local institutions.  Democratic decentralization on the other hand is a robust form of 
decentralization, the emphasis in which is on the authorities at the local level to whom such power 
is transferred. Here, the presence of a democratic and downwardly accountable self-governing 
traditional institution in the local level makes the decision-making process more 
participatory. Theoretical framework surrounding decentralization is discussed in detail in a later 
part of this thesis.  
 
Subsequently, the thesis will inquire into the status of decentralized institutional arrangements for 
decision-making on forest resource governance in Canada.  The main claim of the thesis is that 
this comparative study of the emerging legality in these two jurisdictions highlights that there is 
an ongoing absence of decentralization in Canada.  
 
1.1 Situating Indigeneity: Mainstream and Other  
Clarity over the debates surrounding indigeneity in India and Canada is of paramount importance 
in this present study.  The status of indigeneity has developed through the history of alienation 
faced by Indigenous peoples in both countries. Greater clarity on this issue will thus permit a 
deeper understanding of the impact of settler colonialism on the “original inhabitants” in both 
jurisdictions. This section will consequently examine discussions surrounding “indigeneity” in 
each case.  
5 
The question of indigeneity is a complex one in the Indian context. The geographic vastness of the 
country, together with waves of migration during both historic and prehistoric times, which 
brought diverse races into the region, and the assimilation of ethnic groups, makes any attempt to 
trace a dichotomous distinction between Indigenous peoples and settlers difficult.8 Moreover, the 
caste system, which was a historically significant feature of the dominant Aryan (Hindu) culture, 
assimilated other racial groups into the lower rungs of its hierarchical folds.  Irrespective of 
whether the Aryans were settlers or not, it is indisputable that the settlements made up of 
tribal/forest-dwelling Dravidian/Austro-Asiatic speakers date back thousands of years before the 
recorded presence of Aryan society.9 In addition, avoiding the politically charged issue over the 
actual original inhabitants—irrelevant to the present research—it may be stated that the dominant 
narratives from ancient times maintained a demarcation between forest-dwellers and “mainstream” 
society. As the caste system ossified into the fabric of mainstream Hindu society, forest-dwellers 
were considered to be lower than the very lowest untouchable caste or ati-sudra.10 Romila Thapar, 
a well-respected historian, speaks of “tribal societies” and forest-dwellers, who were dehumanized 
and demonized in the ancient Indian epics.11  
The general othering of forest dwellers, an apparent mistrust of their culture, and the calls to uproot 
and/or conquer them, is therefore a recurrent feature of texts dating back to both more ancient 
periods and later periods.12 However, despite the hostility of mainstream society, the forest-
dwelling populations remained to some extent insulated from outside influences, since migrants 
and settlers avoided densely forested areas for quite some time.13 Later, however, forays by the 
British into these resource-rich forests—which will be discussed in detail later on in this study—
exposed these populations to the colonial State and its discriminatory legislation.  With the advent 
                                                 
8 See generally Romila Thapar, The Penguin History of Early India: From the origins to AD 1300 (London: 
Penguin, 2002) [Thapar]. 
9 See generally Satish Kumar et al, “The earliest settlers’ antiquity and evolutionary history of Indian populations: 
evidence from M2 mtDNA lineage” (2008) 8:1 BMC Evolutionary Biology 230. See also Virginius Xaxa, “Tribes 
as Indigenous People of India” (1999) 34:51 Economic & Political Weekly 3589 at 3590 [Xaxa]. 
10 C R Bijoy, Shankar Gopalakrishnan & Shomona Khanna, "India and the rights of indigenous peoples" (2010) at 
16, online: Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact Foundation (AIPP) <aippnet.org/india-and-the-rights-of-indigenous-
peoples-2> [Bijoy et al]. 
11 Thapar, supra note 8 at 56. See also, CR Bijoy, “Adivasis of India : A history of discrimination, conflict and 
resistance” in Aditi Chanchani et al, eds, This is our Homeland - A Collection of essays on the betrayal of adivasi 
rights in India (Bangalore: Equations, 2007) at 56  [Bijoy, “Adivasis of India” in Chanchani et al]. 
12 Thapar, supra note 8 at 57. 
13 Ibid at 45. 
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of the British in India’s forest regions, the instruments of the newly consolidated, feudal zamindari 
system began demanding revenue from forest-dwelling tribes, with these demands followed by 
other forms of opportunism such as the activities of money-lenders.14 There were numerous tribal 
uprisings and rebellions against the British policy of dispossession and subjugation, which the state 
brutally suppressed in most cases.15 The colonial and post-independence periods, then, ensured a 
seamless policy of state violence, targeting the livelihood of forest-dwelling communities.16 As a 
result, throughout history and into modern times, there has been a recurrent pattern of “othering” 
and exploitation of forest-dwelling tribal communities by mainstream society and the state. Thus, 
the question of indigeneity in the Indian context needs to be understood not from the standpoint of 
time or origin, but from the point of view of rights and the treatment meted out to these 
populations.17  
Although the question of the origins of Canada’s Indigenous peoples is less complicated than it is 
in India, it has had its share of associated controversy. Western science previously retained the 
theory that Canada’s Indigenous peoples are themselves migrants from Asia, who crossed over the 
Bering Strait land bridge.18 More recent studies have challenged this construction of history.19 
Nevertheless, as far as the present research is concerned, a broad division into post-contact settlers 
and Indigenous peoples will suffice. The boreal forest and its resources were a major target for 
European settlers, and the assistance of Indigenous peoples was sought when required, with 
Indigenous peoples then being subjugated or destroyed once they had served these purposes.20  
 
1.2 India and Canada as Comparable Units  
Unlike Canada and the US, India is a country of old immigrants. The Supreme Court of India in 
Kailas v State of Maharashtra, while dealing with a criminal case where the modesty of a tribal 
                                                 
14 See generally  Bijoy, “Adivasis of India” in Chanchani et al, supra note 11 at 16. 
15 See ibid at 54-55. 
16 Bijoy et al, supra note 10 at 18. 
17 See generally Xaxa, supra note 9. 
18 Some have argued that, this theory was advanced to alleviate the guilt for the treatment meted out to the 
indigenous population by the settlers. See Vine Deloria Jr, Red Earth, White Lies: Native Americans and the Myth of 
Scientific Fact (Goldon: Fulcrum Publishing, 1997). 
19 See generally Mikkel W Pedersen et al, “Postglacial Viability and Colonization in North America’s Ice-free 
corridor” (2016) 537 Nature 45. 
20  See generally Sarah Carter, Aboriginal People and Colonizers of Western Canada to 1900 (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1999). 
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woman had been violated, explained this point:  
While North America (USA and Canada) is a country of new immigrants, who came 
mainly from Europe over the last four or five centuries, India is a country of old 
immigrants in which people have been coming in over the last ten thousand years or 
so. Probably about 92% of people living in India today are descendants of immigrants, 
who came mainly from the North-West and to a lesser extent, from the North-East.21 
 
However, one key feature that justifies a comparative study between India and Canada is a shared 
colonial past, which destroyed the traditional governance structures of Indigenous peoples. The 
colonial State completely ignored Indigenous resource governance practices and sustainable 
management techniques. Instead, the colonial State initiated a Western concept of state legality in 
the process of forest governance. Resource management in both jurisdictions takes place through 
multi-level governance structures, due to the countries’ size and diversity.22 The corresponding 
institutions derive their power from exclusionary legislation, dating back to their colonial Eras. 
Furthermore, the phenomenon of globalization has played a significant role in changing the 
“developmental perspectives” of government agencies.23 This shift has further resulted in the 
significant eviction and displacement of Indigenous peoples from their environment.  
In a 2012 article, Pooja Parmar, while discussing law and indigeneity in India, compares India’s 
legal system with Canada’s and argues that “even as constitutional recognition and remedies differ, 
political and legal decisions in both countries have often deployed similar rationales towards 
similar outcomes”.24 The present study therefore relies on similarities between the legal 
approaches adopted in these countries, including the Westminster style of parliamentary 
democracy and a shared Common Law legal system. The current research will be developed on 
the basis of these similarities and will adopt a functional approach to comparative law, as a means 
of explaining the necessity for a revised view of the Canadian framework.  
                                                 
21 Kailas v State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 793, 2011 AIR SC 598, 2011 (1) SCALE 40, (2011) 1 SCR 94  
 (Supreme Court of India) [Kailas cited to SCC]. 
22 C Duffield et al, “Local Knowledge in the Assessment of Resource Sustainability: Case Studies in Himachal 
Pradesh, India and British Columbia, Canada” (1998) 18 Mountain Research & Development 35 at 36 [C Duffield et 
al]. 
23See generally Alochana Sahoo, “Traditionalism and Globalization : A Discourse on Tribal Transformation” (2014) 
1959 Odisha Rev 92. 
24 Pooja Paramar, “Undoing Historical Wrongs: Law and Indigeneity in India” (2012) 49 Osgoode Hall LJ 491 at 
493 [Paramar]. 
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Functional methodology has different purposes like presumptive function, systematizing 
function, epistemological function, and so on. However, the comparative function of 
functionalism is the most vital one.  Ralf Michaels has clearly encapsulated the concept of 
the functionalist comparative law as follows: 
 
First, functionalist comparative law is factual, it focuses not on rules but on their 
effects, not on doctrinal structures and arguments, but on events. As a consequence, its 
objects are often judicial decisions as responses to real life situations, and legal systems 
are compared by considering their various judicial responses to similar situations. 
Second, functionalist comparative law combines its factual approach with the theory 
that its objects must be understood in the light of their functional relation to society…… 
Institutions, both legal and non-legal, even doctrinally different ones, are comparable 
if they are functionally equivalent, if they fulfil similar functions in different legal 
system. … functionality can serve as an evaluative criterion.25  
 
Although he discusses seven different concepts of functionalism like finalism, adaptionism, 
classical functionalism, instrumentalism, refined functionalism, epistemological functionalism and 
equivalence functionalism, Michaels indicates that equivalence functionalism is the most effective 
concept.26 Equivalence functionalism questions the prevalent understanding that emphasizes on an 
ideal type of solution for different problems.27 It presumes that “similar problems may lead to 
different solutions; the solutions are similar only in their relation to the specific function under 
which they are regarded”.28 Hence, equivalence functionalism offers a platform for discussing the 
scope of a legal change through a comparative analysis and thereby ensures a better solution to 
various challenges within a specific legal regime. It approaches law as a tool for addressing social 
changes that can find different solutions for similar problems.  
India and Canada have a history of oppression that separated Indigenous peoples from forest 
governance, and there are certain similarities in the ways in which colonial legislation in these two 
jurisdictions has played an important role in the process. However, both these countries are 
evolving, with two models of decentralization put forward as a solution. The assumption of this 
thesis is that the co-management regime in Canada and the FRA in India have functional 
similarities in their approach towards decentralization in forest governance. Hence through the 
                                                 
25 Ralf Michaels, “The Functional Method of Comparative Law” in Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann, 
eds, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 339, 342 [Michaels]. 
26 Ibid at 344, 345. 
27 Ibid at 356, 357. 
28 Ibid at 358 
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functional method based on equivalence functionalism, this thesis investigates how the functional 
linkages (emerging legalities in this context) in the jurisdictions being reviewed respond 
differently to these commonalities.  
This study also examines the impact of state legalities on the self-rule of Indigenous peoples in 
forest areas. Consequently, a “micro comparison” is proposed, which compares only specific areas 
of law. Of course, a clear line of demarcation between micro- and macro-comparisons will not be 
constructive, since a micro-comparison is incomplete without an element of macro-comparison.29 
As discussed previously, both jurisdictions examined here are common law countries, with a 
similar colonial past. Keeping these macro-factors in mind, this study will explore the extent of 
decentralization in terms of forest governance in each case.  
There are numerous other similarities between India and Canada as two comparable units. 
Geoffrey Samuel, while discussing the dichotomy of similarities and differences in his work on 
comparative law methodology, argues that “similarities and differences depend, at least to an 
extent on the level at which the comparatist is operating.”30 India has a quasi-federal system, with 
a hybrid form of federal and unitary government. To be more precise, it has a federal structure, 
with an inclination towards the centre.  If an attempt is made to trace the origins of it, interestingly, 
one ends up in Canada’s 1867 British North America Act (BNA Act). Arun Thiruvengadam, 
describes the influence of the Government of India Act of 1935 (Act of 1935) which reinforced the 
federalism that was being instilled into the Indian system by the British. The aspects of federalism 
in the Constitution of India, according to him, are more or less transposed forms of the same 
concepts from the Act of 1935.31 Canada’s BNA Act, which was the basis for India’s Act of 1935, 
in this way, can be considered as the basis for the existing federal system in India. The federal 
system in both countries, thus, has common origins. Similarly, the judicial branch in both countries 
is generally separated from the other two branches of the government with the Supreme Courts 
occupying the apex position.  
                                                 
29 Geoffrey Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014) at 
50.  
30 Ibid at 174. 





Article 246 of the Constitution of India defines the legislative powers of the Central and State 
governments in terms of three lists: the Union, State, and Concurrent lists.32 Forests fall under the 
Concurrent list, which gives the central government the authority to overrule any decision of state 
government that is inconsistent with central legislation. The central legislation on forest issues 
consists of the FRA, which overrides all state legislation in India. For instance, the FRA has made 
tribal consent a constitutional right in India. Here, the Gram Sabhas33have been granted some 
crucial powers to protect and preserve their community resources in India. Indeed, due to India’s 
quasi-federal structure, this study will examine legality as it emerges through the implementation 
of central legislation in this context, namely the FRA.  
A useful example to illustrate these developments in India is the effective implementation of the 
FRA in Mendha Lekha, a village in the State of Maharashtra. Mendha Lekha was one of the first 
villages in India to implement the FRA in its true spirit. Since the FRA is a relatively new piece of 
legislation, the jurisprudence surrounding tribal consent to resource governance is still evolving. 
Hence, this present research will focus on some of the critical decisions of the Supreme Court of 
India and various state High Courts in light of the FRA, emphasizing the role of Gram Sabhas and 
their consent in resource governance questions.  
Conversely, in Canada, constitutional powers are distributed between the federal and provincial 
governments. Although section 92(5) of the Constitution Act, 186734 affirms provincial legislative 
authority over forest land, there have been some persistent conflicts. In 1982, for instance, an 
amendment was made to the Constitution Act, 1867, in order to address federal-provincial resource 
conflicts and strengthen the role of the provinces in resource governance.35  Section 92A empowers 
the provincial governments to enact laws on matters relating to the exploration of non-renewable 
                                                 
32 See The Constitution of India, 1950 (India), art 246 [Constitution of India]. Article 246 of the Constitution of India 
deals with the distribution of powers between the central and state governments. This provision provides three lists:, 
Union list (power vests with the central government); State list (power vests with state governments); and Concurrent 
list (both the central government and state governments have concurrent powers of legislation under this list. However, 
the union Parliament has predominant legislative powers over the state legislatures). 
33 FRA, supra note 6, s 2(g). The term “Gram Sabha” means a tribal village assembly that consists of all adult members 
of a village.  In states having no panchayats, padas, tolas and other traditional village institutions and elected village 
committees, it has full and unrestricted participation of women.  
34 Originally enacted as The British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (UK). 
35 Robert D Cairns, “The Resource Amendment (Section 92A) and the Political Economy of Canadian Federalism” 
(1985) 23 Osgoode Hall LJ 253 at 253-254.  
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resources. It further provides an opportunity for provincial governments to develop, conserve and 
manage non-renewable and forest resources. Thus, in Canada, while the provincial legislatures 
have the authority to make laws relating to the governance of forest and other natural resources, in 
India, the upper hand over matters concerning the forests lies with the central government. 
However, co-management regimes in Canada are an essential facet of evolving forest governance, 
whereby the provincial governments and Aboriginal communities have shared roles. The emphasis 
on the part played by Aboriginal peoples in these co-management regimes is a significant facet of 
allegedly decentralized governance in Canada. However, unlike in India—despite experiencing 
similar political movements—the struggle to establish a robust legal regime for the autonomy of 
traditional Aboriginal institutions over forest resource governance is still incomplete in Canada. 
Although some studies highlight the co-management of forest resources as a means of resolving 
conflicts over resource use between Aboriginal communities and the government, it is still alleged 
to be an arrangement to promote the assimilation of the Aboriginal population.36 By way of 
illustration, the case of Clayoquot Sound in British Columbia is often cited by various authors as 
a significant example of a co-management regime in Canada.37  
Hence, the example of Clayoquot Sound will be used in this current thesis to discuss co-
management regimes, in order to try to understand the advancement of a democratic 
decentralization process in Canada and the limits thereon. 
The cases of Mendha Lekha and Clayoquot Sound are significant examples of a decentralization 
process, where the role of Indigenous peoples has converged with forest governance in India and 
Canada.  These instances give a clear indication of how emerging legalities concerning the 
involvement of Indigenous communities in forest resource governance in India and Canada reflects 
different responses. However, these examples also illustrate a common factor of mobilization on 
the part of the people against the exploitation of forest resources, from the very outset. 
Nevertheless, whereas Mendha Lekha has evolved as a noteworthy case of robust self-governance 
                                                 
36 See generally M A Peggy Smith, “Natural Resource Co-management with Aboriginal Peoples in Canada” in D B 
Tindall, Ronlad L Trosper & Pamela Perreault, eds, Aboriginal Peoples and Forest Lands in Canada (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2013) 89 [Smith]. 
37 Holly Spiro Mabee et al “Co-Management of Forest Lands: The Cases of Clayoquot Sound and Gwaii Haanas” in 
Tindall, Trosper & Perreault, supra note 36, 242 at 242 [Mabee, “Co-Management of Forest Lands”]. See also Tara 
C Goetze, “Empowered Co-management: Towards Power-Sharing and Indigenous Rights in Clayoquot Sound, BC” 
(2005) 47:2 Anthropologica 247. 
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in India, Clayoquot Sound is still struggling to achieve this status. In fact, one of the central factors 
uncovered in the present research is the absence of a strong legal framework in Canada. The forest 
rights recognized through the FRA in India have delegated a number of remarkable powers and 
authority to tribal communities via traditional institutions. For example, the decision-making 
power vested in Gram Sabhas under the FRA concerning forest governance has reduced the 
discretionary powers of the Forest Department. Thus, the emerging legality on forest governance 
in India and Canada has responded differently to the demand for democratic decentralization.  
Another factor on the Canadian side is the doctrine of the duty to consult and accommodate.  The 
Supreme Court in Canada is Canada’s apex court, with decisions that are binding on other courts. 
Hence, judgments of the Supreme Court on the duty to consult and accommodate play a significant 
role in determining Aboriginal rights jurisprudence in Canada. Lower court decisions are 
constantly brought before the Supreme Court in Canada on appeal, and it is the Supreme Court’s 
decisions that carry the most weight on the duty to consult and accommodate. Therefore, in 
discussing this additional aspect, this study mainly focuses on Canada’s Supreme Court judgments 
on the duty to consult and accommodate. 
At this juncture, it is perhaps necessary to clarify that any thought on legal transplantation falls 
outside the scope of this study. An attempt will be made purely to expose gaps in the existing legal 
framework, which currently limits the scope for Aboriginal self-governance in Canada. This 
research is based on an analysis of primary as well as secondary sources, thus enabling the 
researcher to gain a good overview of the question at hand. The content of the legislation, 
judgments and relevant policies will consequently be analysed in both jurisdictions, as part of an 
initial investigation. This will involve conventional legal research, in order to understand and 
describe the respective jurisprudence in Canada and India, as applicable to indigenous interests in 
forested areas. This will ultimately introduce a critical perspective on the performance of legalities 
in the Canadian context. 
 
1.3 Understanding the Terminology 
The terms “Adivasi”38 and “Scheduled Tribe” are used synonymously in India. However, these 
                                                 
38 The term “Adivasi: is a combination of the word “Adi” (of earliest times or from the beginning) and “vasi” 
(inhabitant) and is used to denote original inhabitants. 
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terms are not precisely equivalent, since their origins stem from different histories.39 The term 
“tribe” was first used during the British colonial period, in reference to India’s Indigenous peoples. 
The Constitution of India, 1950 retained the term after independence under Article 342, namely in 
its reference to “Scheduled Tribes” (otherwise known as “tribes”). This category was defined on 
the basis of “primitive traits, distinctive culture, geographical isolation, backwardness, etc.”40 
However, it is merely an administrative category, created to ensure a degree of protection and 
privilege to these populations. Moreover, the Indian Parliament has the power to update the list of 
“Scheduled Tribes” in India. The term “Aboriginal” was also put forth during the framing of the 
Constitution of India by Adivasi representatives, but the term “Scheduled Tribe” prevailed.41 
Nevertheless, the designation “Adivasi peoples” corresponds more closely to “Aboriginal peoples” 
in Canada, but it was rejected during the Constituent Assembly debates due to the absence of “legal 
specificity”.42 Therefore, for pragmatic reasons, “Scheduled Tribes” are considered as equivalent 
to “Indigenous peoples” by various agencies, such as the United Nations.  
By contrast, in Canada, the term “Aboriginal” is commonly used to refer to the nation’s original 
populations. The Constitution Act, 1982 deals with “Aboriginal rights” in its section 35.43  
Although s. 35 does not specifically define the term “Aboriginal”, section 35(2) indicates that 
Indians, Inuits, and Métis are included under this umbrella. However, while “Inuit” is a legal term 
for the Indigenous people of Canada’s northernmost regions, “Métis”, although sometimes broadly 
used to denote mixed European-Aboriginal ancestry, appears to refer in legal terms to “distinctive 
peoples who, in addition to their mixed ancestry, developed their own customs, way of life, and 
recognizable group identity separate from their Indian or Inuit and European forebears".44  
Meanwhile, “Indian” is a further legal term covering, at the minimum, all peoples subject to the 
Indian Act but seemingly also “non-status” Indians who are within the constitutional category 
                                                 
39 Paramar, supra note 24 at 496. 
40Ministry of Tribal Affairs, Definition of Scheduled Tribes, online: Tribal Department < 
tribal.nic.in/Content/DefinitionpRrofiles.aspx>. 
41 Pooja Paramar, Claims, Histories, Meanings: Indigeneity and Legal Pluralism in India (PhD Thesis, University of 
British Columbia, 2012) at 6, online: The University of British Columbia Library < 
https://open.library.ubc.ca/cIRcle/collections/ubctheses/24/items/1.0073483>. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 11. 
44 R v Powley, 2003 SCC 43 at para 10, [2003] 2 SCR 207. 
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though outside the statutory one.45 Conversely, “First Nation” is not a legal term in the Constitution 
Act, 1982—it is rather a more recent synonym of and replacement for “Indian”, which some 
consider an offensive term.46 The term “First Nation” does not include any reference to Inuit or 
Métis peoples.  
Aside from the above, there are varying opinions regarding this administrative categorization in 
both the jurisdictions examined here. However, since some of the crucial laws and judgments are 
dealt with in this review, it is appropriate to use such administrative terms, as defined under their 
corresponding legal regimes. Irrespective of this, the Aboriginal or tribal peoples in both 
jurisdictions will generally be referred to as “Indigenous peoples” for the sake of convenience and 
so as to align the discussion with emerging international discourse.  
 
1.4 Structure of the Study 
In Chapter II, a theoretical outline will be developed for an in-depth response to the question at 
hand. This theoretical background will be formulated according to the concept of democratic 
decentralization, as developed by Jesse Ribot, Arun Agarwal, and others. It will be conceptualized 
here on the premise that forest governance amongst Indigenous communities has been more 
sustainable in both jurisdictions, with resource governance practices relying on a decentralized 
(bottom-up) approach. From this theoretical standpoint, it could be argued that forest governance, 
which emphasizes the role of Indigenous institutions and their decision-making powers, is more 
sustainable than a state-centric approach. In Chapter II, the concept of “consent” under 
international instruments will also be briefly explored, with reference notably to the Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples’ Convention, 1989, issued by the Governing Body of the International Labour 
Office in Geneva (ILO 169 or “C 169”)47 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).48  
                                                 
45 Indian Act, 1876, SC 1876, c. 18; James S Frideres, “Circle of Influence Social Location of Aboriginals in 
Canadian Society” in Tindall, Trosper & Perreault, supra note 36, 31 at 32 [Frideres]. On non-status Indians, see 
Daniels v Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2016 SCC 12, [2016] 1 SCR 99.  
46 Ibid. 
47 Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 27 June 1989, 1650 
UNTS 383 (registration number I-28383, entered into force 5 September 1991) [C 169]. 
48 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Annex to GA Res 61/295, 61st Sess, Supp No 
49, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007) [UNDRIP]. 
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In Chapter III, tribal self-governance in India will be examined in the light of the legislative 
framework of the FRA. The chapter will argue that vesting power in the Gram Sabhas caused a 
radical shift in India’s forest governance regime. In order to support the argument that the FRA 
reinforced Gram Sabhas and thereby significantly decentralized forest resource governance, 
reference will first be made to the Mendha Lekha Model in the State of Maharashtra. This example 
will help to explain how the FRA contributed to tribal self-rule by empowering the Gram Sabhas. 
Second, some of the crucial constitutional judgments relevant to the issue will be analyzed, 
emphasizing the role of tribal institutions and their decision-making powers over forest resource 
governance.  
In Chapter IV, the Canadian context will be investigated to show how the constitutional 
recognition of Aboriginal title has redefined the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the 
forest. Judgments on the duty to consult and accommodate issued by the Supreme Court of Canada 
will consequently be examined, with the thesis trying to trace briefly the role of consent in these 
decisions. It will be argued that a lack of recognition of traditional Aboriginal institutions, together 
with the absence of their consent in resource governance, has adversely affected Aboriginal self-
governance in Canada. Here, the example of Clayoquot Sound in British Columbia will be 
analysed, in order to explain the challenges faced by community-based forest management in 
Canada. An attempt will subsequently be made to compare to what degree the forest governance 
regime has transferred power to traditional institutions in India and Canada. 
In Chapter V, concluding comments will be made to reflect the findings for each jurisdiction 
covered. The aim of this thesis is not to make prescriptive recommendations, but instead to 
highlight the lacunae in Canada’s decentralization process by analyzing tribal self-governance on 







CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The colonial powers considered the presence of Indigenous populations in the forest areas of 
Canada and India as the biggest obstacle to their extraction and exploitation of natural resources.49 
Hence, the exclusion of Indigenous peoples from their land and resources was fundamental to the 
establishment and sustenance of colonial resource governance mechanisms. The centralized 
bureaucratic governance mechanisms developed under these colonial regimes restructured 
Indigenous institutions and their identity, thus emphasizing the political authority of colonial 
power over forest resources. This centralization continued even after the end of the colonial era in 
these jurisdictions.  Over an extended period, Indigenous peoples were considered incapable of 
managing natural resources, both in India and Canada. However, the past few decades have 
witnessed a new trend towards decentralized governance in these countries. 
The debates surrounding decentralized governance have provided new direction to resource 
management by strengthening Indigenous institutions and their decision-making powers in both 
India and Canada. This part of the present research examines the literature on decentralization as 
a meaningful step towards devolving power over resource governance to Indigenous institutions. 
It analyzes the concepts that legitimize the transfer of power to Indigenous institutions by 
enhancing the decision-making powers of local communities. This chapter also examines the 
visibility of this decentralization approach within international instruments, such as C 169 and 
UNDRIP, which highlight the role of the institutions that represent Indigenous peoples and their 
consent in resource governance. Thus, through the concept of decentralization, this chapter will 
develop a framework to examine the emerging legalities of forest governance in India and Canada.   
 
2.1 Colonialism, Indigenous Institutions and the Centralization of Governance Mechanisms  
The redefinition of Indigenous identity due to the interference of modern states has caused 
substantial damage to traditional Indigenous institutions. Colonialism and the globalized economy 
have encroached on Indigenous institutions and their powers. Craig Proulx argues that the “power 
to define Aboriginal identity and community has not been in the hands of the people due to 
                                                 
49 Rebecca Tsosie, “Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The Role of Ethics, Economics, 
and Traditional Ecological Knowledge” (2016) 21 Vt L Rev 1 at 36.  
17 
historically and geographically distinct colonial discourses and practices”.50 A different identity 
has consequently been imposed on Indigenous peoples through a variety of centralized 
statutes/legal instruments. The depth of this colonial mindset is evident from the way in which 
colonial states have classified Indigenous peoples. The dominant perception in society, which is 
indeed an outcome of colonialism, is the biggest determinant of Aboriginal identity.51 Some 
modernization theorists argue that social changes have been “liberating humanity from the limited 
world of the past”, but the voices of dissent against these are also loud and clear. In an important 
article analyzing theorists like Ferdinand Tonnies, Emile Durkheim and John Dewey, the scholars 
Arun Agarwal and Clark Gibson, argue that the apparatus of modernization has contributed to the 
dissolution of the “ties that anchor humans to their milieu, providing a sense of selfhood and 
belonging”.52  
It may be stated in relation to this study that the concept of centralized governance, which is the 
hallmark of colonialism, has had an adverse impact on the organic nature and evolution of 
Indigenous communities and their institutions, resulting in a significant restructuring of the latter. 
It has also had scant regard for the role played by Indigenous peoples in resource governance. 
Theorists such as Garrett Hardin and Scott H. Gordon have held extreme views on this point, 
arguing that the use of “common property” by communities is unsustainable.53  Hardin also argued 
that the overuse of resources by communities was a primary reason for resource depletion. These 
arguments were prevalent in the dominant discourses prior to the 1980s, resulting in the creation 
of a centralized bureaucratic governance model.54 This centralization of power continued 
incessantly through various forest policies, imposing the rule of forest bureaucracy on Indigenous 
peoples. For a long period, forest bureaucracies branded Indigenous populations as dependent on 
the forest and therefore encroaching upon it. Indigenous peoples’ access to forests and forest 
resources was therefore restricted. However, Edward Webb argued that centralized administration 
was not successful in achieving its projected goals of forest conservation and the preservation of 
                                                 
50 Craig Proulx, Reclaiming Aboriginal Justice, Identity, and Community (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Limited, 
2003) at 152. 
51 Karyn Tracey, Landscapes of Difference: An Inquiry Into the Dicourse of the National Park and its Effects on 
Aboriginal Identity Production (MA Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 2003) at 21. 
52Arun Agarwal & Clark Gibson, “Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in Natural Resource 
Conservation”, (1999) 27 World Dev 629 at 631 [Agarwal & Gibson]. 
53Fikret Berkes & Mina Kislalioglu, Community Based Management and Sustainable Development  (New York: 
Belhaven Press, 1989) at 568. 
54Ibid.  
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forest cover.55 Webb further emphasises that the whole process has resulted in “legally stripping 
away access, use and management rights from communities”, which were once maintained by 
“locally crafted institutions”.56 Jean-Marie Baland and Jean-Philippe Platteau even go to the extent 
of claiming that an analysis of centralized power reveals deteriorating resource management under 
such arrangements.57 Thus, it may be argued that centralization mechanisms have not been 
successful as sustainable governance models projected by modern states. This dominant resource 
governance practice continued during the post-colonial phase, which further impacted traditional 
Indigenous governance structures and the relationship of these communities with the natural 
resources that they conserved and managed as part of their cultures.  
As a result, there has been a gradual shift in the discussion, with the emphasis increasingly being 
placed on the participation of local communities in resource governance. Theorists such as Elinor 
Ostrom, through her principles of sustainable governance for common-pool resources, have 
questioned notions that disregard the role of communities in resource governance. Ostrom firmly 
rejects the concepts of “Leviathan authority” and “privatization” as deeply problematic.58 She 
argues that neither state nor private property offers a better alternative for resource governance, 
since a community-centered resource governance approach necessarily deconstructs the image of 
the community as an obstacle to resource governance.59 Top-down conservation models, wherein 
state actors attempt to discipline resource users, are thereby rejected in favour of a community-
centered self-governance mechanism.  
Ostrom proposes eight universal principles for common self-governance,60 highlighting the 
significance of “clearly defined boundaries,” and the “non-involvement of state mechanisms in 
self-governance”. In one of her subsequent works, she argues that “CPR [common-pool resources] 
Institutions with high levels of performance demark who has the right to use the resources; have 
                                                 
55 Edward L Webb, “Forest Policy as a Changing Context in Asia” in Edward L Webb & Ganesh P Shivakoti, eds, 
Decentralization, Forest and Rural Communities: Policy Outcomes in Southeast Asia (California: Sage, 2007) at 28. 
56 Ibid at 27. 
57 Jean-Marie Baland & Jean-Philippe Platteau, Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for 
Rural Communities (London: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 244.  
58 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: Evolution of the institutions for Collective Action, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990) at 8, 12 [Ostrom]. 
59 Agarwal & Gibson, supra note 52 at 631. 
60 The eight universal principles are (1) Clearly defined boundaries (2) Congruence between appropriation and 
provision rules and local condition (3) Collective-choice arrangements (4) Monitoring (5) Graduated sanctions (6) 
conflict-resolution mechanisms (7) Minimal recognition of rights to organize (8) Nested enterprise for CPRs that are 
parts of larger systems, See Ostrom, supra note 58 at 90. 
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themselves crafted rules that are considered fair and well matched to local physical, biological, 
cultural circumstances...”61 She pushes to avoid “the multiplicity of failed projects and institutions 
that have dominated past policies”.62 Ostrom put forth an approach that underlined the significance 
and potential of self-governing communities in resource governance. Her work undeniably pushed 
ahead the larger discussions on decentralized governance. 
 
2.2 Towards Decentralization 
Over the past three decades, various policies embedded in decentralization have ensured increased 
participation by Indigenous peoples in resource governance.63 Decentralization provides 
legitimacy to non-state actors and traditional Indigenous institutions in resource governance 
frameworks. The decentralization of power is the mechanism through which “governments or 
other political coalitions use institutional change to redistribute power away from the center in a 
territorial–administrative hierarchy”.64 Indeed, some studies have found that efficiency, equity, 
long-term sustainability, and democracy can actually offer fundamental justifications for 
decentralization.65 The process of decentralization signifies power re-distribution to various 
territorial units or local groups and thereby transfers decision-making authority to those who will 
be most affected by such a transfer. However, despite its various drawbacks, some scholars admit 
that “well-functioning democratic processes” amongst these territorial units will guarantee the 
interests of Indigenous peoples in terms of forest resource governance.66 In turn, traditional 
                                                 
61Elinor Ostrom, “Neither Market Nor State: Governance of Common-Pool Resources in the Twenty-First Century” 




62Ibid at 20. 
63 Reem F Hajjar et al, “Is Decentralization Leading to ‘Real’” Decision Making Power for Forest Dependent 
Communities? Case Studies from Mexico and Brazil” (2012) 17 Ecology & Society 1 at 1. 
64 Arun Agarwal & Elinor Ostrom, “Decentralization and Community-Based Forestry: Learning from Experience” 
in Edward L Webb & Ganesh P Shivakoti, eds, Decentralization, Forest and Rural Communities: Policy Outcomes 
in Southeast Asia (California: Sage, 2007) at 47. 
65See generally Jesse C Ribot et al, “Recentralizing while Decentralizing: How National Governments 
Reappropriate Forest Resources” (2006) 34 World Dev 864 [Ribot et al, 2006]. 
66 Lawrence C Christy et al, Forest Law and Sustainable Development: Addressing Contemporary Challenges 
Through Legal Reform (Washington DC: World Bank, 2007) at 83.  
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Indigenous institutions that have existed in synchrony with the forests and forest resources have a 
better understanding of the community’s requirements, as well as of these resources.67   
The revitalization of local institutions that have faced severe damage during colonial periods is 
one of the critical goals of forest governance decentralization programs.68 These institutions are 
elected democratically from within local populations. Thus, the “social contract” infers downward 
accountability to the people who elected them.  This devolution of power enables lower-level 
actors to exercise autonomy in the decision-making process.69 Arun Agarwal and Jesse Ribot, in a 
study on decentralization accountability in South Asia and West Africa, established four main 
broad decision-making powers: 
(a) the power to create rules or modify old ones, (b) the power to make decisions about 
how a particular resource or opportunity is to be used, (c) the power to implement and 
ensure compliance to the new or altered rules, and (d) the power to adjudicate disputes 
that arise in the effort to create rules and ensure compliance.70   
They assert that these decision-making powers of local traditional institutions can lead to effective 
decentralization.  
Elsewhere, Jesse Ribot argues that the democratization of decentralization in local governance 
ensures accountability and autonomy in decision-making.71 Thus, it may be understood that 
decentralization is an attempt to render unheard voices audible in resource governance. He further 
explains that democratic decentralization is the strongest form of decentralization, since it makes 
authorities “downwardly accountable to the local population”. This form of decentralization 
transfers powers to local institutions in order to ensure sustainable forest governance through the 
maximization of local discretion. This then results in the formation of new communities, which 
can become the new actors deciding on matters of forest resources.72  
                                                 
67 See generally Ribot et al, 2006 supra note 65. 
68 Donald Allan Gilmour & R J Fisher, Villagers, Forests and Foresters: The Philosophy, Process and Practice of 
Community Forestry in Nepal (Nepal: Sahayogi Press, 1989) at 212. 
69 See generally Philip Booth, “Decentralization and Land-Use Planning in France: A 15-Year Review” (1995) 26 
Policy & Politics 89.  
70 Arun Agarwal & Jesse Ribot, “Accountability in Decentralization: A Framework with South Asian and West 
African Cases” 1999 (33) J Developing Areas 473 at 476.   
71 Jesse Ribot, Democratic Decentralization of Natural Resources: Institutionalizing Popular Participation 
(Washington: World Resources Institute, 2002) at 10-15 [Ribot]. 
72 Arun Agarwal & Elinor Ostrom, “Collective Acton, Property Rights and Decentralization in Resource Use in 
India and Nepal” (2001) 29:4 Politics & Society 485 at 489. See generally Ribot, supra note 71.  
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Leading Indigenous rights scholar James Anaya discusses decentralization in the context of 
Indigenous peoples, arguing as follows: 
In the particular context of indigenous peoples, notions of democracy (including 
decentralized government) and of cultural integrity join to create a sui generis self-
government norm. The norm included two distinct but interrelated strains. One upholds 
spheres of governmental or administrative autonomy for indigenous communities; the 
other seeks to ensure the effective participation of those communities in all decisions 
affecting them that are left to the larger institutions of decision making.73  
 
Anirudh Krishna goes further and connects the decision-making power of institutions with consent, 
arguing that institutional performance relies on public consent and clarifying that “consent 
derives… from a locally shared notion of legitimacy and appropriateness. So, institutions will need 
to be designed that are both technically proficient and locally legitimate”.74  On reading this 
passage alongside discussions on the decision-making powers of Indigenous institutions, one could 
venture that the consent of these institutions is important on questions over the use of resources. 
Thus, the transfer of power to institutions will have a meaningful realization when the consent of 
local actors is awarded the same significance as that of resource governance mechanisms.  
The significance of Indigenous representative institutions and their consent in resource governance 
took a new turn with international instruments, such as ILO C 169 and UNDRIP. The development 
of these instruments occurred in parallel with the evolution of a theoretical framework for 
decentralization, which underlined the significance of Indigenous self-management of land and 
territories. These developments all underlined the need to strengthen the role of Indigenous 
institutions in resource management.  
 
2.3 Indigenous Institutions and Consent under Important International Instruments 
The C 169 and UNDRIP are the most significant international instruments providing a normative 
framework to indicate the significance of Indigenous peoples and their representative institutions 
in resource governance. Hence, this part of the present research highlights the discussion on self-
                                                 
73 S James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 2d ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 
151.  
74 Anirudh Krishna, “Partnership between Local Government and Community-based Organizations: Exploring the 
scope of Synergy” (2003) 23 Public Administration & Development 361 at 361.  
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management under C 169 and Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) discussions within 
UNDRIP.  
C 169 is a significant legal instrument since it plays an essential role in strengthening the debate 
on Indigenous self-governance at international level. It discusses in detail the importance of 
Indigenous participation, consultation and self-management, regarding matters relating to such 
populations. Cathal Doyle points out that the purpose of C 169 was originally to “set up conditions 
for self-management”, which would inevitably reinforce the participation of Indigenous peoples 
in resource management.75 Therefore, although it does not discuss the autonomy of Indigenous 
institutions, it does explain in detail the conditions for Indigenous self-management.76 It further 
asserts the significance of the rights of Indigenous people and their institutions, regarding their 
role in the self-management of their land and territories. It is critical to note here that neither India 
nor Canada have ratified this Convention. However, in a discussion of Indigenous self-governance 
and the consenting powers of Indigenous populations, reference to these international instruments 
is inevitable.  
The ILO Convention 107 (C 107) was an earlier first international law treaty dealing specifically 
with groups recognized as Indigenous peoples.77 For example, this treaty acknowledged the land 
ownership rights of Indigenous peoples. It also asserted the need to acknowledge their customs. 
Therefore, despite the fact that it did not require any consultation of or consent from Indigenous 
peoples, it pointed towards collaboration between Aboriginal peoples and the state.78 However, 
“collaboration” is a term used very loosely here and is insufficient to encompass the original spirit 
of consent in matters concerning Indigenous peoples. Moreover, C 107 left some pertinent 
questions unanswered, leading to the drafting of C 169. For instance, C 169 emphasizes the 
relationship between Indigenous peoples and their land. Its Article 6 is vital, since it binds the 
government to consult Indigenous peoples through their “representative institutions” and 
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establishes a platform to ensure their free participation in such decision-making processes.79 
However, it is crucial to read this provision in consonance with Article 15 of the treaty, in order to 
understand its significance for resource governance. This is because Article 15 insists on 
safeguarding the right of Indigenous peoples to use, manage and conserve natural resources. The 
ILO has clarified that these requirements reflect the political will of the state, which mandates 
either effective consultation or consent, but the question of whether or not the state displays such 
a will remains an important issue.  C 169 also mandates that the State shall recognize “the rights 
of ownership and possession of [indigenous peoples] over the lands which they traditionally 
occupy”.80 Furthermore, Article 16 of C 169 ensures procedural safeguards “to address any 
exceptions and requires appropriate legal procedures including public inquiries ensuring the 
effective representation of the people whose consent is being sought”.81 Thus, it emphasizes 
procedural formalities in obtaining consent on issues relating to natural resource management.  
Nevertheless, there may be differences in the impact of C 169 on Indigenous peoples, even though 
it cannot be denied that it represents an attempt to address some of the mounting concerns left by 
C 107. It goes further and discusses the need for Indigenous consent in resource governance. The 
absence of such consent is one of the major threats faced by Indigenous peoples to their way of 
life at present, in their interaction with state-centered resource governance.  C 169 attempts to 
address this obstacle by strengthening the role of Indigenous peoples in resource management.82 
Thus, to adopt Doyle’s argument, one can argue that C 169 urges a focus on the sustainable 
existence of Indigenous peoples.83  
 
2.4 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)  
The adoption of UNDRIP was a pioneering development in international law. The contribution of 
Indigenous peoples to the drafting of UNDRIP played a significant role in making this a 
comprehensive document that addressed their various concerns. It discusses various aspects of 
Indigenous peoples’ connection with their land and territory. However, one of its key challenges 
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is the fact that it identifies Indigenous peoples as the beneficiaries of various rights, without 
defining the term “Indigenous peoples”.  
Similarly, to C 169, however, UNDRIP recognises the rights of Indigenous peoples to their 
identity, corresponding to their traditions and customs. Hence, it is claimed that UNDRIP is a “just 
document [that] expresses minimum standards of human rights”.84 However, although C 169 
developed a strong background for debates concerning Indigenous institutions and their consent 
in resource governance, UNDRIP has gone ahead and attempted to rectify some of the limitations 
of these debates. Self-determination rights, as envisaged under UNDRIP, enable Indigenous 
institutions to determine “their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development”.85 UNDRIP also provides the “right to autonomy or self-government in matters 
relating to their internal and local affairs”. In fact, Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) plays 
a crucial role in reinforcing the self-determination rights of Indigenous peoples and thereby 
provides them with the opportunity to change over time through the development of their interests. 
UNDRIP insists on consultation with Indigenous peoples and obtaining consent on matters 
connected with their traditional lifestyle;86 it safeguards the interests of Indigenous peoples as they 
participate in issues affecting their land and resources.87  UNDRIP is in fact based on collective 
rights, and the Human Rights Committee has made it clear that the consent requirement in 
UNDRIP is rooted in the self-determination rights of Indigenous peoples.88  
The FPIC requirement under UNDRIP has contributed substantially to new directions in 
discussions on Indigenous self-management in both India and Canada. The United Nations 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, which is a high-level advisory body of the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council, discusses in depth the application of FPIC in the Report of the 
International Workshop on Methodologies regarding  Free, Prior and Informed Consent and 
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Indigenous Peoples.89  This Report provides detailed explanation of elements of FPIC and 
highlights how consent should be free of “coercion, intimidation or manipulation” and how the 
consultation and participation of Indigenous peoples should be ensured through their 
representative and customary institutions.90  These institutions possess decision-making power “in 
phases of assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and closure of a 
project”,91 thus ensuring the participation of Indigenous peoples through these representative 
institutions, thus fostering a co-management arrangement.  Article 19 of UNDRIP vests in the state 
a duty to consult the “representative institutions” of Indigenous peoples to seek FPIC before the 
adoption of any legal framework that could have an impact on them. Similarly, Article 32 also 
mentions FPIC in the context of “project approval”. Furthermore, Article 32(1) specifies the rights 
of Indigenous peoples in determining priorities for their “land or territories”. However, the second 
clause of Article 32 is the most relevant. It proposes that 
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned 
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed 
consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other 
resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation 
of mineral, water or other resources.92 
It is critical to read the above along with Article 33(2), which gives Indigenous peoples the 
authority to “determine the structures and to select the membership of their institutions in 
accordance with their own procedures”. Together, these provisions address some critical issues 
faced by Indigenous peoples in their consultation with the state and project proponents on resource 
governance.  
Thus, one might argue that decentralization processes across the globe have attracted renewed 
interest through international instruments, such as the ILO Convention 169 and UNDRIP. They 
have widened the space for conversation between the state and Indigenous communities on matters 
relating to resource governance.  As mentioned previously in the present study, neither India nor 
Canada has ratified ILO Convention 169 so far. Moreover, when India voted in favour of UNDRIP, 
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Canada was amongst four countries that rejected it during its initial stages. However, after years 
of persuasion, Canada announced its full support for UNDRIP in 2016,93 but only within the 
confines of the Canadian constitution. Nevertheless, there is a gap between constitutional 
requirements in Canada and the requirements of international law. For instance, international law 
emphasizes FPIC, whereas the Canadian constitution requires consultation and focuses on the 
consent of Aboriginal peoples in only certain limited situations.  
Recently, the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination established 
under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, in 
its report dated September 2017, expressed deep concerns about Canada's continuing violations of 
the land rights of Indigenous peoples and stated that 
in particular environmentally destructive decisions for resource development which 
affect their lives and territories continue to be undertaken without the free, prior and 
informed consent of the Indigenous peoples, resulting in breaches of treaty obligations 
and international human rights law.94 
UNDRIP does not have a directly binding effect on the Canadian courts. There are some significant 
discussions evolving on the inclusion of a consent framework under the duty to consult and 
accommodate jurisprudence in Canada, subsequent to UNDRIP. However, the scope for applying 
UNDRIP in Aboriginal rights claims is highly restricted.95 The Crown can largely proceed without 
the consent of Aboriginal peoples. 
This situation is not very different in India when it comes to the application of C 169 and UNDRIP. 
The Indian government excludes the concept of “Indigenous peoples” by pointing out that all 
Indians are indigenous. Moreover, the Supreme Court of India, through a series of judgments, has 
shown its unwillingness to apply international law (whether by treaty or custom) at the domestic 
level.96 However, unlike in Canada, the enactment of the FRA in India has given rise to some 
positive trends in providing FPIC to Indigenous peoples, which is an essential mandate of 
UNDRIP. The FRA insists on FPIC from the Gram Sabhas before any resettlement programs can 
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take place in national parks or sanctuaries.97 Furthermore, the FRA vests the Gram Sabhas with 
autonomy in decision-making over the management of forest resources in India. This was affirmed 
by the Supreme Court of India through one of its historic judgments in Orissa Mining Corporation 
Ltd. v Ministry of Environment & Forest (the Niyamigiri decision).98 Its decision clarified that any 
diversion of forest land for non-forest purposes could only be made after obtaining consent from 
the Gram Sabha.99 Thus, the consenting power of the Gram Sabhas over forest governance is 
asserted through this judgment, as detailed further in Chapter III. 
As a result, it could be argued here that although there is no scope for the direct application of 
these international legal instruments in either India or Canada, the role of representative 
institutions in resource governance has gained visibility through discussions surrounding these 
instruments. These instruments have carried ahead discussions, which insist on the stronger role 
of consent for Indigenous communities vis-à-vis their decision-making powers over forest 
governance.  
 
2.5 Analytical Framework of this Study 
The forest governance regimes in both India and Canada have undergone several fundamental 
transformations over the past few decades. These transformations have involved an evolution from 
a top-down model to a decentralized governance model. To be more specific, co-management is 
one form of decentralized governance adopted in both countries.  
In Canada, the shift commenced in some ways with the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia (1973).100 In this case, the Supreme Court of 
Canada acknowledged for the first time, “Aboriginal title in Canada”.101  Although half the judges 
dissented on an extinguishment issue on the facts of the case, Calder led the way for discussion 
on the unextinguished rights of Aboriginal peoples and recognized the legitimacy of their claim to 
title, unless specifically surrendered. Calder recognized the rights of the Nisga’a of the Nass 
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Valley in British Columbia and developed a platform for negotiation between this population and 
the government. The corresponding negotiations continued for 30 years, and the first modern-day 
treaty in British Columbia came into effect on May 11, 2000.102 The Nisga’a, who were wards of 
the federal government prior to this agreement, received a fee simple title to around 2000 km2 of 
land under a trilateral agreement. Furthermore, the law-making power provided to them under the 
treaty resulted in the drafting of the Nisga’a Forest Act,  which ensured “both sustainable harvests 
and a fair share of economic benefits”.103 Thus, Calder introduced a pluralistic perspective into 
the Canadian legal regime and catalyzed the first federal land claims agreement.  
Aside from these developments, the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement also represented 
a significant shift in Canada’s co-governance regimes. The protests by the James Bay Cree against 
the Quebec government’s plan for a hydroelectric project led to the creation of the first modern 
land claim agreement in 1975. However, the forest development in this region resulted in the 
exploitation of Cree land and resources for more than two decades. After years of negotiations and 
series of lawsuits, the James Bay Cree and the Quebec provincial government drafted  a “nation-
to-nation agreement” in 2001. This agreement dealt with diverse issues, such as forestry, mining, 
and hydroelectricity, and it facilitated Cree participation in forest management decision-making 
through two co-management structures.104  
The Nisga’a Forest Act  and the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement saw crucial moves 
towards incorporating Aboriginal forest values into resource governance.105 A co-management 
regime thus evolved in parts of Canada, legitimizing the role of Aboriginal institutions and their 
decision-making power over the administration of resources. Although such co-management 
arrangements are still in the process of evolution, they are a remarkable step in participatory forest 
conservation106 (Chapter IV contains an expanded discussion on this topic).  Conversely, in India, 
the co-management process began with the Joint Forest Management Policy, 1990, which 
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reiterated the need for forest conservation through local participation.107 However, it took a new 
turn in the form of the 73rd Constitutional amendment, which gave legal legitimacy to tribal self-
rule.108 The first dynamic shift in forest legislation was the enactment of the FRA.  From an earlier 
co-management model of power-sharing, the FRA “embraces a rights-based approach and 
potentially creates space for democratic and inclusive forest governance”.109 The statutory powers 
vested in these institutions facilitate the actual decentralization process. The FRA is, therefore, a 
powerful instrument, which asserts the role of tribal institutions. Moreover, in the process of 
recognizing tribal rights, it ensures downward accountability (see Chapter II for further discussion 
on this).  These two forest reforms offer a platform for understanding the evolution of two forms 
of democratic decentralization in Canada and India. In this current research, the following 
analytical framework has been adopted to understand the efficacy of two evolving forest reforms:  
• The devolution of power and authority to Indigenous institutions  
• The vesting of decision-making power in these institutions with regards to resource 
governance, as well as the capacity and power relations that will enable them to make 
appropriate decisions. 
Based on this framework, the present study involves a comparative analysis of institutional 
arrangements under the FRA, as seen in the example of the village of Mendha Lekha in India’s 
Gadchiroli District and a co-management regime in British Columbia, through an example of the 
Clayoquot Sound co-management structures. In both these examples, the political struggle of 
Indigenous peoples plays a significant role in asserting Indigenous peoples’ democratic rights 
through their institutions. There are instances where “such assertions from below have forced 
governments to concede greater authority to local people in forest governance, which is 
substantially different than shared governance in a decentralization framework.”110 These rights 
asserted through political movements are capable of bringing about institutional reforms that create 
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a space for discussion on strong democratic decentralization.111 Hence, the devolution of power 
and authority to Indigenous institutions will be examined here, as well as the autonomous decision-
making power vested through these forest reforms. Furthermore, in order to understand the 
efficacy of evolving jurisprudence in both the jurisdictions under study, this research will briefly 
examine the consent framework in Aboriginal jurisprudence concerning the duty to consult and 
accommodate (drawing upon judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada) and jurisprudence on 
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CHAPTER III: THE INDIAN CONTEXT 
 
This chapter deals with one of the most important research questions relating to the Indian context 
of the present study, namely the ways in which the emerging legal regime for forest governance 
has responded to the demand for democratic decentralization in this area. Here, there will be an 
attempt to analyze the emphasis on tribal institutions within the Indian legal regime, examining 
the devolution of power to these institutions and the scope for decision-making vested in them 
with regards to forest resource governance. 
This chapter begins with a brief introduction to India’s tribal populations and analyses the impact 
of exclusionary colonial and post-colonial forest legislation upon them. It then proceeds to the 
evolution of a new decentralized legal regime through the enactment of the FRA, discussing in 
detail the various rights envisaged and analyzing its use as an instrument for decentralizing 
resource governance. This part of the chapter, where the FRA is thoroughly explained, may be 
considered as central since it scrutinizes institutional reforms under this legislation.  For clearly 
illustrating the implementation of the FRA and demonstrating how it has contributed to the 
devolution of power to tribal institutions, an example of the village of Mendha Lekha has been 
adopted in this thesis.  
After setting out the current legal framework in detail under the FRA, this chapter, therefore, 
analyses some of the evolving judicial interventions around the FRA in India. As a result, it will 
be clarified how the proper legal foundation laid down by this legislation has assisted the courts in 
making few noteworthy judicial interventions.    
 
3.1 Tribes in India: An Introduction 
Those responsible for framing the Indian Constitution, who identified “tribes” as “backward” 
groups, categorized them as “Scheduled Tribes” in an attempt to “assimilate” them into newly 
independent India.112 As per the census of 2011, around 8.6% of India’s total population was in 
these so-called Scheduled Tribes, constituting around 84.3 million people.113 This figure represents 
                                                 
112 Constitution of India, supra note 32, arts 366 (25), 342.  
113 Ministry of Tribal Affairs, Report of the High-Level Committee on Social Economic, Health and Educational 
status of Tribal Communities of India, (2014) at 34, online: < 
32 
the largest number of Indigenous/tribal peoples in any country worldwide.114  Although the 
Constitution of India discusses the term “Scheduled Tribes” and establishes various privileges for 
this group, it does not explain the criteria for the classification. It was the Lokur Committee Report 
of 1965 that laid down a five-point framework of criteria: (a) primitive traits; (b) distinct culture; 
(c) geographical isolation; (d) shyness of contact with the community; and (e) backwardness.115 
Some of these criteria reflect the perspectives of India’s colonial past.116  
Tribal populations are spread across India in different administrative categories but are included 
in general administrative categories wherever they represent a minority. Nevertheless, tribal 
groups enjoy some special privileges in terms of educational and employment opportunities under 
the Constitution of India, irrespective of their numbers. In those areas where they dominate, they 
benefit from provisions in the Fifth and Sixth Schedules of India’s Constitution. These Schedules 
contain several significant Constitutional safeguards since they recognize the cultural 
distinctiveness and self-government of India’s tribal peoples. The Fifth Schedule protects them via 
separate laws for Scheduled Areas; including the special role of the Governor and Tribes Advisory 
Council.117 Legislation such as the Provisions of Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act 
(PESA) has additionally ensured further legal and administrative reinforcement to the Fifth 
Schedule.118 On the other hand, the Sixth Schedule relates to the administration of the north-eastern 
States, such as Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram.  
Until the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Scheduled Areas were referred to 
as “excluded areas” under the Sixth Schedule. Post-independence, however, a sub-committee on 
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the North-East Frontier (Assam) Tribal and Excluded Areas (otherwise known as the “Bardoloi 
Committee”) was formed, and on its recommendation, the Constituent Assembly identified the 
Sixth Schedule areas.119 An Autonomous District Council was set up under this Constitutional 
mandate, which provided for decentralized governance in this region through a representative 
structure. Aside from these Constitutional safeguards, there is also extensive central and state 
policy and legislation, aimed at ensuring various rights and protection for India’s tribal peoples. 
However, India’s poverty statistics show that this constitutional and legislative protection is 
insufficient to address the interests of its tribes, which have mainly been dependent on the 
country’s forests and forest resources over a prolonged period.  
Exclusive forest legislation, a large number of development projects, and the globalization or 
liberalization policies of changing governments have worsened the conditions endured by India’s 
tribal peoples.120 The development model induced by state machinery and corporations has, in fact, 
provoked widespread resistance from them. It has even led to the growth of left-wing extremism 
in forest lands, which is where the tribal population is mostly located.121 In the nine States that are 
most affected by left-wing extremism, six are classed as Scheduled Areas under the 
Constitution.122 As mentioned before, one of the common features of such regions is the large-
scale displacement of their tribal population and misappropriation of tribal resources. The impact 
of restrictive forest legislation in the colonial and post-colonial period is another major 
contributory factor since most of the tribal populations rely on the forest for survival.  The next 
part of this research will examine how this forest legislation has resulted in the systematic 
exclusion of traditional tribal institutions by imposing a centralized bureaucratic governance 
structure.  
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3.2 Colonialism and Exclusionary Conservation: A Glimpse of Colonial/Post-colonial Forest 
Legislation in India 
The legal category of “forest” in India constitutes one-quarter of its land. Out of a total tribal 
population of 67 million, most depend on the forest and its resources for their life and livelihood.123 
India’s tribal peoples have a symbiotic relationship with the forest and have even played an 
important role in managing and conserving these resources through their customary practices, 
perpetuated via traditional institutions.124  
Although it cannot be denied that disparity due to caste and class existed in Indian society during 
the pre-colonial period, there was a general coherence and stability.125 Even the reach of Islam 
through the Mughal invasion did not modify existing resource use patterns or the social structures 
of the tribal population.126 However, some scholars argue that it was the Christian invasion from 
Europe—undergoing its Industrial Revolution at the time—that which substantially transformed 
India’s patterns of resource use.127 Thus, the wood normally used by communities for domestic 
purposes, or to build shelters, became a source of revenue. The development of technology as a 
result of the Industrial Revolution in Europe further contributed to the exploitation of forest 
resources.128 Moreover, the demand for railway sleepers and the construction of railway networks 
destroyed vast tracts of forest. The expansion of India’s railways from 1349 km in 1860 to 51,658 
km in 1910 contributed to this mass exploitation.129  
This process continued for a longer period through the formation of a government Forest 
Department, with a centralized bureaucratic structure and the support of experts from Germany.130  
This Department, established through important colonial legislation, still plays a significant role 
in the governance of India’s forests. In this section, the history of forest legislation in India is 
explored, in its evolution from a centralized governance structure to one that is more decentralized. 
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In fact, the colonial regime had already established its monopoly over India’s forests and forest 
resources through the enactment of specific forest legislation by the early 19th century, while there 
is no evidence of any codified forest laws during the pre-British period. On the contrary, these 
resources were revered and protected.131 The British, who established their colonial roots during 
the mid-19th century, recognized the significance of state control over forest resources, leading to 
the hurried enactment of the first Indian Forest Act in 1865.132 The 1865 Act was intended to hasten 
the acquisition of forest areas for railway provisions and was therefore silent on the rights of 
users.133  A further amendment was made to this Act in 1878, emphasizing the authority of the 
colonial government to declare all forest land as government land through the reservation of the 
forest. It changed the concept of common property and pushed for direct state control by 
categorizing forest as “Reserved”, “Protected” and “Village” forest. This categorization enabled 
the government to collect more revenue by taxing forest produce. Later, the Forest Policy 
Resolution developed by the British government in 1894 also argued in favour of the 
commercialization of Indian forests. Although the objective of this Resolution was projected as 
forest conservation, it was a reassertion of state control over the forest.134  
In 1927, the Indian Forest Act (IFA) was enacted as a slightly altered version of the Indian Forest 
Act of 1878. The 1927 IFA is one of India’s most significant pieces of forest legislation, as it was 
the first to consolidate the laws on forest and forest produce. It reiterated the absolute state 
monopoly over resource governance and completely eliminated any ambiguities that could 
challenge this monopoly.135 It thus laid down the foundation for the scientific management of the 
forest and encouraged commercial timber production. Furthermore, the IFA,136 like existing forest 
policies, clearly focused on revenue-yielding aspects, rather than conservation. The very preamble 
of this legislation reiterates that the 1927 IFA was intended “to consolidate the law relating to 
forests, the transit of forest-produce and the duty that could be levied on timber and other forest-
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produce”.137 Thus, it could be argued that India’s colonial past resulted in a state monopoly, 
ecological destruction, and a decline in customary rights over its forests.  
Nevertheless, the post-independence scenario was no different; independent India carried over the 
forest governance regime evolved during the colonial period by relentlessly maintaining state 
control over forest resources. The tribes and their livelihood were never a priority for 
policymakers, who were instead engaged in forest management aimed at extending the IFA as an 
umbrella over all forest legislation, even after independence. The prevailing presumption was that 
colonial forest conservation was more scientific than was conservation based on the traditional 
knowledge exemplified by tribal peoples. In fact, attempts were even made to criminalize these 
tribal communities, alleging that their use of the forest was ecologically detrimental.138 Forestry 
laws, including the 1927 IFA, even relied on paramilitary principles to establish the Forest 
Department.139  This resulted in several ongoing conflicts between the Forest Department and 
tribal communities, which continue to this day. Armed insurgency over India’s forests was a 
further outcome of this. However, the first Forest Policy declared in 1952 confirmed that all 
interests were subservient to the national interest, highlighting that: 
Village communities in the neighbourhood of a forest will naturally make a greater use 
of its products for the satisfaction of their domestic and agricultural needs. Such use, 
however, should in no event be permitted at the cost of national interests. The accident of 
a village being situated close to a forest does not prejudice the right of the country as a 
whole to receive the benefits of a national asset.140 
The concept of forest conservation was not on the priority list until the 1970s, with a change of 
government in India. However, following the Stockholm Declaration of 1972, the rationale for 
uprooting tribes was shifted from “revenue generation” to “conservation”. This gave rise to a wider 
political discourse centered around an “elite urban environmentalism” in the country. It was a 
movement that led to the enactment of the Wild Life Protection Act  (WLPA), which excluded the 
tribal population from “protected areas” and placed more emphasis on flora and fauna (such as 
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tigers).141 However, further destruction of habitat ensued as did the alienation of the tribal 
population from their source of livelihood, including what is called “minor forest produce.” The 
incorporation of section 27142 and Section 35143 of the WLPA consequently restricted the 
movement of tribes within sanctuaries and national parks, thus perpetuating the blatant violation 
of rights guaranteed to them by Articles 19(1) and 19(1)(e) of the Indian Constitution. Neither 
could this be justified as a reasonable restriction permitted by Clause 5 of the Article. Ironically, 
even this Clause 5 specifies that the state may impose such reasonable restrictions for, inter alia, 
the “protection of the interest of any scheduled tribe”. 
The 42nd Constitutional amendment of 1976, which inserted Articles 48(A) and 51(A)(g) into 
India’s Constitution also stressed this conservation approach. The amendment provided directions 
to the state and imposed a fundamental duty on the citizen to protect and enhance the environment. 
The next important step was the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 (FCA), which took a similar path 
by nullifying the use of forest land for any other purpose, except with the approval of the central 
government. This legislation also reiterated the old centralized conservation mechanism and even 
laid down penal measures for violating its provisions. Therefore, although the 1970s witnessed a 
shift towards conservation-based forest governance, the emphasis was still on a centralized 
approach.  
Later, India’s Supreme Court bolstered this alienation through its decision in T.N. Godaverman 
Tirumulpad v Union of India (Godaverman).144 Godaverman was a writ petition filed in the 
Supreme Court of India to protect illegal timber operation in the Nilgiris Forest, situated in India’s 
Western Ghats region. The scope of this case was later extended from the question of illegal tree-
felling to the revamping of India’s entire forest policy. A dynamic shift in forest policy, therefore, 
took place after the interpretation of “forest” by the Supreme Court in this case.145 The 
corresponding amicus curiae invited the attention of the Supreme Court to encroachment upon 
forest land. In its view, this was the main reason underlying deforestation. The primary argument 
was that encroachment was a major threat to the forest, leading to a request for the suppression of 
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any illegal encroachment, which had not been regularized before 1980. The case resulted in a 
circular being issued by the Ministry of Environment, Forest, and Climate Change (or the Ministry 
of Environment and Forest, as it then was) demanding the eviction of encroachers within a 
stipulated time. Consequently, there was a massive displacement of around 300,000 people from 
approximately 150,000 hectares of forest land between 2002 and 2004, “which even included 
violence”.146 Godaverman thus worsened the separation of  the forest from India’s tribal 
population by treating the latter as illegal encroachers on their own traditional land.  
After a series of deliberations and court battles against this serious violence against tribes, the 
government ultimately acknowledged the need for legislation that would recognize the forest rights 
of tribal peoples. It was during this period that demands rose for the inclusion of local people in 
forest resource governance.  Various social movements, such as the Chipko and Appiko 
movements, along with changing conservation discourse across the globe, contributed to the 
introduction of Social Forestry Programs in the 1970s and 1980s.147 Later, the National Forest 
Policy, 1988 and the Joint Forest Management Policy, 1990 reiterated the need for forest 
conservation through local participation.148 The primary objective of the National Forest Policy, 
1988 was to “ensure environmental stability and maintenance of ecological balance including 
atmospheric equilibrium which is vital for sustenance of all lifeforms, human, animal, and 
plant”.149 Meanwhile, the “Joint Forest Management” model was adopted as a 
…strategy under which the government represented by the Forest Department and the 
village community enter into an agreement to jointly protect and manage forestlands 
adjoining villages and to share responsibilities and benefits.150  
The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change at the central government level and the 
state government at the state level subsequently provided guidelines for implementing Joint Forest 
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Management. The strategy adopted by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change 
was to implement Joint Forest Management by establishing village-level Forest Protection 
Committees, which constituted all the eligible voters in the community. These Committees were 
assigned different names in different States and were responsible for electing executive 
committees for their daily management. There are now has almost 100,000 Joint Forest 
Management committees, co-managing more than 22 million ha of forest land.151 However, there 
are persuasive arguments that this program has not contributed to any transformation of the 
strained relationship between the Forest Department and tribal peoples.152 Some scholars argue 
that no democratic decision-making has been achieved in this way and that the program has even 
led to violence.153 Meanwhile, the Forest Department has continued to enjoy its authority in a 
different form through the program. Madhu Sarin also highlights the fact that Joint Forest 
Management is one of the instruments that has been misused to extend forest fringes for settled 
cultivation and grazing land, ultimately leading to the eviction of tribal peoples.154  
It was during this period that the 73rd and 74th Constitutional amendments were passed by the 
Indian Parliament, namely in 1992. These amendments were intended to introduce self-governance 
into rural and urban areas of India. The Bhuria Committee, appointed in 1994 to assess the scope 
of tribal self-rule made recommendations to extend the provisions of the 73rd Constitutional 
Amendment into Scheduled Areas. It emphasized that: 
Tribal life and economy, in the not too distant past, bore a harmonious relationship with 
nature and its endowment. It was an example of sustainable development. But with the 
influx of outside population, it suffered grievous blows. The colonial system was 
established on the basis of expropriation of the natural and economic resources of tribal 
and other areas in the country… Since, by and large, the politico-bureaucratic apparatus 
has failed in its endeavour, powers should be devolved on the people so that they can 
formulate program which suit them and implement them for their own benefits.155 
[Emphasis added] 
                                                 
151 Susan S Wadley, South Asia in the World: An Introduction (Delhi: Routledge, 2014) at 183. 
152 See generally Oliver Springate-Baginski, Madhu Sarin & Gopinath Reddy, “Resisting Rights: forest bureaucracy 
and the tenure transition in India” (2012) 12:1 Small Scale Forestry 107 at 110, 111 [Oliver Springate-Baginski et 
al]. 
153 Ibid at 110. 
154 Madhu Sarin, “Democratizing India’s forests through Tenure and Governance Reforms” (2010) 60 Social Action 
104 at 105. 
155  Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Report of the Committee of Members of Parliament and 
Experts Constituted to Make  Recommendations of Law Concerning Extension of the Provisions of the  Constitution 
(Seventy Third Amendment) Act 1992 to the Scheduled Areas  (New Delhi: Ministry of Tribal Affairs, 1995) cited in 
40 
In furtherance of this, a decision was made to include Gram Sabhas156or “village assemblies” in 
resource governance, through the enactment of the PESA in 1992.157 PESA was envisaged to 
extend the provisions of the Panchayats to Scheduled Areas. Its primary focus was the devolution 
of power and authority to Gram Sabhas. Thus, provisions of this Act reiterated the significance of 
customary laws and the traditional resource management processes of communities covered by the 
Fifth Schedule. It further mandated state governments to authorize Gram Sabhas and Panchayats 
as institutions of local self-governance over certain important subjects, such as the ownership of 
“minor forest produce”, thus preventing the alienation of land and promoting its restoration. PESA 
also authorized the Gram Sabhas to make plans and programs for social and economic 
development and to protect natural resources, including Minor Forest Produce. Furthermore, it 
ensured that Gram Sabhas would be consulted on matters relating to land acquisition.  However, 
this legislation was confined to the nine States under the Fifth Schedule, as defined by the 
Constitution of India. As such, the north-eastern States governed by the Sixth Schedule are 
excluded from its application.  
Although a range of powers are conferred on the Gram Sabhas, as envisaged under PESA, its 
implementation is still at a nascent stage, since most of India’s States have not made any effort to 
draft rules for such implementation. Hence, the powers described under the Act are not adequately 
utilized across many of the Fifth Schedule areas. However, the Biological Diversity Act, 2002 and 
National Environmental Policy, 2006 have since followed, which acknowledge the significance of 
local participation in the conservation process. Moreover, it is the enactment of the FRA that is 
considered to have effectuated a paradigm shift in the history of India’s forest governance.  
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3.3 Emerging Legality through the Forest Rights Act, 2006: Towards the Devolution of 
Powers to the Gram Sabhas 
Unlike most of the legislation discussed in the current context, which is the outcome of 
bureaucratic efforts and generally reflects a top-down approach, the drafting of the FRA was a 
collaborative effort, involving various struggles and movements amongst those at the bottom. This 
fact ensured that the FRA did not resemble legislation with an indifferent attitude towards the 
interests of tribal communities. For populations that had been treated as encroachers on their land 
for centuries, the FRA was an instrument to reclaim their identity and citizenship rights. A group 
of similarly minded activists, left-wing politicians and academics, under a national forum called 
the Campaign for Survival and Dignity, demanded that a “comprehensive replacement of the 
oppressive control of the forest bureaucracy on forested tribal homelands” be made “by restoring 
democratic control over forest governance to statutorily empowered village assemblies.”158  
The next significant step consisted of the National Common Minimum Program, introduced by the 
United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government in 2004, which included tribal ownership rights 
in its agenda.159 The program described that “UPA [would] urge the states to make legislations for 
conferring ownership rights in respect of Minor Forest Produce (MFP), including tendu patta, on 
all those people from the weaker sections who work in the forests”.160 It added that the “eviction 
of tribal communities and other forest-dwelling communities from forest areas [would] be 
discontinued”.161 However, these attempts inevitably faced wide resistance from 
individual/environmental organizations across the country, which claimed that vesting powers in 
Gram Sabhas would lead to the destruction of the forest. The Ministry of Environment, Forest, 
and Climate Change also challenged such an argument, claiming that mass destruction of the forest 
could result. In the midst of all these challenges, the FRA was enacted in 2006 to recognize the 
rights of Forest Dwelling Scheduled Tribes and to assert the role of consent of Gram Sabhas in 
the conservation and management of forest/wildlife resources. The FRA initiated the process of 
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decolonization and democratized governance in India’s forests, amounting to an attempt to shift 
the governance from forest bureaucracy to forest dwellers. The emphasis on community forest 
resource rights and the strengthening of Gram Sabhas for the conservation and management of 
biodiversity, forestry, and wildlife gave a democratic face to this legislation.162 
For the first time in the history of legislation in India, the FRA admitted in its preamble that it 
would attempt to undo the “historic injustice” committed against forest dwellers through colonial 
and post-colonial forest legislation. The provisions of the FRA offered scope for bringing in the 
aspect of livelihood rights for tribal peoples, along with various conservation strategies. They also 
awarded significant powers to the Gram Sabhas, with the potential to transform the conservation 
regime and strengthen the process of local self-governance. The FRA included a category called 
“Other Traditional Forest Dwellers” as beneficiaries, along with “Forest Dwelling Scheduled 
Tribes,” but this was done with the intention of including people who are not categorized as 
Scheduled Tribes under the Constitution of India. Nevertheless, this current research is confined 
to Forest Dwelling Scheduled Tribes since the categories of Other Traditional Forest Dwellers 
include non-tribal populations against the backdrop of India.  
 
3.3.1 Rights under the Forest Rights Act (FRA) 
The FRA mainly speaks of Individual Forest Rights, Community Forest Rights (CFR) and 
Developmental Rights, which also include habitat rights. Aside from forest lands, the FRA extends 
to wildlife sanctuaries and National Parks.  To be more precise, section 3 of the FRA lists thirteen 
important forest rights that it recognizes. Section 3(1), for example, discusses both the individual 
and community tenure of Forest Dwelling Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest 
Dwellers, as follows:  
a) The right to hold and live on forest land in individual or common occupation as habitation 
or self-cultivation and for livelihood by a member or members.163   
December 13, 2005 is the  cut-off date for recognition of rights under the FRA. However, these 
provisions do not provide any scope for converting forest lands for non-forest purposes. This 
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provision, read with section 4(6), enables beneficiaries to claim a maximum limit of four hectares 
of land under Individual Forest Rights. 
b) Community rights, such as Nistar.164 This section re-establishes customary usufruct rights, 
which were legal before India’s independence. After the integration of Princely States 
into the Indian Union, these rights were terminated in many cases. Section 3(1)(b) enables 
communities to claim this Nistari forest, which is clearly recorded as a “Community 
Forest Resource”.  
c) “Right of ownership, access to collect, use and dispose of minor forest produce”, which 
is collected traditionally by communities.165  This should be read in conjunction with 
section 2(i) of the FRA, which defines “minor forest produce” as “all non-timber forest 
produce of plant origin including bamboo, brush wood, stumps, cane, tussar, cocoons, 
honey, wax, lac, tendu or kendu leaves, medicinal plants and herbs, roots, tubers”.166 
Under the FRA, the term “minor forest produce” is synonymous with “non-timber forest 
produce”. It is controversial since colonial legislations such as IFA condescendingly 
views every forest produce except timber as “minor”, irrespective of their value to the 
communities.167 However, this produce is not “minor” in reality and, rather, represents 
important forest produce, upon which the majority of India’s forest-dwelling tribal 
populations relies for their livelihood. Although PESA vested the Gram Sabhas with 
ownership rights over minor forest produce in the Fifth Schedule areas—inhabited by 
numerous tribal populations—many States were reluctant to proceed with drafting 
legislation in consonance with it. In fact, minor forest produce is not properly defined 
under PESA. Moreover, PESA is confined to Fifth Schedule areas and not extended to 
protected or reserved forests. However, these challenges have been addressed by the FRA, 
with the latter going further to include tendu leaves (Diospyros melanoxylon), cane 
collected by traditional means and bamboo within or outside village boundaries (classed 
as Minor Forest Produce).  
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d) Rights over watercourses/water products and the restoration of traditional seasonal access 
to resources for nomadic and pastoral communities.168 
e) The right to habitat and habitation of “Primitive Tribal Groups”169 and pre-agricultural 
tribal groups.170 It is very important to read this provision alongside the definition of 
“habitat” in section 2(h), which includes any customary Primitive Tribal Group areas or 
pre-agricultural communities in reserved or protected forests. These communities include 
communities that practice shifting cultivation or those which possess semi-nomadic 
hunter-gatherer traits. This was an attempt to include marginalized tribal populations, 
categorized as Primitive Tribal Groups in the purview of the FRA, to protect their 
customary habitats from various forms of exploitation.  
f) Rights to claim land in disputes with the Indian State.171 This was an attempt to enable 
beneficiaries to “reclaim their rights over lands disputed between them and forest 
departments arising out of faulty or non-existent forest settlements.”172 Such an attempt 
permitted the FRA to address issues that included the injustice of making declarations 
about the forest without following due process in places like central and eastern India 
after Indian independence. This provision allowed both community and individual claims, 
but it did not prescribe any limit on the area that could be claimed for.  
g) The right to convert any pattas/leases or grants to title over forest land, issued by any 
authority.173  This was an attempt to undo the conflict arising from the non-recognition of 
pattas or grants issued by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, due 
to its conflict with the Revenue Department.174 In States like Madhya Pradesh and 
Chattisgarh alone, around 1.24 million ha of land are disputed between the Revenue 
Department and the Ministry of Environment, Forest, and Climate Change.175 This clause, 
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therefore, provides a platform for converting any pattas/ leases issued before Indian 
independence, which were no longer recognized as legal titles after independence. The 
four-hectare limit explained earlier under section 3(1)(a) is not applicable in this case.  
h) The right to convert “Forest Villages”176—created by the Forest Department (to ensure 
bonded laborers for forestry activities) —into “revenue villages”.177  Many tribal 
populations in these Forest Villages are denied access to development programs since 
their surroundings continue to be registered as “forest”. Only the Forest Department has 
the power to pursue development activities on forest land under the existing legal regime. 
Hence, the residents in such areas must endure considerable hardship to secure a mere 
domicile certificate. This is due to the fact that the Revenue Department is not entitled to 
issue such certificates for forest land. Without such documents, these inhabitants become 
legally invisible and vulnerable to displacement induced by development, and without 
compensation. Some scholars highlight that there are 2500-3000 officially recognized 
Forest Villages and over 10,000 unofficial Forest Villages in India.178 Hence this 
provision covers a huge tribal population in India. 
i) The right to protect, regenerate, conserve or manage any Community Forest Resource that 
is traditionally protected and conserved for sustainable use.179 The FRA defines a 
Community Forest Resource as: 
…customary common forest land within the traditional or customary boundaries of 
the village or seasonal use of landscape in the case of pastoral communities, 
including reserved forests, protected forests and protected areas such as Sanctuaries 
and National Parks to which the community had traditional access.180 
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This is a very significant provision in the process of democratic decentralization, which 
legislation such as the FRA is aimed at. It is an aspect that will be dealt with in more detail 
below.  
j) Recognition of the rights ensured under various State laws/Autonomous District Councils 
in the Fifth and Sixth Schedule areas.  
k) “Right of access to biodiversity and community right to intellectual property and 
traditional knowledge related to biodiversity and cultural diversity.”181 This was intended 
to protect the diverse traditional knowledge of tribal peoples concerning biodiversity.  
l) Rights over and above any traditional rights that are not specifically added in Clauses (a) 
to (k) and which exclude the “traditional right of hunting or trapping or extracting a part 
of the body of any species of wild animal”.182  
m) The right to in situ rehabilitation of Forest Dwelling Scheduled Tribes and Other 
Traditional Forest Dwellers, who are displaced without legal entitlement or rehabilitation 
prior to the cut-off date of December 13, 2005.  This provision was added to address the 
massive displacement suffered by tribal populations, due to an excessive number of 
developmental projects on forest land.  
Furthermore, section 4 of the FRA prescribes conditions for the recognition and vesting of rights 
specified within it. These comprise the following: 
a) Land should be under the occupation of forest dwellers before the cut-off date (December 
13, 2005).183  
b)  The rights claimed under the FRA are inalienable and non-transferable, and they can be 
passed to others only by inheritance. If the claimant is married, the land rights shall be 
registered in the name of both spouses, while in the case of a single person, they shall be 
registered in the name of a single head.184 
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c) A potential claimant shall not be evicted or removed until the process of recognition and 
verification is completed.185  
d) The forest rights recognized shall not exceed four hectares of land and are constrained to 
areas occupied by forest dwellers (the area of four hectares is not applicable to 
Community Forest Resource rights). 
  
3.3.2 Institutional Reforms under the Forest Rights Act (FRA) 
The FRA unambiguously clarifies that “the Gram Sabhas are the authority to initiate the process 
for determining the nature and extent of individual or community forest rights or both”. Section 5 
of the FRA provides for certain major institutional reforms by altering the relationship between the 
Forest Department and tribal peoples. It empowers Gram Sabhas to 
(a) “…[P]rotect the wildlife, forest, and biodiversity; 
(b) Ensure that the adjoining catchment area, water sources, and other ecologically sensitive 
areas are adequately protected; 
(c) Ensure that the habitat of forest-dwelling Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest 
dwellers are preserved from any form of destructive practices affecting their cultural and 
natural heritage; 
(d) Ensure that the decisions made in the Gram Sabha to regulate access to community forest 
resources and stop any activity which adversely affects wild animals, forest, and 
biodiversity are complied with”.186 
The word “empowers” provides legal validation for the powers of the Gram Sabhas in some 
important areas, such as the protection of wildlife, forest, and biodiversity. Gram Sabha decisions 
in fact, are binding on the right-holders. This way, decision-making powers are devolved from the 
Forest Department to traditional tribal institutions. The Gram Sabhas are the competent authority 
for determining, receiving and verifying claims under the FRA. They are also authorized to hear 
and resolve conflicts regarding the claim process. Furthermore, these village assemblies are 
entrusted with the power to constitute a committee for the protection and management of resources. 
For such committees, known as Forest Rights Committees (FRCs), they are entitled to elect 
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members. The FRCs thus constituted should have a minimum of 10 and maximum of 15 persons. 
Moreover, two-thirds of their members must be from Scheduled Tribes, and at least one third 
should be women.187  These FRCs are intended to assist the Gram Sabhas with the process of 
collating, verifying, and approving claims. In effect, the processes carried out under the FRA 
decentralize forest governance from forest bureaucracy to village assemblies. Furthermore, in 
Chapter IV, the FRA explains other authorities and procedures for vesting forest rights. A four-tier 
institutional structure is constituted under the Act. Apart from the Gram Sabhas, there is the Sub-
Divisional Level Committee (SDLC), District Level Committee (DLC) and State Level 
Monitoring Committee (SLMC).   
The SDLC is the next level of authority, consisting of government officials, such as the Sub-
Divisional Officer and one Forest Officer-in-charge. Moreover, three members are drawn from 
Block or Tehsil.188 Two of these members must be from Forest-dwelling Scheduled Tribes.189 
SDLCs are intended to ensure the functioning of a free and fair Gram Sabha and are expected to 
raise awareness of provisions of the law.190 These Committees have the authority to collate, 
examine, and consolidate claims decisively filed by Gram Sabhas.  They are also entrusted with 
the task of coordinating with other SDLCs to resolve overlapping claims from different Districts.  
SDLCs subsequently forward these claims to a DLC, which is a body chaired by the District 
Collector, Divisional Forest Officer, and three members of the District Panchayat (two of these 
being from Scheduled Tribes/forest dwellers).191  DLCs have to ensure that necessary information 
about the FRA is provided to the Gram Sabhas and FRCs. They also ensure that the FRA’s 
objectives are kept in mind throughout the process of verifying and approving a claim. 
Nevertheless, although they have the authority to examine, consider and approve claims, they are 
bound to hear the claimants/Gram Sabhas, before issuing any rejections and must give a valid 
reason for any such rejection.192  
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Finally, SLMCs are State-level committees, consisting of: a Chief Secretary as Chair; Secretaries 
in Charge of the Revenue Department; the Forest Department; Panchayati Raj; a Tribal or Social 
Welfare Department; three members of the Tribal Advisory Council of members of the state 
legislative assembly, as nominated by the State Government; and the Commissioner for Tribal 
Development. SLMCs are appointed to regularly monitor the process of recognizing and vesting 
in claims and reports submitted to them. The FRA also guarantees any aggrieved person, by order 
of the Gram Sabha and an SDLC, the right to petition an SDLC and DLC, respectively, within 60 
days of the date of a decision.  
 
3.3.3 Evidence under the Forest Rights Act (FRA) 
One of the main hurdles in the implementation of legislation such as the FRA, is the evidence to 
be produced by tribal communities to prove that they are the occupants of land that was claimed 
before December 13, 2005 and that they depend on the forest for their bona fide livelihood. 
Although there were certain procedural ambiguities in the evidence requirements under the FRA, 
these were later clarified by Rule 13 of the Forest Rights Rules, which clarify the oral and 
documentary evidence admissible for recognizing and vesting forest rights. They consist of: 
a) public documents, government records such as gazetteers, census, survey and settlement 
reports, maps, satellite imagery, working plans, management plans, micro-plans, forest 
enquiry reports, other forest records, record of rights by whatever name called, pattas or 
leases, reports of committees and commissions constituted by the government, 
government orders, notifications, circulars, resolutions;  
(b) government-authorized documents such as a voter identity card, ration card, passport, 
house tax receipts, domicile certificates; 
(c) physical attributes such as a house, huts and permanent improvements made to land 
including leveling, bunds, check dams and the like;  
(d) quasi-judicial and judicial records including court orders and judgments;  
(e) research studies, documentation of customs and traditions that illustrate the enjoyment of 
any forest rights and having the force of customary law, by reputed institutions, such as 
the Anthropological Survey of India;  
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(f) any record including maps, a record of rights, privileges, concessions, favours, from the 
erstwhile Princely States or provinces or other such intermediaries;  
(g) traditional structures establishing antiquity such as wells, burial grounds, sacred places;  
(h) genealogy tracing ancestry to individuals mentioned in earlier land records or recognized 
as having been a legitimate resident of the village at an earlier period of time;  
(i) statement of elders other than claimants, reduced in writing.  
Indigenous populations across the globe have tended to rely on oral as opposed to written history. 
Hence, the acceptance of both documentary and oral evidence, as in Rule 13(g) and (i) of the Forest 
Rights Rules, has made the verification and claim process more accessible to tribal populations. 
Furthermore, Rule 13(2) of the Forest Rights Rules, which provides for the Community Forest 
Resource evidence requirement, has enlarged the scope of Community Forest Resource claims 
under the FRA. It even includes: 
traditional grazing grounds; areas for collection of roots and tubers, fodder, wild edible 
fruits and other minor forest produce; fishing grounds; irrigation systems; sources of 
water for human or livestock use, medicinal plant collection territories of herbal 
practitioners” and “remnants of structures built by the local community, sacred trees, 
groves and ponds or riverine areas, burial or cremation grounds.193 
Thus, one could argue that the acceptance of even oral evidence for the FRA claim process has 
legitimized the role of traditional knowledge and widened the scope of the Gram Sabhas in these 
processes.  
 
3.3.4 The Forest Rights Act (FRA) and Its Interface with Other Major Forest Legislation and 
Policies 
The existence of conflicting legalities in forest governance is a major challenge and one that was 
widely discussed after the enactment of the FRA. Section 13 of the FRA unambiguously states that 
“the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any 
other law for the time being in force”.194 It has already been discussed above how the 
categorization of forest under the IFA and WLPA has resulted in the alienation of tribal peoples 
from the forest. The FCA is another major piece of legislation with a centralized institutional 
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structure, which functions through central government on the “dereservation of forests or use of 
forest land for non-forest purposes”.195 As mentioned earlier, the IFA categorizes forest as 
Reserved Forest, Protected Forest, and Village Forest, whereas the WLPA classifies it as a national 
park, wildlife sanctuary, or tiger reserve.  However, in many areas, the settlement processes 
associated with these categories run counter to the interests of tribal populations, whereby they are 
exposed to mass displacement if their rights are not recorded during settlement. Nevertheless, the 
FRA recognizes forest rights in all these categories of forest and clarifies that no distinction shall 
prevail between them. Since the IFA, WLPA, and FCA are three important pieces of forest 
legislation, with direct impacts on FRA implementation, this section examines whether the FRA 
and its rules have attempted to rectify overlaps and inconsistencies within the central legislation.  
The FRA is exclusively concerned with the recognition and vesting of pre-existing rights in an 
attempt to rectify past erroneous processes under the IFA. The latter granted the authority to any 
claimant residing within a proposed Reserved Forest to file a claim for forest produce.196 The 
Forest Settlement Officer possessed the authority to verify, grant, or reject such a claim. As 
mentioned previously, tribal populations in India are largely dependent on forest and forest 
produce. Therefore, the presence of a Forest Official in the verification process has had a huge 
impact on establishing the rights of tribal peoples for a very long period. However, the authority 
of the Forest Settlement Officer was reversed on the enactment of the FRA, which granted 
ownership rights over minor forest produce to tribal peoples and more specifically, to traditional 
village institutions or Gram Sabhas.197 This deviated from earlier conservation regimes, which 
surrendered all their controlling power to the Forest Department. Tribal peoples were thus given 
the right to participate in benefits only from timber or usufruct. In addition, at present, it is the 
Gram Sabha or committee authorized by the Gram Sabha that has the power to grant transit 
permits for Minor Forest Produce, even for Community Forest Resources. 
The WLPA is another important piece of legislation with a direct impact on FRA implementation. 
Section 5 of the FRA speaks about protecting wildlife and biodiversity through a more 
participatory and decentralized approach. It seeks to ensure conservation through the Gram Sabhas 
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or committees constituted by them. The FRA unambiguously clarifies that forest rights are to be 
recognized in protected areas under the WLPA. The FRA thus makes it very clear that any attempt 
to evade the recognition of forest rights, such as rights over minor forest produce, constitutes a 
violation of the FRA.  Another important aspect to be highlighted here is the creation of Critical 
Wildlife Habitats,198 and the adoption of “inviolate areas for wildlife protection” inside such 
Habitats, following the recognition of forest rights through a democratic process.199 The FRA 
prevents any subsequent diversion of Critical Wildlife Habitats by Central or State Government, 
or indeed by any other entity.200 It is also quite clear that any subsequent modification or 
resettlement shall be made only after obtaining the “free, informed consent of the Gram Sabhas in 
the areas concerned to proposed resettlement”.201 
The FCA is equally cruicial, as it significantly impacts the forest conservation regime in India. In 
this thesis, it has already been explained how a centralized bureaucratic governance structure has 
been preserved through this legislation and reasserted via court cases. In Godaverman, for 
instance, the Indian Supreme Court upheld the position that the state government should obtain 
the prior approval of the central government before undertaking a forest diversion. However, the 
FRA clarifies that the recognition of forest rights need not involve the FCA. To clarify, section 
4(7) of the FRA mandates that any forest rights conferred must be free of all encumbrances and 
procedural requirements, including clearance under the FCA, which requires paying the net present 
value and “compensatory afforestation” for the diversion of forest land.202 Thus, through the FRA, 
the Supreme Court decision on net present value and compensatory afforestation has been 
overridden.  
The FCA also has a significant relationship with development rights, as mentioned under section 
3(2) of the FRA. It has already been stated elsewhere in this study that there are two important 
conditions attached to development rights, these being the one-hectare limit on the land for 
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diversion and the limit on the trees to be cut during the diversion process. The mandate for 
obtaining clearance under the FCA previously hindered even minor development projects on forest 
land, such as the construction of primary schools, community centers, primary health centers, small 
canals, electricity lines, etc. However, these obstacles were dispensed with through the enactment 
of section 3(2) of the FRA, which legitimized the powers of the Gram Sabha as an authority to 
make such decisions. Furthermore, in a circular, the Ministry of Tribal Affairs mandated that 
consent is required from Forest-Dwelling Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers 
to the diversion of forest land.  Specifically, this is to be by a letter from the Gram Sabha 
“indicating that all formalities processed under the FRA have been carried out and they have given 
their consent to the proposed diversion”.203 
A further important policy framework, which developed community participation in forest 
resource governance in India, is the National Forest Policy, 1988—otherwise known as the Joint 
Forest Management Policy. Mounting pressure from below, namely from civil society, 
organizations, and other agencies has forced the government to concede greater authority to local 
populations over forest governance. This grant of authority is substantially different from shared 
governance in a decentralization framework.  Joint Forest Management is a policy that still 
prescribes an outline for forest management in India and is projected as an important development 
in forest management policy. It was proposed to be implemented through an arrangement that 
included communities, NGOs, and the Forest Department. However, as highlighted by Max Krott 
and others, forest policy discourse, with its emphasis on a supervisory role by the state agencies, 
essentially displays a tendency to move away from a political process that ensures structural 
equality.204 In contrast, the Joint Forest Management policy, which revolves around a centralized 
bureaucratic resource governance process, overlooks the role of tribal peoples. The associated 
usufruct rights are therefore not extended to individuals, but rather limited to co-operative and 
Village Forest committees. However, its major contradiction lies at the point where it requires 
close supervision by the Forest Department of the beneficiaries’ activities. This was later revisited 
through the enactment of the FRA, which prescribed a plan for conservation management and the 
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regeneration of community forest resources under its section 5, Rules 4(e) and (f).  The FRA also 
mandated that such plans should be incorporated into the micro-plans of the Forest Department 
with necessary modification, as proposed by the committee under section 4(e). Thus, the FRA, 
along with its amendment rules of 2012 has restructured the institutional arrangement under the 
National Forest Policy, 1988. 
However, although there have been circulars clarifying that Joint Forest Management committees 
are not a substitute for a CFR management committee, there are instances where the Forest 
Department would nonetheless propose Joint Forest Committees as a viable alternative. 
Nevertheless, this has been clarified by the Ministry of Tribal Affairs, which states that equating 
FRA committees with Joint Forest Management committees is not legally appropriate and does 
not stand.  
 
3.3.5 Community Forest Rights (CFR) as an Instrument of Decentralized Governance: Re-
recognition of a Common Property Regime 
The common property regimes that were prevalent during the pre-colonial era were successful in 
yielding long-term benefits.205 However, some faded into non-existence, due to a variety of factors 
that included economic transformation. In India, they were “legislated out of existence”, both by 
formalizing and codifying property rights to forest lands and, later, through the nationalization of 
the forest.206 The rationale was that state ownership would be more efficient in ensuring sustainable 
resource governance. Nevertheless, an analysis of the relevant literature has unequivocally 
clarified that such an argument against community ownership is unfounded. India has made a 
noteworthy effort to undo the colonial influence in its legal framework, notably through the 
adoption of the FRA. The most important aspect of this is the CFR provision that grants rights to 
tribes over the protection and management of forest land. This has enabled the democratization of 
forest governance through the devolution of powers to Gram Sabhas. Therefore, CFR 
implementation has played a significant role in ensuring the authority and consent of Gram Sabhas 
concerning resource governance. The FRA has achieved this by legally validating various powers 
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that the traditional tribal bodies exercised during the colonial era. Livelihood security is ensured 
by vesting the right to collect and sell minor forest produce in communities under state control for 
more than a century throughout the colonial and post-colonial periods.207 The FRA also prevents 
any further eviction or displacement of tribal peoples, until the completion of various processes to 
recognize and verify the different rights under it. It thereby seeks to vest control over forest land 
in Gram Sabhas.  
Various rights defined under section 3(1) of the FRA have already been discussed in this study. 
For example, the CFR concept includes all community rights defined under section 3(1), including 
rights over non-timber forest produce, the rights of particularly vulnerable tribal groups, the right 
to convert forest villages into “revenue villages,” the right of access to biodiversity, and so on. 
Hence, for the current case study analysis, this research will focus on CFR implementation, since 
it plays a significant role in asserting the role of Gram Sabhas in resource governance.  
Although official government data from India’s Census and Forest Survey indicates that half of 
India’s forests fall within the CFR category, only a small proportion of these lands have been 
recognized and distributed so far.208 As a result, there are still 34.6 million hectares of forest that 
could be recognized as CFR lands in India, and the potential beneficiaries of this land could amount 
to around 200 million tribespeople and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers from over 170,000 
villages.209   
CFR implementation in India has gained momentum over the past two-three years. To address the 
inadequacies of its implementation, India’s Ministry of Tribal Affairs issued a Guideline for the 
States and amended FRA Rules in 2012, which mapped out the CFR concept. Various issues, such 
as the lack of awareness of the relevant laws, the compulsion to produce certain evidence, and the 
improper convening of Gram Sabhas have been cited as slowing down CFR implementation.210 
Moreover, the majority of state agencies have focused on the implementation of individual forest 
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rights. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that even after all these efforts, there are problems with 
CFR implementation. However, many villages in states like Maharashtra, Odisha, Madhya 
Pradesh, Kerala, and Karnataka Gujarat have made promising efforts in this area.211  There has 
clearly been landmark progress made in certain states, with Maharashtra being one of the most 
pioneering. Here, Gadchiroli is a high-performing District. In fact, it has a history of organized 
resistance on the part of its tribal population, which has gradually strengthened its traditional 
institutions via Gram Sabhas and its Indigenous tribes. Gram Sabhas, which were almost defunct 
for a long period, was revitalized through a political process on the part of the local tribal 
population, together with subsequent FRA implementation. Hence, in an example involving the 
Gadchiroli District of Maharashtra, the next part of this research analyzes the strength of the Gram 
Sabhas and their contribution to effective FRA implementation.  
 
3.4 Example of the Village of Mendha Lekha in the Gadchiroli District of Maharashtra 
 
Maharashtra is the second most populous state in India, located in the west of India and home to a 
tribal population of over 8.9%. Its forest totals more than 20% of the State. Better FRA 
implementation and more specifically, CFR implementation in Maharashtra is owed to various 
historical and political factors. The “forest land” determined by law during the colonial period was 
treated as a source of timber for a significant length of time. The rights of the people living on such 
land were consequently displaced, and they were considered as encroaching upon the land. Their 
socio-economic deprivation and lack of political voice resulted in various tribal uprisings. Political 
mobilization in Maharashtra overall also influenced these movements, partly triggering the 
enactment of the FRA.212 Aside from this, a history of strong political movements and active civil 
society groups also played an important role in improving FRA implementation in this area.213  
However, a major challenge faced by most of the states lagging behind in their FRA 
implementation has been ignorance of the concept of Gram Sabhas under the FRA.214 Maharashtra, 
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is an exception. An interesting example of FRA implementation involving a politically conscious 
Gram Sabha in this region is the village of Mendha Lekha in the Gadchiroli District of 
Maharashtra.215 Gadchiroli is in the north-east of Maharashtra and is considered as one of the least 
developed districts in the state. It has a total geographical area of 14412.0 km2, with around 75.96% 
of this area falling into the administrative categories of reserved or protected forest.216 It has one 
of the highest levels of forest cover in the State of Maharashtra and borders on two other States, 
Andhra Pradesh to the south and southwest and Chhattisgarh to the east. It is also home to the 
endogamous Madia and Gond tribes. According to the 2011 Census, these tribal groups constituted 
38.70% of the district’s total population, resulting in a tribal population of 414,306 in the district. 
Moreover, Gadchiroli is a mineral-rich forest region, with a high concentration of forest resources. 
However, it is also denounced as the epicenter of left-wing extremism in the state of Maharashtra. 
At the same time, it was the first district to actively sanction CFR claims covering 98% of the land 
under CFR utilities.  
Therefore, this present study explores a village, namely Mendha Lekha, where over 80% of the 
land is covered with forest. As a result, the local tribal population, mainly made up of Gond tribes, 
relies on the forests and forest resources. Moreover, the implementation of PESA (since most of 
the land falls under the Fifth Schedule) and the FRA have played a profound role in resource 
governance there. Various reasons have been proposed for the high number of CFR claims made 
in Gadchiroli, such as a political scenario emerging through the influence of left-wing extremism 
and the availability of Nistar Patrak217 in the District.  
This section, therefore, describes what is considered to be one of the most important and workable 
models of CFR implementation in India. It also examines how the emphasis on devolution of 
decision-making powers to Gram Sabhas under the FRA has paved the way for a sustainable, 
decentralized development model in Mendha Lekha.  Although there have been initiatives for the 
implementation of individual forest rights, the emphasis has mainly been on CFR, used as an 
instrument to reach out to local tribes and secure rights that are denied to them.  
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3.4.1 Tracing Tribal Mobilization towards a Village Republic 
The history of a strong Gram Sabha and tribal self-rule may be traced back to tribal resistance in 
the area. Even under local landlords, the Gond tribes enjoyed unrestricted use of the forest and its 
resources during the pre-British period.218 However, as in other Indian States, their customary 
rights were deeply infringed by the British government, and this injustice continued for a long 
period, even beyond Indian independence.219 In the name of issuing permits for collecting grass 
and non-timber forest produce, forest officials started collecting bribes from local tribes. This 
increased corruption substantially in the area.220 A century of oppression followed, with such 
corruption amongst public servants resulting in unrest amongst the region’s Gond tribes. The 
situation was aggravated in the 1970s when the Maharashtra government decided to construct two 
dams in Gadchiroli. For the local tribal population, these dams meant socio-cultural disruption and 
displacement from their land.221 Subsequently, due to strong tribal resistance, the government 
decided to withdraw from this project. This anti-dam movement was followed by others, such as 
“Jungle Bachao, Manav Bachao”(Save Forest, Save Humanity) under activists like Hirabai Hiralal 
and Devaji Tofa, who were deeply involved in tribal issues in Mendha Lekha that led to the 
foundation for tribal self-rule in the village.222 However, it also necessitated the restoration of 
traditional governance structures and reduced government influence in the area.  
In 1988, through a study and discussion group, the Gram Sabha was consequently revitalized in 
Mendha Lekha and focused on gathering all the relevant legal and revenue documents concerning 
the village. Furthermore, a decision was made to revive the Ghotul, a traditional cultural space, in 
order to disseminate knowledge about tribal life to adolescents in the village.223 Unfortunately, this 
led to conflict between the tribal populations and the Forest Department, which seized the bamboo 
used to construct the Ghotul.224  In response to this violent action, thirty-two villages came together 
and convened a Gram Maha Sabha (an assembly of several different Gram Sabhas), including 
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Mendha Lekha.225 There was a decision reached to construct a Ghotul in different places as an act 
of non-violent agitation. It represented a temporary victory for the tribal population, as a Ghotul 
was constructed in different places, but given that colonial legislation provided indeterminate 
powers to the Forest Department over these resources, with bamboo being one of the most 
important resources of economic use, this conflict was prolonged until the enactment of the FRA.  
Nevertheless, the outcome of these efforts was that Mendha Lekha’s Gram Sabhas evolved into a 
more transparent and participatory body, which adopted consensus-based decision-making.226  
This later contributed substantially to FRA implementation, since the Gram Sabha is the most 
important institution in this process.  
Although all those who live in the village are permitted to attend meetings of the Gram Sabha, 
irrespective of their age or gender, the Gram Sabha itself is comprised of one male and one female 
member of each household. It convenes once a month to discuss different issues.  In cases of 
emergency, the meeting extends until a consensus is reached. Around 75% of Gram Sabha 
members are normally expected to attend meetings, with the uniform participation of men and 
women.227 Along with government departments, the Gram Sabha plays an vital role in 
implementing various forestry and development programs. However, it will accept only funds 
generated through such government programs and rejects any major external funding. In fact, a 
significant source of funding for the Gram Sabha is the 10% donation made by its members from 
their wages.228 Most importantly, an informal study circle known as the Abhyas Gats regularly 
gathers in Mendha Lekha to discuss various issues related to the forest. Occasionally, experts are 
brought in from outside to discuss specific topics, in order to increase villagers’ awareness of their 
legal and political rights. This enables informed decisions to be made by the Gram Sabha and 
enhances communication skills amongst the tribespeople.  The Abhyas Gats analyzes forest-related 
legislation and policies. Consequently, the village of Mendha Lekha has gradually evolved into a 
“village republic” by reviving and empowering its traditional governance structure. 
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The Gram Sabha has formed part of various forest conservation and management activities in this 
region since the end of the 1980s, while local communities rely exclusively on the forest to meet 
their daily domestic needs.229 However, they regulate their levels of resource extraction through 
consensual decision-making, with external forces, including the Forest Department or other 
government departments, being prevented from conducting forest activities without the permission 
of the Gram Sabhas. The only commercial activity allowed within the forest is the collection of 
non-timber forest produce. Moreover, local tribes fight against any destructive ecological 
practices.230 
 
3.4.2 Sustainable Watershed Management Efforts 
An empowered Gram Sabha and the influence of regular study circles have made the village aware 
of sustainable resource governance strategies in the forest surrounding Mendha Lekha. The most 
significant of these are the Gram Sabha’s watershed management efforts, with over a thousand 
gully plugs. This represents an attempt to clear forest streams and ponds of debris. Although the 
Gram Sabha approached government agencies and the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (NABARD) for financial aid to support this mission, it was denied by both the 
above-mentioned entities. Remarkably, the Gram Sabha decided to proceed without the support 
of these agencies, relying instead on the voluntary labour of its own people.231 Nevertheless, their 
attempt to construct a pond within the forest during a dry month in 1993 was initially denied by 
government agencies on the grounds that construction is not permitted on forest land. However, 
by appeasing these agencies, the local population succeeded in building a van taalab (forest pond) 
using their employment guarantee fund and claiming that it was being constructed for animals.232 
However, they did not have sufficient funds to complete the work and so the Gram Sabha decided 
to introduce fish into the pond. Permission to catch fish from the pond was subsequently given to 
anyone helping to complete the excavation work. Under this arrangement, the pond was completed 
by 1994. Even to this day, permission to fish in this pond is granted in exchange for the contribution 
of labour to clean it. After this successful effort, the local population constructed baodis (small 
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irrigation wells/ponds) near agricultural land for their farming needs. Although they approached 
NABARD again for the funds to construct these baodis, the Bank initially refused their request, 
but through relentless persistence, the Gram Sabha was eventually successful in convincing the 
Bank to support them in the construction of 17 baodis. Mendha Lekha now relies exclusively on 
these ponds and wells for its water.  
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the Forest Department has completely overlooked all 
these proactive initiatives of the Gram Sabha towards forest conservation. In fact, the declaration 
of the Mendha Lekha forest as a reserved forest in 1991 was used as an instrument to alienate the 
local community from it. Moreover, the Joint Forest Management Resolution initiated by the State 
of Maharashtra in 1992 to regenerate degraded forest was not adopted in Mendha Lekha, based on 
the premise that the forests in Gadchiroli cannot be categorized as “Degraded”.233 However, in 
continued negotiation efforts by the Gram Sabha, Maharashtra included Mendha Lekha in its Joint 
Forest Management framework. Thereafter, the Forest Protection Committee or Van Suraksha 
Samiti was created under the Joint Forest Management program in Mendha Lekha.  
The Gram Sabha has set out specific rules for Joint Forest Management implementation, 
emphasizing that any work conducted within the forest requires permission from the Gram Sabha. 
These rules also clarify that the villagers have powers to punish offenders within and outside the 
village.234 Thus, the role of the Gram Sabha has gradually been reinforced. Bamboo harvesting 
was an important activity carried out by the village under Joint Forest Management in 1999. The 
bamboo left over from the villagers’ personal use was sold to paper mills. However, the percentage 
profit expected by these communities from the sale of bamboo was never passed on to them. 
Moreover, there were concerns in the community over the method of bamboo harvesting applied 
through this joint effort. The attitude of the contractors from the private paper mills was that they 
“treated the bamboo resource as a stock to be depleted while the villagers saw the bamboo stands 
as a permanent fund that could provide a flow of regular, sustainable resources.”235 The tribal 
economy was therefore reliant on a non-commercial perception and the villagers’ understanding 
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was rather cultural and ecological.236 This created a rift between the Gram Sabha and the Forest 
Department.  
These efforts made the tribal population in this region aware of the significance of community 
existence.  The population embraced “Gramdan”,237 declaring that “[w]e have our government in 
Mumbai and Delhi, but in our village, we ourselves are the government”.238 Through this, the 
villagers surrendered their individual rights to the Gram Sabha, and a decision was made to engage 
in community farming on the land. Gramdan is a step towards true democracy, which enables all 
voices in the decision-making process to be heard. These voices are thus involved in the final 
decision.239 The idea is to retain the community over individual interests and it widens the scope 
of the Gram Sabha’s negotiating powers. This community-centric approach institutionalized in 
Mendha Lekha has contributed to gradual tribal empowerment, not just within the village but also 
in other tribal villages outside Gadchiroli.240  
 
3.4.3 The Forest Rights Act (FRA) and Its Aftermath 
The enactment of the FRA added new force to these self-rule practices of the Gram Sabha in 
Mendha Lekha. The rights under the FRA enabled the Gram Sabha to protect, manage, and 
conserve the forest and its resources.  The FRA has therefore provided a strong negotiating 
platform for tribes by transforming the role of the Forest Department from that of “custodians of 
the forest” to that of mere facilitators of conservation. However, the presence of an active Gram 
Sabha and a responsive administration in Gadchiroli, prior to the enactment of the FRA, was a 
decisive factor in initiating the claims procedure. While the majority of Indian states mistakenly 
focused on individual rights under the FRA, Mendha Lekha, due to its strong community Gram 
Sabha structure, decided to give attention to CFR implementation. Furthermore, the study groups 
mentioned above played a significant role in reaching out to the rest of the population regarding 
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the legal formalities at the district and Taluka241 levels. These efforts hastened the process for CFR 
claims in Gadchiroli, with Mendha Lekha becoming the first village in the country to be granted 
CFR in 2009.  
Ultimately, more than 1800 hectares of forest were allocated as CFR lands in Mendha Lekha, and 
around 14,000 claims were granted during the 2011-12 period. The model developed in this village 
was later adopted as a standard format across the district, as well as in different parts of the country. 
A forest management strategy was prepared by the Mendha Lekha Gram Sabha, “which included 
need-based extraction and sale of forest produce such as bamboo, the establishment of no-go zones 
for wildlife protection, and drafting a village biodiversity register”.242  Support from strong 
institutional arrangements in the village ensured effective forest governance, which helped secure 
livelihoods, as well as ensuring ecological security. The constitution of the PESA monitoring 
group, comprising the Gram Sabha and civil society groups, took place after the enactment of the 
Maharashtra Rules under the PESA in 2014, but it also played a role in properly implementing the 
PESA and the FRA in the State.243  
 
3.4.4 Post-Claim Scenario 
Section 5 of the FRA entrusts the right to manage and plan CFR lands to Gram Sabhas. A 
committee must then be constituted under Rule 4(1)(e) to safeguard these rights and prepare plans 
for the conservation and management of these CFR areas. This provision facilitates the 
strengthening of CFR implementation in the post-claim stage, but various Gram Sabhas have 
adopted different strategies. Interestingly, the Mendha Lekha Gram Sabha has brought in 
ecological experts, such as Madhav Gadgil,244 to sit on the committee entrusted with the task of 
collecting information and preparing a management plan.245 It has also developed a plan for the 
sustainable harvesting of bamboo in order to avoid its exploitation since bamboo is a major source 
of livelihood for the people of this region. Over the years, they have shifted their focus towards 
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forest conservation and away from bamboo harvesting by deciding to limit harvesting to the 
minimum.246 However, the model originally evolved in Mendha Lekha, with experts being brought 
in to prepare CFR management plans, which were later followed in different parts of the country.   
 
3.4.5 Rights over Non-timber Forest Produce, Including Bamboo  
The emphasis on rights over minor forest produce for communities is one of the most important 
highlights of the FRA. Section 2(i) brings non-timber forest produce, such as bamboo and tendu 
leaves, under the purview of minor forest produce, while section 3(1)(c) of the FRA provides for 
the collection, usage, and disposal of these lucrative resources to forest-dwelling communities. 
However, the harvesting of bamboo cannot merely be viewed as a measure to ensure the security 
of the livelihood of tribal communities. Sunita Narain, an Indian environmentalist and proponent 
of sustainable development, has rightly pointed out that “since 1857, bamboo has remained 
shackled in the grips of India’s forest bureaucracy, which has refused to let go of this money-
spinning forest product”.247 Thus, it is also an attempt to ascertain the power of the Gram Sabhas 
over a vital resource, which has been in possession of the Forest Department for more than a 
century now.  
The strengthening of the role of the Gram Sabha through the FRA so that it can make decisions 
over the harvesting and sale of bamboo using sustainable practices has ensured the protection and 
regeneration of bamboo. The Gadchiroli District contributes to around 85% of bamboo production 
in Maharashtra.248  It was under the control of the forest bureaucracy for more than a century, and 
in 1968, the Government of Maharashtra leased out bamboo forests to Ballarpur Industries Ltd. 
Even after the enactment of the FRA in 2006, local communities faced various obstacles from 
government agencies regarding issues that included the auctioning and transit of bamboo. 
Furthermore, the Forest Department granted permission to Ballarpur Industries Ltd. to clear 
bamboo from the forest in 2011. This created unrest in areas covered by CFR, since bamboo was 
mainly found in these. The acknowledgment by the Director of the Maharashtra Bamboo Mission 
that bamboo forests in Maharashtra are mostly located on forest land recognized under CFR was 
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“technically” an admission that the Gram Sabhas in these forests are the largest producers of 
bamboo in Maharashtra.249  
Mendha Lekha, as the first village to be granted CFR, began collecting bamboo from its 1800 
hectares of CFR land. Even after years of repeated efforts, since the Department was not keen to 
issue a transit pass,250 the Gram Sabha launched a series of protests.251 These efforts bore fruit 
when the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change intervened after their repeated 
struggles and directed the Forest Department to recognize the right of the Gram Sabha to issue 
transit passes for selling and auctioning bamboo after harvesting.252  This initiated a transformation 
in the state’s bamboo regime. In 2012, an amendment was made to the rules under the FRA, which 
authorized the committee set up under section 4(1)(e) to modify and issue transit permits in relation 
to the transportation of minor forest produce. Although different villages in Gadchiroli approached 
government officials for assistance with the bamboo trade, the response was very passive, pushing 
Mendha Lekha’s Gram Sabha to conduct a successful independent sale and auction to 
contractors.253 Thus, Mendha Lekha became the first village to exercise CFR over the harvesting 
of bamboo. Through their strategies and planning in this area, the Mendha Lekha Gram Sabha 
overturned the common perception that local communities are not competent to manage forest 
produce. It also set a record by earning more than Rs.10 million in the initial years of bamboo 
harvesting. However, as mentioned earlier, the Mendha Lekha Gram Sabha has since shifted its 
focus from bamboo harvesting to forest management, thereby pushing the agenda of needs-based 
bamboo harvesting.  
The Mendha Lekha model of forest conservation and governance was later adopted as a guideline 
by various other Gram Sabhas in the implementation of section 2(1) of the FRA. Thus, at present, 
bamboo production, employment creation, and forest conservation go hand in hand at Mendha 
Lekha, with a focus on clump management and various soil conservation techniques. A new 
method of forest management has consequently been applied to ensure a secure livelihood. The 
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bamboo harvesting initiative under CFR in Mendha Lekha underlines how the conservation of 
forest produce is best achieved by providing support to Gram Sabhas.  
The Mendha Lekha case study is an important one in the history of sustainable resource 
governance amongst traditional institutions.  The decision-making process involved was unique in 
that it relied completely on the Gram Sabha while ensuring that decisions were based on 
consensus. Informed decision-making is an important challenge, which most traditional 
institutions face in the process of resource governance the world over. India is no different in this 
respect. However, arrangements such as study groups in Mendha Lekha gave the villagers a 
platform for informed decision-making on various issues, including matters of conservation and 
resource management. Moreover, the equal gender representation made governance more 
inclusive, while transparent decision-making brought the village closer to the process of self-rule.  
These efforts were strengthened after the implementation of the FRA, which enabled them to make 
decisions that optimally suited them. Furthermore, instruments like the FRA provided a legal 
framework for the Gram Sabha’s assertion of power and authority. It widened the scope of this 
traditional institution to resource governance, while simultaneously ensuring secure livelihoods by 
extending rights to forest produce, namely bamboo.  These rights were subsequently affirmed 
through several important judicial interventions by the Supreme Court of India.  
 
3.5 Important Judicial Interventions in Application of the Forest Rights Act (FRA) 
The judiciary has always played an important role in confirming the alienation faced by India’s 
tribal populations since independence. Terra nullius and “eminent domain” principles have been 
indiscriminately used by various constitutional courts to justify development projects that are 
detrimental to the interests of tribal communities. For instance, the Supreme Court of India’s 
verdict in the Godaverman case worsened the relationship between tribal communities and the 
forest and depicted them as encroachers on their own traditional land. It has already been discussed 
in this paper how the enactment of the FRA in 2006 provided a legal foundation for the claims of 
tribal communities to forest land. The FRA rights regimes were later interpreted through some 
judicial decisions. This section explores such judgments that have asserted the role of Gram 
Sabhas under the FRA. As the legislation is evolving, the courts have had only limited 
opportunities to interpret its provisions. 
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The extraction of a natural resource has been one of the main challenges faced by Indigenous 
communities across the globe, ever since the colonial phase. In India, natural resources and tribal 
communities are mostly located in forest areas. Hence, development projects that are always 
claimed for the “economic advancement of the tribal population” have resulted in multiple 
displacements of tribal communities from such areas over the past few decades. However, this 
conflict between the Forest Department and tribal communities underwent a paradigm shift 
following the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Niyamigiri.254 This case successfully 
displayed how a strong Gram Sabha with significant legislative support can prevent a 
multinational Goliath from proceeding with a mining project that could have been detrimental to 
the interests of the communities affected and their resources.  
The Niyamgiri Hills, which are rich in several endemic and threatened species of flora and fauna, 
extend over 250 km2 in two districts of the state of Orissa.255 They are inhabited by the Dongria 
Kondh, a particularly vulnerable tribal group distributed in around three hundred settlements 
across the Niyamgiri Hills. These communities traditionally depend on the forest and Minor Forest 
Produce for their livelihood.256 In fact, the very existence of the Dongria Kondh communities has 
depended on the Niyamgiri Hills for more than a century.257 This tribe believes that the Niyamgiri 
(‘Hills of Law’) is the abode of their deity, Niyam Raja (‘King of Law’). However, in 1997, the 
State of Orissa signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Vedanta Corporation to launch 
an aluminum refinery in the Kalahandi District.258 The setting up of this industry required bauxite 
mining in the Niyamgiri Hills. The process of land acquisition started in 2002 and the refinery 
became operational by mid-2006. Like most development projects, it largely bypassed 
environmental legislation. Nevertheless, tribal activists and organizations resisted the project and 
initiated court proceedings against it, which helped delay the forest clearance. In 2005, after finally 
obtaining environmental clearance in 2004, the Government of Orissa approached the Ministry of 
                                                 
254 Niyamgiri, supra note 989898. 
255Meenal Tatpati, Ashish Kothari & Rashi Mishra, “The Niyamgiri Story: Challenging the Idea of Growth without 
Limits” (Pune: Kalpavriksh, 2016) at 6, online: 
<www.kalpavriksh.org/images/alternatives/CaseStudies/NiyamgiricasestudyJuly2016.pdf > [Tatpati et al, 
“Niyamgiri Story”]. 
256Ibid.  
257 The Dongria believe that they were settled in the plains around Lanjigarh and would go into the hills to hunt and 
gather food. However, eventually they started dwelling in the hills.  
258Tatpati et al, “Niyamgiri Story”, supra note 255 255 at 10. 
68 
Environment, Forest and Climate Change for the diversion of 660 hectares of forest land.259 The 
Supreme Court intervened at this juncture through a Central Empowered Committee and a 
different committee was appointed by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change to 
examine the environmental compliance of the project.260 The most important of these committees 
was the Saxena Committee, which categorically held that 
[s]ince the company in question has repeatedly violated the law, allowing its further 
access to the proposed mining lease area at the cost of the rights of the Kutia and Dongria 
Kondh… [this] will have serious consequences for the security and well-being of the 
entire country. 261 
The Saxena Committee highlighted the violation of sections 3(1)(i) and 3(1)(e) of the FRA  and in 
its report, further emphasized that the project violated important forest legislation, such as the FCA 
and the Environment Protection Act, 1986. Hence, the Ministry of Environment, Forest and 
Climate Change rejected the request for Stage II Forest Clearance. Aggrieved by this decision, the 
Orissa Mining Corporation approached the Supreme Court to quash the Order. In 2013, the apex 
court, through its path-breaking judgment, redefined tribal jurisprudence in India, holding that the 
Gram Sabha constitutes the competent authority to safeguard the culture and traditions of the tribal 
population.  
For the first time, through its judgment dated 18th April 2013, the Supreme Court of India 
acknowledged the collective cultural claims that were missing in India’s legal jurisprudence.262 It 
examined the application of the FRA in its true spirit and held that   
the Legislature has also addressed the long-standing and genuine felt need of granting a 
secure and inalienable right to those communities whose right to life depends on right 
to forests… thereby strengthening the entire conservation regime by giving a permanent 
stake to the STs [Scheduled Tribes] dwelling in the forests for generations in symbiotic 
relationship with the entire ecosystem.263 
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It further asserted the duty and power of the Gram Sabha in preserving the habitat from destructive 
practices that could affect cultural and natural heritage.264  
The judgment thus clarified that any diversion of forest land for non-forest purposes could be 
undertaken only after obtaining the consent of the Gram Sabha, as prescribed under the Ministry 
of Environment and Forest Guidelines of 12 July 2012.265  Furthermore, the Court held that the 
Gram Sabha could decide whether the mining project affected the “religious rights” of the local 
tribal population, “especially their right to worship their deity, known as Niyam Raja, in the 
hilltops of the Niyamgiri range of hills”, as this right needed to be “preserved and protected”.266 
Subsequently, the Gram Sabha concerned rejected the mining project through a resolution, and 
the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change thereafter canceled its Stage II 
Clearance.267 Regardless of this, however, the Orissa Mining Corporation filed an interlocutory 
application on 25 February 2016, pointing to the need to review this Gram Sabha resolution against 
the mining project. Their primary argument was that such a resolution should not be perpetual, but 
rather needed to be re-examined. The Supreme Court of India directed the Government of Orissa 
to file a fresh petition, making all stakeholders party to the case, which is still under their 
consideration.  
All said, it should be noted that there are relentless attempts from the side of the Ministry of 
Environment, Forest and Climate Change to dilute the FRA and remove the consent provision from 
it, since it is a major hindrance to the government and corporations to proceed with development 
projects in the name of “public purposes”. However, strong opposition from the Ministry of Tribal 
Affairs and other grassroots movements has thwarted such attempts to date.  Efforts have also been 
made to influence the Dongria Kondh community, who led the Niyamgiri struggle, and to silence 
their dissenting voices through state action, including police arrest.268 It is essential to note here 
that it is due to the sheer fortitude of this community and the resilience of the FRA as a legal 
instrument that such suppressive actions have proved unsuccessful.    
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Since 2013, there have been various judicial interventions, both consistent with and contrary to the 
spirit of the Niyamgiri judgment. Moreover, certain Orders issued prior to Niyamgiri stand in the 
way of effective FRA implementation in some states. Of these, the most important has been the 
interim Order issued by the High Court of Madras, which stayed the granting of all claims under 
the FRA.269 Although the High Court allowed the verification process under the FRA, it required 
the permission of the High Court to issue a certificate of title to indicate that proceedings under 
the FRA amounted to an “encroachment” of forest land. This matter was later transferred to the 
Supreme Court and in its Order dated 1 February 2016, the Court removed this ambiguity arising 
from the Madras High Court Order.270 The Supreme Court subsequently made it clear that no 
reason stood to sustain this Order.  
Another important decision following the Niyamgiri judgment concerned the Kinnaur District in 
Himachal Pradesh. After a seven-year struggle, the Gram Sabha of Lippa village challenged the 
decision of the Himachal Pradesh government to set up a hydroelectric project in their village, 
which required the diversion of over seventeen hectares. Around 150 hydroelectric projects had 
mushroomed in this region, even after various committees had repeatedly clarified that “there 
cannot be a totally environment-friendly hydroelectric project in the Himalayas.”271 Hence, a 
petition was filed in the National Green Tribunal, invoking provisions of the FRA to stop the 
various processes initiated by the Government of Himachal Pradesh for such projects.  272 The 
National Green Tribunal vide order dated 4 May 2016 accepted the argument that the project 
violated the FRA and demanded that the proposal be brought before the Gram Sabha for its 
consent. The Tribunal also directed the Gram Sabha to examine whether there was any violation 
of religious/cultural claims or livelihood rights of the relevant tribal communities.273 Although the 
Government of Himachal Pradesh appealed against the National Green Tribunal’s Order before 
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the Supreme Court of India, they were later obliged to withdraw their petition due to resistance 
and political pressure.274  
It is also pertinent to mention here that there have been attempts to sabotage the consent provision 
by the government agencies themselves. The cancellation of the CFR area in the Sarguja District 
of the state of Chattisgarh without the consent of Gram Sabhas is an important example of one 
such attempt.275 Although seventeen Gram Sabhas passed a resolution against this coal mine, the 
Chattisgarh government was obstinate in its decision, simply going ahead and violating the 
provisions of the FRA and PESA. Furthermore, various government agencies and corporations 
collaborated to coerce and circumvent Gram Sabha proceedings, even attempting to forge and 
fabricate Gram Sabha resolutions. In fact, in more recent times, fabricated Gram Sabha resolutions 
in the Keonjhar District of Orissa State apparently consented to hand over more than sixteen 
hundred hectares of forest land to the Orissa Mining Corporation. However, the local tribal 
population denied ever consenting to this forest clearance.  
The greatest impediment when attempting to challenge a development project before any court in 
India is posed by the application of the “eminent domain” principle by a court.  Although the FRA 
is legislation in its nascent stage, with very little case law interpreting it, it may be broadly argued 
that these judicial interventions have created both positive and negative ripples. However, by and 
large, the rights of tribal populations are given priority in such court decisions, unlike in past 
judgments. In the Niyamgiri case, the Supreme Court clearly weighed the interests of local tribes 
over development projects that were likely to be detrimental in ecological and socio-economic 
terms to these communities. In its verdict, the Supreme Court underlined that “the gram sabha 
could get to speak the language and formalize their cultural and religious beliefs into a legal 
language”.276 One scholar has argued that  
within law’s broad and enduring commitment to individuated rights and property 
relations, and the modern states’ commitment to developmentalism, there is a duty of 
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consultation and an imperative of ‘consent’ that may serve as a precedent for future 
iterations of forest and community rights.  
For this negotiation purpose, there is now a binding legal instrument. The Niyamgiri case is a 
significant one since it questioned jurisprudence that, until then, had been based on 
“developmentalism and cultural homogeneity”.277 Although there are also some feeble dissenting 
voices, the legal construction of the FRA in the Niyamgiri judgment is now the law of the land and 
binding on every High Court in India.  
 
3.6 Conclusion on the Indian Context 
Irrespective of the progress made in this area, community-centric resource governance practices 
emerging in India through programs like Joint Forest Management have been treated as a privilege 
offered to tribal communities rather than the recognition of their rights. However, the enactment 
of the FRA has granted extensive powers to Gram Sabhas on matters relating to the conservation 
and management of forest and wildlife resources, thereby strengthening the self-governance 
mechanisms of India’s tribal communities. The FRA itself acknowledges in its preamble that “the 
forest rights on ancestral lands and their habitat were not adequately recognized in the 
consolidation of state forests during the colonial period as well as in independent India”.278 In this 
chapter, the importance of devolving power and the process of democratic decentralization have 
therefore been discussed. In its legal framework, the FRA entrusts Gram Sabhas with significant 
rights, including the right to determine the nature and extent of individual and community rights. 
Other important committees, such as SDLCs and DLCs under the FRA are entrusted with the duty 
to assist Gram Sabhas in the process of verifying claims. A further clarification of the authority of 
Gram Sabhas may be observed in the directions issued by one state government to its officers in 
2009, where it was stated that:   
role of the official is to render proper and timely assistance to these committees and to 
ensure custody of the records. No individual officer has been given the powers under 
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the Act to overrule or object to the decisions of the appropriate authority, other than 
filing an appeal to the next higher authority as prescribed.279 
This letter further points to the fact that any reverification by the Committees under the FRA shall 
be conducted only after giving “due intimation to the Forest Rights committees”.280  
The transfer of ownership of minor forest produce to tribal communities is considered as one of 
the most important rights obtained through the FRA. Moreover, apart from their right to own and 
use minor forest produce, Gram Sabhas are authorized to auction/dispose of it as they see fit. This 
is intended to secure the livelihood of tribal peoples.  The Mendha Lekha example is therefore 
noteworthy in how effective FRA implementation can result in tribal self-governance while 
simultaneously ensuring a self-sufficient economy through a community’s authority over forest 
resources. The existence of a strong Gram Sabha in Mendha Lekha, due to previous political 
movements, has contributed substantially to developing the capability of these tribal institutions 
to implement the Act.  The revitalization of local bodies, which is an important requirement for 
the effective transfer of power to Indigenous communities, can in fact be observed in Mendha 
Lekha. This example also illustrated how a community-led and decentralized forest governance 
system is more sustainable than a centralized one. The successful adoption and implementation of 
a forest management strategy by the Mendha Lekha Gram Sabha emphasize the need-based 
extraction and sale of forest produce; found to be more sustainable than a state-led strategy that is 
reliant on purely economic advantage. 
The legal scenario developed by the FRA empowers tribal institutions to challenge any government 
decision on the diversion of forest lands for non-forest purposes, such as mining. The FRA 
mandates the procurement of tribal consent before such diversions. The Supreme Court of India  
has since affirmed this through its verdict in the Niyamgiri case.  Thus, it may be argued that the 
FRA serves as a powerful and robust instrument to ensure the autonomy of traditional tribal 
institutions in India.  India’s emerging forest regime in India has a strongly decentralized approach, 
which effectively deconcentrates power to the local level through the Gram Sabhas. However, 
since the powers of these institutions are transferred as rights rather than privileges, they have 
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greater accountability. Furthermore, this devolution of power has created a space for effective 
decision-making, which is an important component of democratic decentralization. Forest reform 
through the implementation of the FRA is an effective example of how devolving authority to tribal 























CHAPTER IV: THE CANADIAN CONTEXT 
 
This chapter discusses the emerging legality on forest governance in Canada and the extent of 
democratic decentralization in its approach. Through an analysis of Canada’s co-management 
regime, the role of Aboriginal institutions will be examined in terms of forest governance and the 
relevant authority vested in these institutions. It starts with a brief outline of the impact of 
colonialism on these Aboriginal institutions and resource governance mechanisms. Thereafter, this 
chapter extends to the post-colonial phase to trace the evolution and development of self-
governance mechanisms and the impact of co-management regimes on resource governance. The 
example of co-management systems developed in Clayoquot Sound on the west coast of 
Vancouver Island in British Columbia is adopted to understand the potential and limits of the co-
management process. Furthermore, this chapter examines the role of Aboriginal consent under the 
duty to consult and accommodate doctrine by analyzing pertinent judgments of the Supreme Court 
of Canada. 
 
4.1 Forests and Aboriginal Peoples in Canada: An Introduction 
Forests constitute half of Canada’s entire land mass. The national identity and history of the 
country, therefore, have close ties with the forest environment.281 In fact, Canada is home to 10% 
of the world’s forests, which is mostly undisturbed, while the country continues to be the world’s 
largest exporter of forest products. Aboriginal people constitute 4 percent of the total Canadian 
population.282 More than 85 percent of the Aboriginal peoples live in productive forest areas of 
Canada and around half the Aboriginal peoples in Canada live in the boreal forests.283 To draw a 
distinction, First Nations and Métis largely rely on forest areas, whereas the Inuit are based in non-
forest areas.284 Thus, it may be argued that the lives of the Aboriginal population in Canada are 
generally closely intertwined with the forest and forest resources. 
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While they have deep historical roots, Aboriginal rights are still under deliberation in various 
legislative and judicial efforts. One important event in the evolution of the legal framework 
surrounding Aboriginal rights in Canada is the drafting of the Constitution Act in 1982, which 
recognized and affirmed Aboriginal and treaty rights. This recognition of rights had a strong 
influence on forest resource governance in Canada.  The majority of forest land falls under various 
treaties. For instance, the Maritime Peace and Friendship Treaties were entered into between the 
British and First Nations on Canada’s east coast, to develop co-operation between these 
communities and colonial forces. However, in northern Canada and British Columbia, where 
treaties were largely never signed, governments are in an ongoing process of negotiating various 
comprehensive and specific land claims. The British Columbia treaty process was initiated in 1992 
to address various issues to do with Aboriginal rights and title. More than half the First Nations in 
British Columbia are involved in such treaty negotiation processes.285 
A key challenge facing Canada at present is to reconcile the interests of Aboriginal peoples in 
Canadian forests with the process of economic development. In this regard, there are a number of 
different stakeholders in Canada’s forest management. Federal, provincial and territorial 
governments, as well as the private sector, Aboriginal communities, and others play important 
roles. However, the Constitution Act vests the primary responsibility for forest governance in the 
provincial governments. As a result, different provinces have varying forest legislation and forest 
management policies. Many Aboriginal peoples claim the actual forest land where they reside and 
are unwilling to settle for mere monetary benefits.286   
The treaties signed with Canada’s Aboriginal peoples normally deal with aspects such as land 
ownership, collaboration in resource management, resource revenue-sharing, and wildlife 
harvesting rights.287 Thus, it could be argued that the role of Aboriginal peoples in forest 
governance is crucial.  However, the history of alienation faced as a result of colonialism has 
adversely affected Aboriginal institutions and claims to forest land. The next part of this research 
examines the extent of alienation faced by Aboriginal peoples in centralized forest governance as 
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an effect of colonialism. It further explores the emerging legality that shifts its focus from 
assimilation to a devolution process, in which the form of decentralized governance responds to 
the forest governance regime.  
 
4.2 Colonialism and Its Impact on the Aboriginal Population 
Similarly, in India, colonialism has played an important role in alienating Aboriginal populations 
in Canada from the resources that they have traditionally governed for centuries. The historic 
treaties in Canada between the Crown and the Aboriginal peoples were introduced as a step to 
eliminate conflicts over land and resources.288 They played a crucial role in deciding the Native-
newcomer relationship.289 Scholars such as Jim Miller also argue that these treaties established 
social harmony between Indigenous and non-native peoples.290 However, there are other 
arguments that such treaties were peculiar agreements between the Crown and some of its subjects 
and did not necessarily act as a foundation for asserting Canada’s authority over Aboriginal 
peoples.291 
Meanwhile, Aboriginal peoples perceived treaties as agreements that allowed their land to be 
shared, but as Miller suggests, they “had no idea they were considered wards, nor did they think 
they were selling their land.”292 It has even been argued that the consent obtained from Aboriginal 
peoples in terms of resource governance was through compulsion.293 The treaty-making process 
has resulted in the dispossession of a large number of Indigenous peoples.294 The consent that 
colonial forces claimed to have obtained through treaties and agreements was arguably not sought 
with any honest intention of giving recognition but was rather aimed at diluting resistance from 
the Aboriginal peoples. 
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In short, there was an attempt to dismiss Indigenous sovereignty de jure, while obtaining de facto 
consent from the Indigenous population to assert Crown supremacy over Aboriginal title to 
territories. The sovereignty established by the state without the consent of those being governed 
consequently infringed various rights, including the right to self-governance. The legislation 
enacted during the Colonial phase then carried over this exclusionary spirit, and the principle of 
terra nullius played a pivotal role in justifying and executing the colonial agenda295while 
disregarding the presence of Aboriginal nations. Terra nullius was a principle that presumed 
Aboriginal peoples to be primitive and asserted the dominance of Crown sovereignty.296 As a 
result, settlers asserted their power over land and resources.297 Furthermore, the relationship 
between settler society and Aboriginal peoples shifted from “mutually beneficial associations… 
between equal nations to the coercive and imposed structure of domination..”298  As argued by 
Dominic O’Sullivan, it led to resource alienation and the “collective political and economic 
marginalization” of Aboriginal peoples.299   
This exclusion of Aboriginal peoples through colonial legal frameworks had an impact on 
Aboriginal institutions. The transformation from traditional modes of conservation—already in 
existence prior to colonialism—into a centralized system resulted in continued non-recognition of 
Aboriginal rights and title. Stephen Wyatt argues that 
as forestry science and the economic importance of timber and paper developed during 
the 1900s, government and the forest industry shared the responsibility for forest planning 
and forest management, with the actual balance of rights and obligations depending on 
the specific situation and wider government policy.300 
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The establishment of the Canadian Forestry Association represented a major shift towards this 
scientific forestry model.301 The resources that Indigenous communities had legitimately used for 
centuries became inaccessible to them, and they lost their decision-making power over the 
conservation process.  
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 was another major instrument establishing the authority of the 
Crown over Aboriginal land. Furthermore, The Indian Act, 1876 (the Indian Act) umbrella 
legislation concerning Canada’s Aboriginal population was enacted along similar lines. 
Interestingly, however, this Act excluded Inuit, Métis and non-status Indians. It is one of the most 
controversial pieces of legislation enacted during the colonial period to impose federal supremacy 
over Aboriginal peoples. Nevertheless, since its inception, the Indian Act has become the central 
legislation dealing with Aboriginal affairs in Canada. This Act, through the imposition of a 
colonial government system, played a significant role in altering the political structures of the 
Aboriginal population for generations.  It reflected the dominant mainstream perception of the 
assimilation of Aboriginal people into mainstream society and made status Indians effectively 
wards of the Crown.  Furthermore, the missionary dissemination of Christianity during this period 
resulted in the destruction of many aspects of Aboriginal culture and practices.  
Ken Coates and Keith Carlson have rightly pointed out that “First Nations bore the major share of 
the dislocations and cultural change and had to fight to secure both basic and Aboriginal rights.”302 
The Indian Act has thus been frequently amended by Parliament, in an attempt to assimilate and 
“civilize” the Aboriginal people, which has adversely affected the organic nature of their 
governance structures. Moreover, the Indian Act has been used as an instrument to establish a 
monopoly over Aboriginal land and resources. For generations, the political structures and culture 
of Aboriginal communities across the country have been created and distorted by the imposition 
of governance systems under the Indian Act.303 Moreover, this suppression has had ample support 
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from Canada’s judicial and economic system.304 Aside from this, Aboriginal women, who played 
an important role within Aboriginal governance structures, are completely ignored under the 
Indian Act.305  
The 19th and 20th centuries, therefore, witnessed extensive legal and political resistance from 
Aboriginal people against the Indian Act. Even the Confederation document, the Constitution Act, 
1867, made only brief reference to Aboriginal communities and did not acknowledge that prior to 
European contact they “belonged to nations structured by ancient forms of government exercising 
sovereign authority over persons and territory.”306  In fact, the constitution provided wide 
proprietary and legislative powers to provincial governments on matters relating to forest 
resources. The provinces were granted ownership rights over “land, mines, minerals and royalties” 
under Section 109. The Constitution Act, 1867 also entrusted the provinces with the power to make 
exclusive legislation for the “management and sale of the public lands belonging to the province 
and of the Timber thereon”.  
 
4.3 Assertion of Provincial Jurisdiction over Resource Governance in the Post-Colonial 
Phase 
The Constitution Act, 1982 is an important legal document, with section 35 recognizing and 
affirming Aboriginal and treaty rights.  It also confirms provincial jurisdiction over forest 
conservation and management. An important natural resources amendment was adopted through 
the 1982 constitutional amendments, authorizing the provincial governments to make laws on the 
exploration of “non-renewable natural resources in the provinces”307 as well as on the 
“development, conservation and management of non-renewable natural resources and forestry 
resources in the province.”308  
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Total Provincial forest ownership in Canada amounts to 90%, compared to federal forest 
ownership of 4% and private ownership of 6%.309 The various provinces have forest policies that 
vary in their substance. However, the Aboriginal community’s access to forestry activities is 
confined to limited forest tenure systems in Canada. All the forty-two major forest tenure systems 
give only a limited access to various Aboriginal communities with regard to forestry activities 310. 
Even within the federal government’s limited forest ownership, Aboriginal participation is further 
curtailed in section 7 of the Indian Act and the Indian Timber Regulations. Frideres (2013) 
observes that the “…government’s objective in forestry programs rarely coincide with Aboriginal 
land use and socio-economic priorities.”311 Additionally, the arguments are very strong that the 
exclusion of Aboriginal treaty rights in federal/provincial/territorial forest policies are also major 
obstacles in the way of involving Aboriginal people in sustainable forest management.312  
Nevertheless, attempts by Aboriginal peoples to negotiate alternative forest tenure have been 
strongly opposed by both the federal and provincial governments.313 For instance, in British 
Columbia, three transnational companies own around 90% of the annual allowable cut from Crown 
forest land, with an extendable lease spanning 15-20 years.314 However, the financial benefits for 
Aboriginal communities are far less than British Columbia’s total revenue stream.315 In furtherance 
of various court interventions, the province has initiated 35 direct awards of timber, as well as over 
100 agreements in favour of the Aboriginal people, with the latter being entitled to $35 million per 
year. Communities were also allowed to log more than $33 million cubic meteres of timber per 
annum. This is less than 4 percent of the Province’s total revenue stream since British Columbia 
earns more than $1 billion annually from forestry companies in stumpage fees for logging public 
land.  Thus, there is a genuine reason to suspect that attempts to include Aboriginal peoples in 
forest activities may not be intended to develop self-governance mechanisms within this 
population.   
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Albeit restricted, the federal government has played some role in forest management in Canada. 
This is part of “cooperative federalism”, which enables both federal and provincial Government 
to reach an understanding through agreements over matters relating to the environment and 
policy.316 The Constitution Act provides a strong legal framework for provincial governments to 
make laws on conservation and the management of non-renewable natural and forestry resources. 
However, on matters relating to the harvesting of timber and manufacture of forest products, the 
private sector retains an important position.   
Until recently, the responsibility for forest management was shared between private industry and 
the government, with the role of Aboriginal communities were completely overlooked. Although 
Canada’s Aboriginal peoples continued to perform various activities on forest land, they did not 
have a voice concerning forest management.317 The treaties signed between Aboriginal peoples 
and the Crown, together with Western scientific forest management practices, gave legitimacy to 
the arguments excluding Aboriginal people.318 Aboriginal decision-making institutions were 
rendered passive and placed in submission to the interests of the dominant society.  The Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal People rightly observed that 
control over Indian political structures, land holding patterns, and resource and economic 
development gave Parliament everything it appeared to need to complete the unfinished 
policies inherited from its colonial predecessors.319 
The outcome has been numerous ethnocentric mono-cultural institutions, which emphasize state 
dominance through “institutional racism.”320 
 
4.4 Democratic Decentralization through Co-management in Canada 
Irrespective of previous shortcomings, forest governance systems in Canada have made a 
significant shift in the past three decades through the inclusion of Aboriginal self-governance. 
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Scholars such as Jennifer Dalton argue that self-government is the embodiment of self-
determination in Canada since it can lead to “decision-making, law-making capabilities, and 
varying degrees of autonomy, including about a land base or territory”.321 Aboriginal self-
governance in Canada was recognized more than a century ago in a lower court decision in 
Connolly v Woolrich (1867), which redefined the constitutional links between Aboriginal peoples 
and the Crown.322 However, a subsequent Privy Council decision that endured for a prolonged 
period minimized any such determination.  The 1888 Privy Council decision in St. Catharines 
Milling and Lumber Company v. the Queen323 involved a land dispute between the province of 
Ontario and the Government of Canada. On appeal from the Supreme Court of Canada, the Privy 
Council acknowledged the existence of an Aboriginal interest in the unsurrendered lands as a 
“personal and usufructuary right dependent on the goodwill of the sovereign”.324 The exact nature 
of this right was, unfortunately, left undefined and this position continued unchanged until the 
decision in Calder of 1973.325  St. Catharines is generally considered to be reflecting a Eurocentric 
perspective which resulted in an unconvincing balancing act.326 
Acknowledgment of Aboriginal title claims in 1973 through Calder revived the debates 
surrounding this topic. Calder resulted in the drafting of the Comprehensive Land Claims Policy 
and Specific Land Claims by the federal government in 1973.327 The Comprehensive Land Claims 
Policy, which led to the creation of “modern treaties” after Calder, specified a self-governance 
mechanism intended to guide the federal government in its negotiations with Aboriginal groups. 
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It subsequently acknowledged the participation of Aboriginal communities in resource 
administration. 
Co-management provides an opportunity for power-sharing between governments and Aboriginal 
peoples. Efforts to shift towards co-management have played a significant role in reshaping 
Canada’s forest resource governance. Thus, it has evolved into a collaborative resource 
governance mechanism by ensuring community participation through a meaningful decision-
making process. Alfonso Castro and Erik Nielsen emphasize the significance of institutions 
involved in this decision-making process and argue that “co-management connotes a collaborative 
institutional arrangement among diverse stakeholders for managing or using a natural resource.”328 
However, there are structural as well as procedural conditions attached to it. For instance, co-
management regimes rely on a centralized bureaucratic set-up with Western language and 
hierarchy at its core.329 The hierarchy in such governance impacts the role of Aboriginal 
communities in the governance process. There are even arguments that co-management regimes 
render traditional communities submissive to the dominant knowledge system, without placing 
much emphasis on their traditional ecological knowledge.330  
Conversely, there exists a huge gap in the perception of the federal government’s self-governance 
policy and Aboriginal perceptions of self-governance.331 Shin Imai argues that the differences not 
only lie in the “expectation of the process”, but also conceptualizes “differences” in various 
ways.332 He goes to the extent of arguing that co-management regimes in Canada are a “softer way 
for governments to access Aboriginal lands through co-management boards.”333  Nevertheless, 
arguments in favour of co-management regimes are very robust. They are held to give communities 
an advantage over their familiarity with Western environmental governance in co-management 
frameworks. Communities thus use this space to challenge state hegemony and regain their crucial 
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role in management.334 Such regimes offer the democratization of resource governance through 
settled rules and agreements. Even the fact that most co-management boards have an Aboriginal 
membership of 50% is projected as an indication of their inclusive nature in Canada. There is a 
further claim that this cooperative arrangement enhances the capacity of communities at the local level and 
contributes to the exercise of self-determination rights.335 
Many Aboriginal communities assert their self-determination rights through a co-management 
process.336 The struggle to reclaim land and resources by Aboriginal peoples in Canada receives a 
new dimension through the evolution of a co-management regime.337 However, although co-
management is highlighted as a method of resource governance, it also plays a pivotal role in 
reshaping the relationship between people with different interests and powers.338 As discussed 
before, in its most basic form, co-management is understood to be a power-sharing arrangement, 
supported by an agreement. The roles of governments and stakeholders in the decision-making 
process constitute a significant factor in determining the nature of co-management 
arrangements.339  
Co-management efforts have various primary and secondary objectives, which include sustainable 
resource governance, with an emphasis on Indigenous knowledge systems, decentralized decision-
making, and revitalized Indigenous institutions and culture.340 Institutional arrangements play a 
significant role in the implementation of co-management processes since a governing power 
without a proper institutional process to implement it is futile.341 Some argue that a systemic 
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change in institutional design, which is competent to alter decision-making cultures, can be highly 
significant in achieving the goals of co-management.342 These co-management institutions 
perform a key function in addressing the social, legal and political claims of Aboriginal peoples.343 
The Royal Commission on Aboriginal People has set out three broad categories of co-management 
arrangement in Canada.344 These consist of claim-based, crisis-based, and community-based 
resource management. This categorization is primarily based on the events contributing to the 
creation of a co-management agreement. Claim-based co-management involves long-term legal 
agreements, which establish shared bodies for the management of resources in a specific area. It 
consists of co-management under comprehensive claims agreements and deals, involving 
negotiation between the Canadian Government and Aboriginal peoples.345 In contrast, crisis-based 
co-management is an ad hoc and temporary institutional arrangement to address a crisis due to 
development, the over-use or mismanagement of resources, etc. It is operated through an Interim 
Measures Agreement, with a limited period of application. The third and final category mentioned 
above is community-based resource management, which is a Government initiative with minimal 
Aboriginal participation. 
The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement is a claim-based agreement that originated as an 
outcome of the court action by the Cree Nation against hydroelectric power developments in 
Quebec. Quebec’s territorial claim over the Cree and Inuit homeland without consulting them was 
legally ambiguous since there was no treaty between federal or provincial governments.346 Hence 
the Cree and Inuit approached the Quebec Superior Court against the provincial plans to move 
forward with a hydroelectric project. In 1973, the court ordered an injunction on the project, and 
subsequently, the parties entered into a series of negotiations which resulted in the first 
comprehensive land claims settlement in Canada.  
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The Nisga’a Final Agreement was also an outcome of the hard-fought legal battle between the 
Nisga’a of the Nass Valley and the government. The Yukon Land claims, which dealt with land 
claim agreements between First Nations and the federal government in Yukon is also a notable 
example. Before the negotiation of this agreement, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) 
was controlling affairs in the Yukon Territory. The First Nations in this region had only limited 
powers until the negotiation of self-governance agreements. The Umbrella Final Agreement which 
was first negotiated provided a model for the Yukon First Nations’ Final Agreements as well as 
the Self-Government Agreements. It recognized First Nations jurisdiction and vested authority in 
them for the management of resources and land use planning.347 Similarly, the Nunavut Land 
Claims Agreement established an Inuit-majority territory and extensive co-management 
arrangements.  Finally, the Inuvialuit Final Agreement is another example of an agreement 
underlining the significance of communities in the decision-making process.   
 
On the other hand, a reference to some of the crisis-based co-management in Canada is also very 
important at this juncture since constant struggles of communities have resulted in the negotiation 
of some of the notable crisis-based co-management agreements. The Gwaii Haanas Agreement is 
a unique co-management arrangement which asserted the authority of Haida Nation people in the 
preservation of Gwaii Haanas, a protected area in the province of British Columbia. The 
unsustainable timber logging practices led to widespread protests from the Haida Nation peoples 
and various other groups.348  This led to different treaty negotiations and finally resulted in the 
drafting of the Gwaii Haanas Agreement. This agreement contained parallel statements that 
acknowledged the sovereignty, ownership, and jurisdiction of the Haida Nations Council and the 
federal government simultaneously.349  
 
These instances illustrate how different co-management arrangements have become a standard tool 
to address the resource use conflicts in Canada. These negotiations were adopted as attempts 
towards non-confrontational resource governance. Various legal and political struggles have 
contributed to the growth of co-management regime in Canada. It has provided a platform for 
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including Aboriginal values and their traditional ecological knowledge in resource governance, 
thereby reducing the conflicts between Aboriginal peoples and the government agencies in the 
management of resources. Co-management was adopted as an attempt towards integrating 
Aboriginal peoples into the decision-making process. It seeks to ensure capacity development 
along with the integration of their cultural traditions.350 The provincial governments adopted this 
arrangement as a "tangible expression of a fundamental rethinking of rights and relationship.”351 
 
There are also places in Canada where Aboriginal groups entered into Interim Measure 
Agreements while negotiations were taking place. Interestingly, the upper hand that these interim 
agreements provided to the Aboriginal groups sometimes offered stronger protection to them than 
in some of the final agreements.352 Clayoquot Sound of Vancouver Island in British Columbia 
would potentially be an excellent example for such an attempt. Co-management efforts have 
developed as a key instrument in asserting the role of Aboriginal voices in forest resource 
management in British Columbia since it is “a province where few historic treaties were signed 
and where ownership of the land remains in question.”353 Hence, this research examines co-
management between Aboriginal peoples and the British Columbia provincial government through 
the example of Clayoquot Sound.   
 
4.5 Forest Land and Aboriginal Rights in British Columbia: From Colonial Alienation 
towards Co-management 
One-sixth of Aboriginal peoples in Canada live in British Columbia and the Aboriginal forest in 
this Province totals around 198,000 hectares.354 British Columbia is, in fact, the Province with the 
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second largest forest cover in Canada after Quebec, with a total of 57,910 million ha 355of forest 
land. Of this, provincial Crown land constitutes 96%, and 3% is privately owned.356  
Similarly, to in other parts of Canada, colonialism has pervasively influenced Aboriginal 
governance structures in British Columbia. The relationship with Aboriginal peoples was more of 
a partnership during the period between the 1770s and 1840s since the Aboriginal people had the 
upper hand over resource management.357 Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that this period 
transformed Aboriginal governance structures. New values, such as the accumulation of private 
land ownership, were imposed on Aboriginal communities at this time.358 The first phase of 
cooperative existence ended after the decline of the fur trade and the exploration of mineral 
resources by colonial powers.359 The Confederation of British Columbia in 1871 opened up the 
Province to further exploitation, which resulted in a strained relationship between Aboriginal 
peoples and government. The exclusion of Aboriginal communities from their land and resources, 
amongst other reasons (including income loss), adversely affected the Aboriginal population. This 
exclusion was concretized in the 20th century through various provincial government policies.360  
Notwithstanding the above, there was no substantial change in the condition of the Aboriginal 
peoples in British Columbia after British Columbia joined Confederation in 1871.  Moreover, as 
in any other Canadian Province, the Indian Act influenced Aboriginal culture and governance 
structures in British Columbia. John Giokas refers to Judge Scows’s statement which affirms that 
the Indian Act disturbed “the respected forms of government” of the Aboriginal people.361  For a 
very long period, the provincial government and the forest industry were the most important 
players in the management of the forests in British Columbia.362 Aboriginal peoples, with a value 
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system that was quite distinct from that of the government and industrial agencies, initially failed 
to penetrate into a formal forest governance regime. This exclusion created wide resistance in the 
form of direct action by Aboriginal peoples to establish sovereignty over their land. To an extent, 
this resistance helped Aboriginal peoples to retain their culture.363 In addition, British Columbia is 
a province that has been at the forefront of Indigenous legal activism.364 Haida activism is an 
example of how these direct actions have sometimes resulted in important government 
decisions.365  
The Supreme Court of Canada first acknowledged the self-government rights of Aboriginal people 
in Delgamuukw v British Columbia, which recognized unextinguished Aboriginal rights.366 This 
led to the creation of the British Columbia Treaty Commission to facilitate and negotiating treaties. 
The “negotiation update” of the British Columbia Treaty Commission clarified that two-thirds of 
Aboriginal people were involved in the modern treaty process in British Columbia. In many cases, 
Interim Measures Agreements were entered into during claims negotiation, and some evolved as 
significant forms of co-management in Canada. Further, Aboriginal resistance resulted in 
recognition of Aboriginal rights in some provincial legislation. 
 
As a result of all these activities, forest governance and Aboriginal policies in British Columbia 
have undergone a substantial transformation over the past few decades. The decisions in 
Delgamuukw and Haida also pressured the provincial government into establishing a new forest 
governance regime that is inclusive of Aboriginal peoples.    
In 2003, the provincial government of British Columbia initiated some crucial steps through the 
enactment of the Forest (First Nations Development) Amendment Act, 2002 (Bill 41) and the 
adoption of the Forest Revitalization Plan.367 Bill 41, which added section 47.3 to the Forest Act, 
provided discretionary powers to the Minister of Forests of British Columbia to invite applications 
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from First Nations for granting small-scale timber tenures if they enter into an agreement with the 
provincial government. These agreements were called “forest and range agreements” or “direct 
award agreements.”368  Further, a comprehensive provincial policy was introduced by the 
Provincial Government to incorporate the Aboriginal interests through consultation on matters 
relating to the management and development of land and resources of the Crown. 
  
However, dissatisfaction amongst Aboriginal peoples lingered on since their participation was 
almost ornamental and forest industry representatives were playing a crucial role in shaping these 
policies along with the Government agencies.369 Also, the forest and range agreements based on a 
per-capita formula were causing discontentment in many First Nation groups. Huu- Ay-Aht First 
Nations challenged this in the Supreme Court of British Columbia and was successful in obtaining 
an order which categorically held that the existing forest and range agreements that are reliant on 
the population-based formulae do not satisfy the requirement of good-faith consultation and 
accommodation.370  
 
In 2010, the Provincial Government of BC initiated steps to revamp the forest and range 
agreements and devised forestry specific interim measure agreement i.e. Forest Consultation 
Revenue Sharing Agreement (FCRSA) and the Forest Tenure Opportunity Agreement (FTOA). 
Various factors including the decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court in Huu-Ay-Aht 
triggered the process of adoption of these agreements.371 FCRSAs offered economic benefits to 
First Nations through revenue-sharing procedures. On the other hand, FTOAs were more of an 
area-based tenure arrangement that lent a vital role to First Nations in resource management. 
FCRSAs were a notable shift from the previously existing population-based formulae to a revenue-
sharing formula. They relied on the percentage of revenue derived from forest-related activities in 
a First Nation territory.372 However, the agreement is passive on the extent of infringement that a 
particular forestry activity may cause. Moreover, the provincial government continues to have the 
upper hand in the decision-making relating to these agreements.   
                                                 
368 Ibid at 303. 
369 Ibid at 299-300. 
370 Huu-Ay-Aht First Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2005 BCSC 697 at para 56-59, 33 Admin LR 
(4th) 123. 
371 Forsyth, Hoberg & Bird, supra note 367367 at 308. 
372 Ibid at 308-309.  
92 
 
Similarly, First Nations Woodland Licenses (FNWLs) developed in 2010 were a further tenure 
innovation but without different consequences. FNWLs were adopted to provide licenses to 
harvest timber on the Crown land. This was also an important tenure reform which enhanced the 
role of Aboriginal peoples in the forest management in British Columbia. However, as rightly 
observed by Lisa Ambus and George Hoberg, the tenure structures “are not as substantive, 
comprehensive, or innovative as originally envisioned.”373 
 
Having said that, we cannot deny the fact that the adoption of these policies and agreements has 
contributed to a substantial transformation of the forest economy in the province of British 
Columbia. The evolution of a new Aboriginal forest tenure played an important role in the 
transformation of the forest governance regime in British Columbia. Above, the development of 
co-management in the forms of various legislations and policies has been discussed, including its 
significance as emerging legality. The increased participation of Aboriginal peoples in decision-
making processes has been a critical step in forest management within British Columbia. For the 
Aboriginal population, their empowerment is not only about authority but also about claiming 
rights over their traditional territories.  Clayoquot Sound in British Columbia is a noteworthy 
example since it is an advanced co-management arrangement that has been active for more than a 
decade.374 The next section will discuss the example of Clayoquot Sound and examine the role of 
Aboriginal institutions, especially in decision-making over forest management. 
 
4.6 An Analysis of Clayoquot Sound 
Canada’s co-management regimes are evolving and promising institutional arrangements for a 
resource governance framework.375 Their significance for forest management has already been 
discussed previously in this thesis.  Co-management is highlighted as a pragmatic decolonization 
instrument to challenge the authoritarian position adopted by the state against Aboriginal peoples. 
The forest and its resources are recognized as an integral part of the life and culture of Aboriginal 
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communities in Canada. However, various developmental projects, such as mining, and resource 
extraction have affected the mutuality of the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the 
forest.376 An example of Clayoquot Sound is consequently an important illustration of one of the 
most evolved co-management processes in Canada.377 Clayoquot Sound is mostly inhabited by the 
Ahousaht, Hesquiaht, Tla-o-qui-aht, Toquaht, and Ucluelet of Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations. It is 
one of the most pristine forests on Vancouver Island, spread over 350,000 hectares. To understand 
more about Clayoquot Sound, it is vital to grasp the historical and political context that empowered 
First Nation communities to bring about effective co-management.  
The Province of British Columbia witnessed its biggest incidence of civil disobedience in the mid-
1980s and 1990, when conflict flared up between the government and First Nations over natural 
resources.378 The main factors triggering this movement consisted of the forestry policies of British 
Columbia’s provincial government, which allowed foreign investors to obtain long-term logging 
leases in the region. The idea was to generate foreign capital, without giving any attention to the 
protection and conservation of old growth forests. Neither were the interests of most of the local 
inhabitants considered.  First Nations and some environmental non-governmental organizations 
consequently set up blockades on logging roads, which even resulted in an international boycott 
of forest products from British Columbia.379 For example, media coverage, along with these 
protests, discouraged international buyers of MacMillan Bloedel products.380  However, the 
blockaders were not interested only in protecting the forest, but also in promoting the recognition 
of Aboriginal title. The Clayoquot Sound band declared this land as a “tribal park” in an attempt 
to claim their title on the basis of socio-cultural and economic values.381  
The ensuing political struggle contributed to the transformation of forest policy in British 
Columbia, where timber companies and the provincial government had the upper hand over 
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determining the timber harvest and other important forest policies.382 The conflicts then took a 
radical shift in 1985, when the Chiefs of the Ahousaht and Tla-o-qui-aht First Nations obtained an 
injunction to prevent logging at Meares Island until their land claims were recognized.  This was 
the first court intervention with an impact on resource development efforts in British Columbia, 
based on a claim to Aboriginal title.383 Further to this, the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable 
Development Task Force was established by the Government of British Columbia to resolve these 
conflicts in 1989. However, the Task Force failed to resolve them, since they could not reach a 
consensus on the land use plan. It resulted in the issuing of the Clayoquot Sound Land Use 
Decision in 1993, guaranteeing protection to just 34% of the land base.  
Environmentalists and the Nuu-chah-nulth First Nation were dissatisfied with the above decision, 
since they had not been adequately consulted in the process.384 This further triggered a massive 
protest in the region, which resulted in over 800 arrests. One of a kind, the protest put immense 
pressure on the provincial government to expedite negotiation efforts with the Nuu-chah-nulth 
First Nation. An Interim Measures Agreement was subsequently signed, thus establishing the 
Clayoquot Sound Central Region Board in 1994.385 This Interim Measures Agreement guaranteed 
the Nuu-chah-nulth First Nation with some control over their traditional land and resources. 
Meanwhile, the Central Region Board had equal participation from both the Provincial 
Government and Nuu-chah-nulth First Nation, with the power to review all land use and resource 
management.  
The Central Region Board consists of five First Nation representatives from each First Nation in 
Canada’s central region (one member each from the Ahousaht, Hesquiaht, Tla-o-qui-aht, Toquaht 
and Ucluelet of Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations), five non-First Nations representatives from the 
British Columbia Government, and finally, one Co-chair appointed by the Province and one Co-
chair appointed by the First Nations.  One of the main functions of the Central Region Board 
includes the promotion of sustainable economic development, the evaluation of compliance with 
forest standards, and the development of sustainable forest industry in line with increasing local 
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ownership, inter alia. The decision-making of the Central Region Board is mainly consensus-
based and in the absence of a consensus, determined by a double majority vote, whereby most of 
the First Nation representatives and Board members must approve.  If the Central Region Board 
recommendations are not complied with by the end of a stipulated period of 30 days, the matter 
may be referred for an Interim Measures Agreement and to a corresponding cabinet. If any of the 
parties are then dissatisfied with the decision of the cabinet, a dispute resolution body, known as 
the Central Region Resource Council may be called upon to intervene .386 
Thus, an Interim Measures Agreement is projected as a system of provincial and First Nation co-
management in the area. Moreover, through the Central Region Board, some scope is ensured for 
dialogue with the community over the use of land and resources in Clayoquot Sound. Additionally, 
a Scientific Panel for Sustainable Forest Practices was formed in Clayoquot to trace the 
community’s sustainable forest management practices, combining these with scientific and 
traditional knowledge. In addition, this Panel was entrusted with the responsibility to examine 
forest policies in the Clayoquot region. The provincial government accepted over 170 of the 
Panel’s recommendation and the Central Region Board was obliged to ensure that these were 
applied.387 Furthermore, the Clayoquot Sound Planning Committee was established by the 
provincial government to implement the recommendations of the Scientific Panel.  
In 1997, MacMillan Bloedel began the permanent closure of its Clayoquot Sound operations, 
owing to various factors, including the recommendations of the Scientific Panel, First Nation 
negotiations with the provincial government, the fall in the timber market, and various protests 
and campaigns organized by local communities and environmental organizations.388 However, in 
2000, MacMillan Bloedel’s operations were taken over by Weyerhauser Canada. At present, there 
are two major forest tenures in Clayoquot Sound: International Forest Products Limited (Interfor) 
and Lisaak Forest Resources Limited (Lisaak).389 Lisaak is highlighted as a significant effort, due 
to its inclusion of Indigenous values in sustainable logging and its conservation-based forest 
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management. It is in fact a joint venture, wherein both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people are 
parties. Thus, it was a shift from volume-based forestry to value-based forestry.390  Nevertheless, 
an analysis of Lisaak’s progress to date will reveal that the entire focus is on the economic aspect 
of the forest, rather than developing an Aboriginal institutional arrangement for sustainable 
resource governance.   
 
4.6.1 Challenges in Clayoquot Sound 
An analysis of co-management arrangements in Clayoquot Sound will prove that various 
challenges have been faced by Nuu-chah-nulth First Nation communities in the process of co-
management. The Clayoquot co-management effort was an attempt to offer equal partnership to 
First Nations and the Provincial Government with regard to forest management. However, there 
have been various obstacles faced by communities during these efforts, even though the Scientific 
Panel specified participation from First Nations and decision-making over forest management. 
, In their study on co-management efforts in Clayoquot Sound, Mabee and Hoberg conducted 
interviews with various stakeholders involved in the process.391 Their study clarified that the 
majority of First Nation communities, as well as government agencies, admit that the decision-
making process of the Central Region Board does not provide equal partnership for First 
Nations.392 Central Region Board decisions are vested with the right to make recommendations to 
provincial Ministers, while the statutory decision-making power is vested in the Ministry of 
Forests.393 Above all, the extension period of the Interim Measures Agreement was reduced to one 
year in 2008, which rendered communities powerless to make any long-term plans.394 
There are various problems relating to the crisis-based co-management efforts implemented at 
Clayoquot Sound.395 The dispute resolution body of the Clayoquot Sound Central Region Resource 
Council does not have proper guidelines for its work, and this has led to serious ambiguities, 
                                                 
390 Gabriela Pechlaner & D. B. Tindall, “Changing Contexts: Environmentalism, Aboriginal Community and Forest 
Company Joint Ventures, and the Formation of Lisaak” in Tindall, Trosper & Perreault, supra note 36, 260 at 269. 
391 See generally Mabee & Hoberg, supra note 350. 
392 Ibid at 881. 
393 Mabee et al, “Co-Management of Forest Lands”, supra note 37 at 248-249. 
394 Ibid at 243-256. 
395 Alfonso Peter Castro & Erik Nielsen “Indigenous people and Co-management: implications for conflict 
management” (2001) 4 Environmental Science & Policy 230. 
97 
whenever there are conflicting interests.396 The territorial overlap when two or more First Nations 
are involved also plays an important role in delaying the whole process of land claims in 
Clayoquot.  These factors indicate that there are various institutional challenges to the Clayoquot 
Sound model, which are mainly due to a difference in perceptions between Aboriginal peoples and 
State Government, regarding the role and responsibilities of the co-management board.  
Additionally, the ultimate statutory decision-making power is vested in the Provincial 
Government. Hence, the projection of First Nations as equal partners with Provincial Government 
is not realistic. Various other factors were projected as reasons for limiting the equal partnership 
of First Nations and the Government. These include the lower number of politically active First 
Nation members involved, the capabilities of First Nation members, complex scientific planning 
processes, and distrust of existing colonial systems.397  The Scientific Panel’s recommendation 
that the “co-management of the Clayoquot Sound ecosystem must be based on an equal partnership 
between the Nuu-chah-nulth and the Province of British Columbia” also granted equal powers to 
the Provincial Government over the co-management process. The institutional arrangement, 
whereby the role of Government agencies and First Nations are not properly demarcated, has led 
to more difficulties in implementation.398  Scholars such as Mabee highlight that there is an absence 
of “strong institutional and legal structures” with “proper decision-making powers” and this has 
slowed the Clayoquot Sound co-management.399  
 
4.7 Important Judicial Interventions Regarding Aboriginal Consent in Resource 
Governance 
Above, the challenges to forest governance in Canada were discussed, with the example of 
Clayoquot Sound highlighting these in an applied context. This section will now examine the 
jurisprudence surrounding resource governance. The significance of Aboriginal consent in 
resource governance is well-defined in Chapter II. Furthermore, the development of tribal consent 
in India through an analysis of FRA judgments has been examined.  
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In Canada, Aboriginal jurisprudence took a new direction after the decision of the Supreme Court 
in Calder. Moreover, Aboriginal rights are “recognized and affirmed” under section 35(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. Imai argues that these developments, acknowledging Aboriginal title, 
triggered a process of legal efforts to undo the historical injustices inflicted on Canada’s Aboriginal 
peoples.400 It affirms the role of Aboriginal institutions and their consent in resource governance. 
This transformation in the legal framework has in turn given rise to various forms of social and 
legal activism in Canada. The discussions surrounding the role of Aboriginal peoples in resource 
governance became lively after the intervention of the Supreme Court through a series of important 
decisions under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act. However, there is still some reluctance on 
the part of the “settler government” “to acknowledge that Indigenous “consent” is required”.401  
Free Prior and Informed Consent has already been discussed in this thesis, as mandated elsewhere 
under UNDRIP. The major concern indicated by Canada against the adoption of UNDRIP was its 
incompatibility with the existing Constitutional framework. For example, current constitutional 
standards are not directly in consonance with the requirement for FPIC.402 The conflicts between 
federal government policy and judicial decisions also cause delays in the process of adopting 
UNDRIP in Canada.  
This research focusses on consent, as discussed within Aboriginal title and rights cases decided by 
the Supreme Court of Canada. Calder, which discussed Aboriginal claims submitted by the 
Nisga’a Nation, was the first significant decision of the Supreme Court to recognize the existence 
of Aboriginal title in Canada. Judges of the Supreme Court were divided over the question of 
extinguishment in this case. However, it was in R v Sparrow that the Supreme Court of Canada 
first interpreted section 35(1) of the Constitution.403 This decision discussed the fishing rights of 
the Musqueam Nation in British Columbia.  The Musqueam Nation raised various claims, 
including their right of self-determination and the right to ownership over hunting and fisheries 
under section 35(1) of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court denied the claim for self-
governance and maintained the indisputability of the Crown’s sovereignty, stating that “there was 
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from the outset never any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power… [was] vested in the 
Crown”.404 McNeil (2006) argues that denial by the Supreme Court to accept the self-governing 
authority of the Musqueam Nation “may have been a conscious decision by the Supreme Court to 
leave ‘the issue of self-regulation open for subsequent consideration’”.405 Concurrently, a 
justification analysis was set out through Sparrow to assess the infringement of section 35(1) of 
the Constitution Act. This test analyzes the extent of infringement caused by legislation, which 
“has the effect of interfering with an existing [A]boriginal right.” It also examines the justification 
put forth in this regard and vested in the Federal Government, for the power to extinguish 
Aboriginal rights before the enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982. However, the Supreme Court 
clarified that “the consent to its extinguishment before the Constitution Act, 1982, was not 
required.”406  
The question of infringement was discussed in R v Van der Peet,407,  and Lamer CJ in his majority 
opinion added with reference to the test laid down in Sparrow that  
…after the claimant has demonstrated that the legislation in question constitutes a 
prima facie infringement of his or her aboriginal right, the onus then shifts again to the 
Crown to prove that the infringement is justified. Courts will be asked, at this stage, to 
balance and reconcile the conflicting interests of native people, on the one hand, and 
of the rest of Canadian society, on the other.408 
  
It should be noted that the authority, here, is given to the Crown to assess whether there has been 
an infringement. In itself, this indicates the upper hand of the Crown and the emphasis placed by 
the Supreme Court on Crown sovereignty over Aboriginal sovereignty. Thomas Isaac presents a 
different view of this aspect, although he subscribes to the argument that Sparrow failed to make 
any specific mention of Aboriginal sovereignty or self-government: “in Sparrow, the Supreme 
Court has opened the door for using section 35 to promote the recognition and affirmation of 
Aboriginal self-government”.409  However, it was in Delgamuukw v British Columbia that the 
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Supreme Court attempted to interpret Aboriginal consent in resource governance.410 This case 
underwent a thirteen-year long legal process and considered Aboriginal title claims of the Gitksan 
and Wet’suwet’en peoples. Delgamuukw distinguishes Aboriginal title from other “normal” 
proprietary interests; describing it as sui generis. Also discussed was the significance of Aboriginal 
consent, clarifying that “in some cases ‘full consent of an Aboriginal nation’ should be a 
requirement, particularly when provinces enact hunting and fishing regulations in relation to 
Aboriginal lands”.411 In the same decision, while considering the question of the right to self-
government, the Supreme Court relied on the judgment in R v Pamajewon412and held that 
Aboriginal "rights to self-government, if they existed, cannot be framed in excessively general 
terms”.413 On the other hand, the Court was slow to acknowledge the colonial origin of state 
sovereignty. John Borrows argues that “the court was quite willing to frame Crown rights to self-
government in the most "excessive and general" of terms.”414  
Delgamuukw has certainly carried forward discussions on Aboriginal consent. However, 
overemphasis on Crown sovereignty has diminished the impact of these attempts. For instance, 
even the three-part test set out in paragraph 26 of the judgment puts the burden on Aboriginal 
groups to prove that 
(i) the land must have been occupied prior to sovereignty, (ii) if present occupation is 
relied on as proof of occupation pre-sovereignty, there must be a continuity between 
present and pre-sovereignty occupation, and (iii) at sovereignty, that occupation must 
have been exclusive.415 
Delgamuukw confirmed the position held in Sparrow, which gave Federal Government the power 
to extinguish Aboriginal rights before the enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982, without the 
consent of the Aboriginal people. It could be convincingly argued here that this emphasis on  
Crown sovereignty in Delgamuukw has impaired Aboriginal consent and Aboriginal self-
governance substantially.  
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Up until 2004, there were other deep ambiguities regarding the obligations of the Crown towards 
Indigenous peoples. The intervention of the Supreme Court of Canada in three different cases, 
Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests)416, Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British 
Columbia (Project Assessment Director)417 and Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Minister of 
Canadian Heritage) (2005)418 changed the jurisprudential history of Aboriginal governance.  These 
judgments highlighted the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate Aboriginal peoples in cases 
where the existence and scope of their rights remain uncertain. The three judgments redefined the 
relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal populations in the country.419 Dwight 
Newman argues that a “new realm of Aboriginal law” was subsequently established.420 In Haida, 
the Minister abstained from consulting the Aboriginal communities concerned on their license 
claim to the archipelago of Haida Gwaii, but Chief Justice McLachlin held that the Crown has the 
“ultimate legal responsibility” to consult and accommodate Aboriginal rights.421 
Haida may require the Crown to engage in “deep consultation,” where there may be a challenge 
to Aboriginal rights. Although there are ambiguities over the “duty to accommodate”, Haida 
makes it clear that “the Crown must balance Aboriginal concerns reasonably with the potential 
impact of the decision on the asserted rights or title and with other social interests.”422 This 
accommodation is not mandated within the framework of consultation, but in some cases, it will 
“be required as a component of the duty to consult”.423 The duty to accommodate in this instance 
is only considered as “good faith efforts to understand each other’s concerns and move to address 
them”. “Full consent of [the] aboriginal nation” on serious issues is only necessary in cases of 
“intrusions on settled claims.”424 This implies that consent discussed in this decision is confined 
to established rights and not stretched to unresolved Aboriginal title claims, whereby the courts 
emphasize only a “balancing of Aboriginal and other interests.” Although “spectrum analysis”, 
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explained in Haida, is a step towards seeking Aboriginal consent, it varies depending on the 
strength of the claims.  
The Taku River decision discussed a conflict over the transboundary claims of the Taku River 
Tlingit First Nation, with a proposed road for a mining project. The Supreme Court followed the 
same proposition as in Haida, namely that accommodation requires a balance between Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal considerations. The Mikisew decision, dealing with the rights of the Mikisew 
Cree First Nation under Treaty 8, was decided along similar lines. It discussed the failure of the 
Federal Government to consult Mikisew Cree First Nation when approving the construction of a 
winter road in Wood Buffalo National Park. In Mikisew, the Supreme Court extended the Duty to 
Consult and Accommodate, as discussed in Haida concerning treaty rights425and held that this case 
comes at the end of the spectrum, with minimal potential impact. Although this case did not 
directly discuss the consent framework, it touched upon the veto rights of the Aboriginal people 
over matters affecting their treaty rights. The Supreme Court clarified that 
had the consultation process gone ahead, it would not have given the Mikisew a veto over 
the alignment of the road.  As emphasized in Haida Nation, consultation will not always 
lead to accommodation, and accommodation may or may not result in agreement.426  
Hence, it could be argued that even though Mikisew clarified some issues surrounding the duty to 
consult and accommodate, it did not take the debates on Aboriginal consent any further.  Similarly, 
in 2010, the Supreme Court confirmed its position through Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks 
First Nation (2010), holding that “the First Nation does not have a veto over the approval process.” 
427 
 
4.7.1 Tsilhqot’in - A New Dimension of Aboriginal Consent 
Tsilhqot’in is a watershed decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, which redefined the history 
of Aboriginal consent in Canada. The Tsilhqot’in Nation consists of six bands and around 3000 
citizens in central British Columbia. Here, the Supreme Court extended the scope of Aboriginal 
title “beyond physically occupied sites, to surrounding lands over which a Nation has effective 
                                                 
425 Mikisew supra note 418 at para 3. 
426 Ibid at para 66. 
427 2010 SCC 53 at para 14, [2010] 3 SCR 103 [Little Salmon cited to SCC]. 
103 
control.”428 The Court recognized the Tsilhqot’in Nation’s Aboriginal title to approximately 1,700 
square km by upholding 
ownership rights similar to those associated with fee simple, including: the right to decide 
how the land will be used; the right of enjoyment and occupancy of the land; the right to 
possess the land; the right to the economic benefits of the land; and the right to pro-
actively use and manage the land.429 
Although there were differing opinions regarding the governance capacity of a nomadic 
community like the Tsilhqot’in Nation, the Court gave them the benefit of the doubt and ruled in 
their favour, citing  
evidence of a strong presence on or over the land claimed, manifesting itself in acts of 
occupation that could reasonably be interpreted as demonstrating that the land in question 
belonged to, was controlled by, or was under the exclusive stewardship of the claimant 
group.430 
Tsilhqot’in made the consent of Aboriginal people compulsory in the case of a proven Aboriginal 
title. Nevertheless, although the Supreme Court in Tsilhqot’in shows some inclination towards 
Aboriginal consent, the vesting of the Crown with some exceptional powers limits its application. 
There are in fact many statements within the case which restrict the scope of Aboriginal consent.  
Tsilhqot’in confirmed Delgamuukw and provided the Crown with the authority to infringe 
Aboriginal rights, referring to Lamar, C.J. in Delgamuukw where he stated that when land is 
required for 
agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the general economic development 
of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered species, 
the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations to support those 
aims, are the kinds of objectives that are consistent with this purpose and, in principle, 
can justify the infringement of [A]boriginal title.431  
The Supreme Court gave the Crown the authority to justify infringement, if “(1) it has discharged 
its duty to consult and accommodate; (2) its actions were backed by a compelling and substantial 
objective; and (3) the action was consistent with the government’s fiduciary duty”.432 The Sparrow 
test mandates proof of a “compelling and substantial” purpose as a precondition for this 
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infringement, which in itself, has a nullifying effect on any attempt to bring Aboriginal consent 
into Aboriginal title claims. The Supreme Court also decided that the Crown’s overriding power 
must not “substantially deprive future generations of the benefit of the land”.433  
A significant gap in Tsilhqot’in was its recognition of Crown sovereignty over Aboriginal 
sovereignty. The finding of the Court that terra nullius is not applicable in Canada was far from 
descriptively true of the path of Canadian law, and the approach of the court has created many 
challenges for the Aboriginal peoples in asserting their sovereignty over their land.434Having said 
that, it cannot be denied that Tsilhqot’in was a decision on the right path, since a change in the 
relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples cannot be achieved in a day. Neither can 
it be denied that judgments like Tsilhqot’in provided an opportunity to think beyond the limitations 
of Colonial institutions in the decision-making process. However, the indication coming from 
recent Supreme Court judgments on the duty to consult and accommodate, like the 2017 decision 
in Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations)435 shows 
that a great deal of deliberation is required over this issue. The judgment makes it clear that 
unsatisfied claimants do not have any veto power and, in the case, “where adequate consultation 
has occurred, a development may proceed without consent.”436 
Thus, an analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada judgment makes it clear that the Canadian courts 
need to take further action to incorporate Indigenous consent into the decision-making process. 
They do indeed emphasize consultation, accommodation and the justification of infringement, but 
lack the concept of Aboriginal consent or veto power in decision-making. The adoption of consent 
in international instruments, such as the ILO, UNDRIP. etc. are an indication of its significance 
for resource governance. Analysis conducted in this part of the present thesis makes it clear that 
decolonization is an ongoing process and success in the court room is very limited.  
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4.8 Conclusion on the Canadian Context 
Co-management regimes facilitate a symbiotic relationship, which allows both Aboriginal peoples 
and state agencies to learn from each other.437 However, various factors can hinder the co-
management process in Canada, since communities are still struggling to overcome the damage 
caused by Colonial legislation and policies over the years, including the Indian Act. The Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal People rightly points out that co-management should be a merging of 
two different systems, so as to avoid the assertion and supremacy of one over the other. However, 
the present case study highlights that state agencies have a domineering power in co-management 
regimes.  
An analysis of the co-management regime in Clayoquot Sound revealed that Aboriginal 
institutions and their decision-making powers are not given due importance in the process of forest 
resource governance. The top-down bureaucratic approaches developed through Colonial 
legislation and institutions play a significant role in policy formulation and execution, reflecting a 
reluctance to acknowledge Aboriginal autonomy.  
In the present example, especially instances such as land use planning, state agencies like the 
Ministry of Forests play a pivotal role. In contrast, the Central Region Board merely serves as a de 
facto advisory body, since First Nations are not joint signatories to forestry plans.438 The unequal 
representation of heterogeneous First Nation groups on the Central Region Board is a precipitating 
factor that delays the implementation of a co-management arrangement. Moreover, the fact that 
the functioning of a co-management board is dependent on funding from the provincial 
government has a strong bearing on the decision-making process. The provincial government, 
therefore, continues to perform its role as a hierarchical authority and dominates decision-making. 
As a result, it may be observed that the state remains at the center of the decision-making process 
and in effect, this reproduces a top-down model of resource governance. In many cases, the 
decision-making authorities are state agencies.  
Aside from the above, the nature of this specific example is a determining factor. Clayoquot Sound 
is party to a crisis-based co-management agreement and unlike claim-based co-management, this 
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relies on an Interim Measures Agreement for its implementation. Ambiguous terms and conditions 
in agreements are an important factor impacting on the recognition of decision-making power to 
Aboriginal peoples. The shifting of government priorities, once the crisis fades from public 
memory, is an important drawback of crisis-based co-management.439 That said, it may also be 
observed that there are instances where co-management efforts in Canada have offered 
institutional arrangements with scope for higher decision-making powers to be awarded to 
Aboriginal peoples. The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement were one of the first co-
management agreements to ensure a legally defined role for the Cree and Inuit people of Northern 
Quebec, in the management of their traditional land and resources. It was cited as a significant 
deviation from the imposition of an industrial mode of forestry on Aboriginal peoples.440 Claim-
based co-management efforts in Gwaii Haanas for the preservation of a protected area represent 
another example. Under this Gwaii Haanas Agreement, the Haida Nation was given equal 
decision-making power alongside Parks Canada, since they demanded a joint signatory status.441 
However, the fact remains that these examples are exceptions and not rules and there is a 
consequent need for strong institutional and legal structures concerning the proper implementation 
of co-management efforts in Canada. 
The demand for an autonomous Aboriginal government is based on the premise that their 
jurisdiction over their traditional territories will result in a strong decision-making process. 
However, it is not difficult to understand that Canada is reluctant to grant complete jurisdiction 
over these alleged Aboriginal territories, because of their high potential to generate revenue.442 
Hence, a decentralization process to empower Aboriginal Government with rights and 
responsibilities that are equal or comparable to those of Provincial and Federal Government is 
considered highly important. In contrast, recognition of these powers and responsibilities to 
Aboriginal Government will result in an equitable and sustainable governance process. It could 
even be argued that an appropriate administrative and political power transfer would enhance 
Aboriginal decision-making.443  
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In the final part of this chapter, Aboriginal jurisprudence on the duty to consult and accommodate 
was analyzed, since it is considered as the most promising development to vest decision-making 
power for resource governance in Aboriginal institutions. Consultation and accommodation is in 
fact an attempt to incorporate Aboriginal voices into the decision-making process on resource 
governance. Unfortunately, however, the duty to consult and accommodate rather empowers the 
Crown to justify infringement through the Sparrow test and underlines the fact that Canada’s 
Aboriginal peoples do not have the right of veto. The contribution of the latest judgments of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Tsilhqot’in and Ktunaxa is difficult to be considered to offer 
encouraging indications.  It may be concluded that the present legal framework for the duty to 
consult and accommodate in Canada does not mandate for “consent” from traditional Aboriginal 
institutions in forest resource governance and this has had an adverse effect on the journey towards 












CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
 
The principal focus of this thesis is to explore different ways in which the emerging legality of 
decentralization in India and Canada have accommodated Indigenous peoples’ voices in forest 
resource governance. Although there is a common colonial past, the two jurisdictions evolved in 
two different ways on their approach towards decentralized forest governance. Two significant 
legal reforms in these countries have consequently been explored, namely the FRA in India and 
the co-management regime in Canada, in order to investigate decentralized forest governance in 
both jurisdictions. Functionalist method, in this context, offers an appropriate tool to analyze two 
different systems when similarity is observed in the nature of the problem that they face. 444   
 
Different circumstantial factors contributed to ushering in these changes with the legal systems in 
both these countries. Various treaties and agreements signed between the Aboriginal peoples and 
the Crown created a notion that the Aboriginal peoples are vested with some sovereign powers in 
Canada. However, in India, the situation was slightly different due to its unique socio-political and 
cultural setting. The prevalent hierarchies within the society including caste system were some of 
the predominant reasons which alienated the tribal people. Thus, the oppression faced by the tribal 
peoples in India was two-pronged, coming both from the upper caste, mainstream society as well 
as the colonial and post-colonial governments. 
 
The situation worsened during the post-colonial phase and resulted in strengthening resentment 
within the tribal communities in India. The post-colonial exclusionary resource governance 
policies and the large-scale displacement of tribal communities in the name of development 
significantly worsened the plight of these communities. The tribal populations in India were 
considered as encroachers on their land for a very long period. The cultural, social as well as 
political disparities, so created, led to strong indignation amongst the tribal peoples in India. 
Although the Constitution of India ensured various rights and privileges to the tribal populations, 
it remained confined to the text. However, a major policy shift occurred after the adoption of a 
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Joint Forest Management and 73rd and 74th Constitutional amendment. The amendment created a 
platform for democratizing the resource governance and underlined the role of tribal institutions 
in the process.  Different grassroots movements and civil society organizations simultaneously 
pushed for a policy level change that demanded vesting of power with Gram Sabhas in the forest 
resource governance. Although initially uncoordinated, the parallel efforts of different groups, 
institutions, and individuals consolidated at a later stage, strengthening the overall push for 
reforms. The attempt was to create a new legal regime that stresses the role of traditional tribal 
institutions and their decisions in forest resource governance. The enactment of the FRA was in 
furtherance of these many varying reasons. 
 
Although there are similarities in the nature of the institutions administering resource governance 
in Canada and India, the legal regime in Canada is evolving in a differing way. Co-management 
regimes, which are one of the major facets of such an evolution, emphasizes a power-sharing 
model rather than a devolutionary model with strong decision-making powers vested in the 
Aboriginal peoples. The primacy accorded to private industry as well as provincial governments 
in resource governance policies have impeded the interests of Aboriginal peoples in forest resource 
management. The focus of these policies tends to veer away from strengthening the Aboriginal 
institutions and instead approaches a limited concept of power-sharing. Furthermore, in most cases 
the central theme revolves around the idea of economic benefit-sharing. 
 
The dependency of Indigenous peoples on forest resources in India and Canada is also a significant 
factor. In Canada, although the Aboriginal peoples are largely closely linked with the forests, their 
lives and livelihood are not fully dependent on it. On the other hand, in India, one-quarter of the 
land comes under the category of “forest,” and the majority of the tribal peoples in India are 
dependent on the forest and its resources for their livelihood. Thus, the treatment of the tribal 
peoples as encroachers in their own land caused bitterness amongst them across India. This is one 
of the reasons for the divergence in the political and legal evolution between India and Canada. 
While such a movement pushed for the decentralization of powers to the tribal population in India 
and ultimately compelled the government to enact comprehensive legislation like the FRA, it was 
different in Canada. There is a marked absence of consolidated political and civil society 
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movements demanding a legal framework that asserts the role of the Aboriginal people in forest 
resource governance. 
 
Distinctions between Canadian and Indian federalism are also an influential factor in causing a 
variance in the legal evolution within these two jurisdictions. Acute socio-cultural diversity within 
the country demanded a strong center in India that stressed a unitary state which has only a 
subsidiary federal nature. Matters relating to forests come under the Concurrent List.  Although 
the state legislature has equal powers with the central government on subjects under the Concurrent 
List, the Constitution of India insists that it should not be in conflict with any of existing central 
legislation. Since the FRA is central legislation, it brings uniformity to the evolving legal regime 
across the states in India. On the other hand, in Canada, the provinces are vested with exclusive 
powers on matters relating to conservation and management of forest resource. Section 92A, added 
in 1982, “provides permanent safeguards of the provinces’ constitutional position” and offers a 
greater footing to the Provinces in the negotiation process.445 Therefore, Canadian federalism 
limits the scope for the enactment of legislation like the FRA and developing a legal framework in 
harmony with other federal and provincial legislation in Canada. 
 
Thus, the two jurisdictions which are under study in this research have similarities within their 
differences. However, from a functionalist standpoint, what is to be paid attention to is the 
similarity in the nature of the challenges faced and the approach within the solutions devised. The 
challenges, as explained throughout this thesis, display striking similarities. The solutions also 
have an analogous conceptual background of decentralization, although contextual factors may 
have contributed to divergent outcomes. This divergence in outcomes is what this thesis attempted 
to decipher. Again, instead of focusing on the difference in those outcomes, the focus ought to 
remain “… on their relation to specific function under which they are regarded”.446 
 
The implementation of the FRA in the village of Mendha Lekha in the Indian State of Maharashtra 
and co-management efforts in Clayoquot Sound in British Columbia comprised the two 
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illustrations adopted to analyze the question at hand. This research was subsequently developed 
around two main analytical frameworks, i.e. the devolution of power and authority to Indigenous 
institutions in both these forest reform contexts and the decision-making power vested in these 
institutions regarding resource governance.  
Chapter II proceeded by outlining the significance of the devolution of power to local institutions 
in the process of democratic decentralization. Autonomous decision-making power vested in these 
institutions should ensure robust, decentralized governance. However, the system applied in the 
Clayoquot Sound co-management continues to follow a Colonial model of forest governance, 
which devolves essential powers to the Provincial Ministry of Forests. As rightly pointed out by 
Tindall and Trosper, forest governance in Canada is more or less at a transitional stage between 
“assimilation” and shared power,447 with effective decentralization still in its nascent stage. 
Clayoquot Sound projects a power-sharing model that is reliant on an Interim Measures 
Agreement, with the equal participation of representatives from Provincial Government and 
Aboriginal peoples. However, the challenge is that each First Nation communities have only one 
representative against five Provincial Government representatives. This upsets the balance within 
the decision-making process. As a result, the demand from communities for equal nation-to-nation 
representation is not being properly met and representation is still on a regional basis.448 The 
Central Region Board therefore serves as an agency to integrate First Nation perspectives, rather 
than simply projecting their voices. Moreover, the decisions of the Board are merely 
recommendations for the Ministry, which continues to hold final decision-making power over 
forestry plans. Thus, through the Ministry of Forests, Provincial Government still has the upper 
hand in the Central Region Board’s final decision-making process.449 Additionally, the statutory 
authority for decision-making is vested in Provincial Government for the majority of co-
management efforts involving forestry.450  
The analysis of the Clayoquot Sound example conducted here emphasizes that there is still a 
struggle to raise Aboriginal interests to equal status with those of the state under Canada’s co-
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management regime. This inevitably falls within the “integration approach” discussed by the Royal 
Commission for Aboriginal People, which expects Aboriginal peoples to conduct their activities 
within existing forest management systems.451 However, co-management arrangements in Canada 
still lack proper definition and rely on Colonial institutional structures for their implementation. In 
short, they are still evolving and there are strong arguments that they merely represent an interim 
measure for the equal sharing of power, rather than an arrangement for co-jurisdiction.452  
Clayoquot Sound is no exception in this regard.  The revitalization of traditional Aboriginal 
structures has yet to gain serious attention in the discourse surrounding co-management efforts in 
Canada. A systemic change in institutional design is still a long way from being a promising 
discourse around these arrangements. The rebuilding of such institutions clearly necessitates 
proactive political initiatives. However, in the majority of cases, the focus is on economic 
development, rather than ensuring the development of a stable institutional arrangement. Even 
joint venture initiatives, such as Lisaak Forest Resources, are merely business ventures, ultimately 
intended to generate profit. Therefore, it could be said that the state still acts as an enforcer, rather 
than a facilitator in Canada. The process of equal constitutional recognition for Aboriginal peoples 
as compared to India is not considered seriously in discussions about the co-management regime 
in this context. As rightly pointed by Claudia Notzke, the legitimization of a co-management 
regime is not drawn from “necessity, common sense, legislation, policy or a sense of social justice, 
but from a constitutionally entrenched right”.453 Thus, Canada’s co-management regime would 
have more relevance if the principle of co-existence was adopted, instead of the present principle 
of assimilation.454  
Conversely, in India, the inclusion of decentralized governance under the 73rd and 74th 
Constitutional amendment represented a crucial step towards decolonization, asserting the rights 
of tribal peoples in forest governance.  It introduced some noteworthy institutional changes, such 
as the FRA, which removed the influences of past Colonial structures. India thus projects a strongly 
decentralized approach, where the Gram Sabhas are not only vested with shared powers but also 
autonomy in decision-making. The FRA offers broad powers to Gram Sabhas over the recognition 
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of forest rights and the conservation and management of CFR. Furthermore, it holds decisions of 
the Gram Sabhas as final on various matters, including decisions to divert forest land for non-
forest activities. Additionally, Gram Sabhas have the authority to constitute the committee that 
prepares the plans for conserving and managing CFR.  
Unlike Clayoquot Sound, the rights vested in Gram Sabhas are against the backdrop of a strong 
FRA legal framework. This bolster claims and binds the Government with the statutory decisions 
of these Gram Sabhas. Meanwhile, the FRA provides a platform for reconstructing the role of 
colonial forest bureaucracy in India. Many tribal communities in this context have taken advantage 
of the opportunity to revitalize their traditional tribal institutions. In the example of Mendha Lekha, 
this has been discussed in detail. Here, importance has been given to reinforcing the Gram Sabha, 
while simultaneously focusing on economic benefits, such as the sale of forest produce like 
bamboo. The enactment of the FRA, which resulted in the devolution of powers to Gram Sabhas, 
is an important step towards the decentralization of India’s forest governance regime. Extensive 
restructuring of the institutional design has consequently contributed to radical transformations of 
decision-making culture in forest governance.  
In both the jurisdictions under study, the legal jurisprudence evolving around the significance of 
Indigenous consent in resource governance has been analyzed. The jurisprudence relating to the 
duty to consult and accommodate in Canada does not provide any space for Aboriginal consent; it 
merely includes consultation, deep consultation and accommodation. However, Mikisew made it 
clear that accommodation may or may not result in an agreement. Similarly, Tsilhqot’in 
legitimized the Crown’s authority to justify infringement under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982. Thus, it could be argued that the space for jurisprudence on the expansion of rights through 
judicial decisions is becoming exhausted in Canada. This could be due to the absence of a 
Constitutional recognition of these rights as compared to India and the lack of a firm statutory 
platform for the courts to exercise their discretion, unlike India. Despite being nascent legislation, 
a promising pattern may nevertheless be observed in the few decisions that have followed India’s 
FRA, irrespective of a general shortage of judgments in this area. The Supreme Court of India, in 
Niyamgiri, underlined the role of the Gram Sabha and its consent in forest resource governance. 
It thereby affirmed the relevance of the duty to consult and obtain consent from tribal peoples on 
matters relating to their land and resources. This could help identify the relative legislative vacuum 
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in Canada as compared to India, which leaves minimal scope for the judiciary to intervene and 
assert the role of Indigenous consent in resource governance.  
The analysis of the above jurisdictions reveals that the legal framework in India is more effective 
for the decentralization of forest governance. The political mobilization that has contributed to the 
strengthening of traditional tribal institutions, the Constitutional recognition of decentralized 
governance, and progressive legislation, such as the FRA granting statutory powers to the Gram 
Sabhas, are just a few of the major factors contributing to this achievement. Among these, the FRA 
has made forest bureaucracy accountable to local tribal institutions and addressed the power 
asymmetries caused by colonial structures.  
The institutional change achieved through this new face of forest governance in India has resulted 
in the redistribution of power away from the center, as envisaged by scholars on decentralization. 
It has consequently provided a platform for achieving equity and long-term sustainability in 
resource governance, while simultaneously strengthening traditional institutional structures.  The 
downward accountability of these institutions ensures autonomy in the decision-making process, 
as argued by scholars such as Ribot. Thus, the role of traditional institutions in resource governance 
is asserted. A strong political will, constitutional recognition of Indigenous rights, empowered 
traditional institutions, and strong decision-making authority vested in these institutions are some 
of the most important factors bolstering democratic decentralization. 
In contrast, although Canada’s co-management regime has initiated some optimistic discourse, it 
is still in the process of evolution and has not yet succeeded in providing equal legal rights to 
Aboriginal peoples. Discretionary power still rests with the provincial governments on various 
critical issues. As such, Canada’s co-management arrangement is in the form of a “privilege” 
granted to communities, rather than a “right”. However, as argued by Ribot, the transfer of power 
to communities in the form of a privilege and not right, leads to upward accountability.455 This has 
been reflected in decentralized governance under Canada’s co-management regime.  
Thus the present comparative analysis exposes how these two countries with a common colonial 
past have responded differently to a demand for the democratic inclusion of Indigenous voices in 
forest resource governance. Thus, it may be concluded that the FRA opens a broader space for the 
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democratic decentralization of forest governance, compared to the co-management regime in 
Canada. In conclusion, the present author ventures that the Indian context at least demonstrates a 
model with the potential to inspire positive change in similar contexts, like Canada, which remains 
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